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I. Introduction
Plaintiffs in civil cases face a host of perplexing tax issues,
including: (1) the amount of any recovery that is properly included in
their gross income;' (2) the amount of deductible expenses incurred;2 and
1. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2002) (defining "gross income" in part to include "all income
from whatever source derived"); id. § 104(a) (providing exclusion from gross income for
categories of recoveries, including worker's compensation awards, compensatory
damages for personal physical injuries or sickness, and certain amounts recovered
through accident or health insurance from gross income).
2. See id. § 162 (allowing deductions for ordinary and necessary business
expenses); id. § 212 (allowing deductions for "ordinary and. necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year... for the production or collection of income."). In
some circumstances, a deduction is not proper and litigation costs must be capitalized.
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(3) the tax year(s) when the recovery and those deductible expenses are
properly taken into account.3 Attempts to resolve these issues through
legislation and litigation have been only partially successful, leaving
some uncertainty for litigants seeking to ascertain the proper tax
treatment of recoveries and the costs of generating them.
As for the first issue-the amount of a recovery characterized as
gross income-the Internal Revenue Code specifically provides an
exclusion from gross income for some recoveries, including
compensatory damages on account of physical personal injuries.4
Recoveries outside the scope of this exclusion remain under a default
rule of taxability, unless some other basis for exclusion can be shown.
5
See id. § 263(a). Deductions may also be disallowed to the extent that they are allocable
to the production of tax-exempt income. See id. § 265(a)(1).
3. See id. § 451 (providing general rule for taxable year of inclusion for gross
income); id. § 461 (providing general rule for taxable year of deduction).
4. See id. § 104(a). After extensive litigation, Congress intervened to clarify the
scope of this limitation. Section 1605(a) of the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, 1838, amended section 104(a)(2) to require
that personal injury or sickness be physical, thus narrowing the exclusion that previously
extended to nonphysical injuries. Id. § 1605(a). Section 1605(b) of the Act clarified that
emotional distress was not to be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness, except
to the extent of medical expenses incurred for treatment. Id. § 1605(b); see I.R.C.
§ 104(a). Civil rights claims had previously generated litigation as to whether the
underlying cause of action was sufficiently tort-like to support an exclusion under section
104. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995); United States v. Burke, 504
U.S. 229 (1992). Section 1605(a) of the Act also clarified that punitive damages were not
within the scope of the exclusion. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 § 1605(a).
An amendment in 1989, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, had previously limited the exclusion for punitive damages in
cases not involving physical injury or sickness. See id. § 7641(a). Lower courts had
reached conflicting conclusions as to whether punitive damages were "on account of'
personal injury before the Supreme Court resolved this issue in O'Gilvie v. United States,
519 U.S. 79 (1996).
5. See Treas. Reg. 1.61-1(a) (1995) ("Gross income means all income from
whatever source derived, unless excluded by law. Gross income includes income
realized in any form, whether in money, property, or services."); see also Downey v.
Comm'r, 33 F.3d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[A]II accessions to wealth are taxable unless
a taxpayer can fit his gain into a statutory exception."); Sparrow v. Comm'r, 949 F.2d
434, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t has long been recognized that [I.R.C. § 61(a)] states a
rule of inclusion. In other words, unless another portion of the Internal Revenue Code
specifically excludes an accession to wealth from taxation, a taxpayer must include it in
his income."); Rickel v. Comm'r, 900 F.2d 655, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[A]ny accession to
wealth is presumed to be gross income, unless the taxpayer can demonstrate that the
accession fits into one of the specific exclusions created by other sections of the IRC.").
In addition to statutory exclusions, a judicially crafted rule is used to evaluate whether
recoveries are accessions to wealth as opposed to a non-taxable return of capital. This
test focuses on the nature of the injury to be compensated: "In lieu of what were the
damages awarded?" Raytheon Prods. Corp. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.
1944). Courts have recognized that the return of capital principle underlies the enactment
of the exclusion for compensatory personal injury damages in the Code. See O'Gilvie,
519 U.S. at 84; Francisco v. United States, 267 F.3d 303, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2001);
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As a result of this tax framework, litigation commonly pursued by
individuals, including claims to vindicate personal rights that do not
involve physical personal injuries or sickness, will often generate taxable
6income.
The tax treatment of a contingent attorney's fee paid in connection
with a taxable recovery has been litigated frequently in the last several
years, with inconsistent results.7 Some courts include the entire recovery
in the client's gross income, while potentially allowing the attorney's fee
as a deduction in computing taxable income. 8 Other courts conclude that
a portion of the recovery representing the attorney's fee is properly
excluded from the client's gross income.
9
Although exclusions and deductions can sometimes produce
equivalent tax results, they often do not in these cases because of
limitations on itemized deductions in computing liability under the
regular income tax and the alternative minimum tax.1" As a result,
taxable recoveries may be taxed at a higher effective rate than other
comparable economic income." In an extreme case, where the ratio of
expenses to the recovery is very high, the resulting tax burden could even
exceed the economic benefit of the recovery.'
2
Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 440.
6. Even litigation rooted in physical personal injuries can generate taxable income
to the extent that punitive damages or interest is a part of the recovery. See, e.g., Bagley
v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 396, 418 (1995), aff'd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997); Kovacs v.
Comm'r, 100 T.C. 124, 128 (1993), affd, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994).
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001); Kenseth v.
Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 369 (4th Cir. 2001);
Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001);
Alexander v. Comm'r, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451
(Fed. Cir. 1995). The IRS has also taken this position in a published ruling. See Rev.
Rul. 80-364, 1980-2 C.B. 294 (treating attorney fee award in case involving back pay as
income to plaintiff). However, it has not consistently applied this position to the case of
particular taxpayers. See AMELIA LEGUTKI ET AL., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 24A:42.12 (Supp. 2001), which points out that the Service computed tax
liabilities in O'Gilvie based on recoveries to the taxpayer net of attorney's fees. See
O'Gilvie, 66 F.3d 1550. Other cases in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits also reflect this
approach. See LEGUTKI ET AL., supra, § 24A:42.12 n.24 (citing Hawkins v. United States,
30 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 1994); Comm'r v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990)); see also
Rice v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (computing tax liability on
recovery for punitive damages net of attorney's fees); McKean v. United States, 33 Fed.
Cl. 535 (1995) (allowing class members to exclude pro rata share of attorney's fees from
income).
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2000); Clarks v. United
States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.
2000).
10. These limitations are discussed in detail in Part III.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part 111.
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Fee-shifting statutes present another area of uncertainty in defining
gross income. Although litigants typically bear the cost of their own
attorney's fees, statutes permit courts to award attorney's fees and
litigation costs to a prevailing party in certain matters, including civil
rights cases. 13 Such awards are made to the client, not to the attorney;
the fee ultimately paid to the attorney depends on the separate
contractual relationship between the attorney and client, which is not
affected by a fee award.
14
Including an award of attorney's fees in the client's gross income
may appear to be consistent with the tax framework associated with other
types of recovery, as the fee award arguably reflects an economic benefit
for the client. However, imposing tax consequences on the client may
produce questionable policy results in this context. Awards under fee-
shifting statutes are not necessarily proportional to the recovery of
monetary damages. 15  For example, civil rights plaintiffs often seek
nonmonetary forms of relief that provide social benefits in addition to
any personal economic recovery.' 6  As some commentators have
suggested, taxing recoveries of attorney's fees in this context has the
potential to undermine enforcement of civil rights laws. 17 However, the
Service has not clearly mapped out its position outside the context of
employment discrimination cases, leaving taxpayers without adequate
guidance as to the proper tax treatment of fee awards in other contexts. 8
Other litigation expenses, such as fees for depositions, expert
witnesses, copying, and filing, also present tax issues for litigants.
Attorneys often finance these costs through making advances on their
clients' behalf, with the expectation of future reimbursement. Clients
must determine when to take these expenses into account for tax
purposes-in the year incurred by their attorney, or in the year a
recovery is obtained. Although the Service has focused on attorneys'
treatment of advances for litigation costs, the client side of this equation
has not received similar attention.' 9 Tax accounting rules applicable to
13. See infra Part lI.B.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil
Rights Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1075 (2000).
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See, e.g., Boccardo v. Comm'r, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing
deductions for costs in connection with "gross fee" contract); Boccardo v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 184 (1987) (disallowing deductions for costs in connection with "net fee"
contract), affd, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995); Rev. Proc. 2002-9, app. § 1A.01, 2002-3
I.R.B. 327 (allowing automatic change in method of accounting for law firms deducting
advances on behalf of clients); Claudia MacLachlan, IRS: Tougher on Expenses, NAT'L
L.J., June 6, 1994, at A6 (describing IRS audit focus on law firms that deduct advances to
20031
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cash method taxpayers can impose harsh results on clients engaged in
multi-year litigation, perhaps even eliminating all tax benefits associated
with these expenditures. However, the Service has also not clearly set
forth a position in enforcing the tax accounting rules in this area, leaving
litigants in a state of uncertainty.
This article explores the tax treatment of costs and attorney's fees in
the context of civil litigation. Both attorneys and their clients need to
understand the application of tax rules in this context, as tax
consequences potentially affect the economic viability of litigation.
Policymakers also need to understand the problems in this area, so that
they can make appropriate decisions about rulemaking and enforcement
efforts.
Part II provides background on contingent fee agreements and fee-
shifting statutes, which is helpful to understanding the lawyer-client
relationship and the context in which these tax issues arise. Part III
illustrates the significance of different tax accounting treatments on
attorney's fees and expenses, including the potential to impose tax
burdens on a successful litigant that exceed the net economic benefit
from a recovery. Part IV explores the parameters of the assignment of
income principle and competing judicial approaches to applying it to
contingent fee agreements. It also examines another paradigm-
capitalization-as an alternative approach to resolving that issue. Part V
addresses current rules governing litigation costs advanced by attorneys
on behalf of their clients, including the practical problems for clients if
such rules are strictly applied in the context of multi-year litigation. Part
VI offers concluding observations and recommendations for legislative
and administrative reform, including the adoption of an optional
capitalization method of accounting for attorney's fees and litigation
costs.
II. Financing Litigation: Fees, Costs, and the Lawyer-Client
Relationship
Under the so-called "American Rule," parties to litigation are
ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees, regardless of the
outcome of litigation. 20 Legislative modifications of this common-law
rule have occurred through the enactment of fee-shifting statutes, which
clients). This topic is addressed in Part V.
20. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Home Care, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) ("In the United States, parties are ordinarily
required to bear their own attorney's fees-the prevailing party is not entitled to collect
from the loser. Under this 'American Rule,' we follow 'a general practice of not
awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit statutory authority.").
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provide relief to prevailing parties with certain types of claims.2'
However, fee-shifting statutes do not necessarily abrogate lawyer-client
agreements, which often still include contingent fee provisions, as to the
amount and mode of payment. Contingent fee agreements, fee-shifting
statutes, and their effects on lawyer-client relationships are discussed
below.
A. Contingent Fee Agreements
Fee agreements between attorneys and their clients can be based on
any number of factors, but two approaches are common in civil
litigation: "certain" fees based on fixed or hourly charges, or
"contingent" fees based on a percentage of the recovery obtained.22
Under a certain fee structure, clients are expected to pay legal fees
regardless of the result obtained, thus forcing the client to bear the
23
primary financial risk of the litigation. Contingent fee agreements
allow clients who are unwilling or unable to finance their own litigation
to pursue their claims by promising a portion of any future recovery to
the attorney in exchange for the attorney's assumption of financial risk
associated with attorney's fees and, in some cases, other associated costs
of pursuing the litigation.24 These agreements may create a lien in favor
of the attorney on any recovery, although the nature of that lien may
21. See id. Courts may also possess an inherent power to award attorney's fees on
some occasions, including to sanction a party bringing a frivolous claim or to achieve
equity by rewarding a litigant whose actions benefit others. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (stating that court's inherent fee-shifting powers not abrogated by
fee-shifting statutes).
22. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1992) (characterizing
fee agreements as "certain," "contingent," or a combination thereof); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS § 6-1.1 to .2, at 92-94 (2000) (discussing reasonable billing
approaches).
23. The attorney may bear a risk of nonpayment associated with extending credit to
the client, but this risk can be reduced or eliminated through security agreements, such as
retainer fees paid in advance to cover costs and fees. Cf Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617, 633 n.10 (1989) (noting criminal cases may have results
similar to contingent fees when forfeiture statute applies to funds paid as retainer).
24. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 122 S. Ct. 1817, 1829 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
For it is in the nature of a contingent-fee agreement to gamble on outcome and
hours of work-assigning the risk of an unsuccessful outcome to the attorney,
in exchange for a percentage of the recovery from a successful outcome that
will (because of the risk of loss the attorney has borne) be higher, and perhaps
much higher, than what the attorney would receive in hourly billing for the
same case. That is why, in days when obtaining justice in the law courts was
thought to be less of a sporting enterprise, contingent fees were unlawful.
Id.; see also ROBERT L. Rossi, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 2.13, at 2-40 (3d ed. 2001) ("The
advancement of litigation expenses by an attorney handling a case on a contingent fee
basis has become a widespread practice.").
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differ under state law.
25
Contingent fee arrangements are exceptions to ancient prohibitions
against the practices of maintenance and champerty.26 Such prohibitions
are rooted in concerns that financing another's legal claims and
transferring rights affecting such claims to someone besides the claimant
may encourage frivolous, harassing litigation.27 Modem rules of
professional ethics have relaxed these constraints considerably, 28 but they
still affect many aspects of modem litigation practices, including the
terms of the lawyer-client relationship and the conduct of non-lawyers in
financing litigation.29
Although accommodating contingent fees, the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 30 continue to recognize and support the ideal of
25. Rossi, supra note 24, § 12.3 (noting that state law generally governs attorney
lien issues, although federal law may govern in federal question case); id. §§ 12.4-.8
(explaining types of attorney liens).
26. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 425 (1978) ("Put simply, maintenance is helping
another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest
in the outcome; and barratry is a continuing practice of maintenance or champerty.").
27. See Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiff's Lawsuits: An Increasingly
Popular (and Legal) Business, 33 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM. 57, 58 (2000); see also Paul D.
Carrington, Your Imperial First Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1167, 1189 (2001).
There is also a public interest of ancient dignity expressed in laws against
champerty ... that accords with widely shared moral judgment in forestalling
activities seeking to cause or perpetuate civil disputes. While it is fairly
contended that much litigation is in the public interest and ought to be
promoted, there are many claims that potential plaintiffs are ill-advised to
assert, not only because they lack merit, but also because the transaction cost,
in heartache as well as treasure, makes their assertion improvident even if
successful.
Id.
28. For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct generally proscribe
contingent fees in connection with criminal and domestic relations matters. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (1983). However, not all commentators accept the
policy rationale for restricting contingent fees in these circumstances. See, e.g.,
ROTUNDA, supra note 22, §§ 6-3.4 to .5 (noting critiques); Lindsey N. Godfrey, Note,
Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Common Sense Approach to
Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1699, 1699 (2001) (discussing ban on contingent fees
in criminal cases); State Bar of Mont., Ethics Op. 990119 (1999) (stating that
contingency fee prohibition in domestic relations is based on policy that lawyer-client fee
arrangement should not discourage reconciliation between the parties); see also Martin,
supra note 27 (discussing emerging legal methods of financing litigation).
29. See Michael Reese, The Use of Legal Malpractice Claims as Security Under the
UCC Revised Article 9, 20 REv. LITIG. 529, 534-35 (2001) (discussing prohibition in
UCC Article 9 on assignment of security interest in personal injury claim as a vestige of
rules against champerty and maintenance).
30. As of the end of 1999, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct have been
adopted as the law governing lawyers by most states. See ROTUNDA, supra note 22, at
§ 1-1.5.4. As one treatise points out, "the Model Rules have frequently been cited as
evidence of the law in various court decisions, even if the jurisdiction did not formally
adopt a version of the Model Rules." Id. The predecessor of the Model Rules, the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, is still used as the foundation for professional
[Vol. 107:3
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client autonomy over settling their lawsuits. For example, the Model
Rules specify that clients cannot waive the right to settle the litigation or
to fire their lawyer.3' Moreover, they prohibit a lawyer from acquiring
an interest in the litigation beyond that related to a reasonable contingent
fee:
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action
or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client,
except that the lawyer may: (1) acquire a lien granted by law to
secure the lawyer's fees or expenses; and (32) contract with a client for
a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
As for a lawyer's practice of financing litigation costs for clients,
the Model Rules limit the scope of financial assistance that a lawyer may
provide:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that: (1) a
lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter;
and (2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.33
governance in states not adopting the Model Rules. Id. For convenience, the discussion
below will focus on the Model Rules, although Model Code provisions may be
mentioned for comparative purposes.
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."); id. 1.2 cmt. 5
("[T]he client may not be asked to... surrender the right to terminate the lawyer's
services or the right to settle litigation that the lawyer might wish to continue."); see also
id. 1.16 (requiring the lawyer to withdraw from representation if discharged by the
client). Settlement concerns create an obvious conflict of interest for lawyers in
contingent fee cases, which is presumably the basis for Model Rule 1.2. Contingent fee
agreements nevertheless may require a client not to settle without the attorney's consent.
See, e.g., Boccardo v. Comm'r, 56 F.3d 1016, 1017 (9th Cir. 1995) (approving fee
agreement that required that "no settlement shall be made without the consent of the
parties hereto"); Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 401 (2000) (stating that "client will
not compromise or settle the case without the written consent of the attorneys"), aff'd,
259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, as a practical matter, a requirement, such as that
found in Boccardo, which provides that, "[s]hould client discharge said Law Firm for any
reason, client, upon demand, shall pay to said Law Firm reasonable value for its services
to date of discharge," would impose a significant limitation on exercising a right of
termination. See Boccardo, 56 F.3d at 1017. From 1951-1983, the law firm was
terminated by less than 1% of its clients. See id.
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.80); see also id. 1.8 cmt 6 (indicating
that paragraph 0) "has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance").
33. Id. 1.8(e). Professor Ronald D. Rotunda explains that this provision allowing
contingent repayment of litigation expenses modifies the Model Code of Professional
Conduct's requirement that clients would remain obligated to reimburse these advances.
See ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 9-6. This modification is thought to "better reflect what
lawyers do in practice." Id. However, as Professor Rotunda points out elsewhere, "the
2003]
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Advances beyond the scope of this rule, such as the payment of a client's
living expenses, may subject a lawyer to professional discipline.
34
Contingent fee practices are commonly justified as a means of
expanding access to the courts by those who would otherwise lack the
resources to finance their own litigation. As one commentator has
observed:
The champerty doctrine, which prohibits the purchase of litigation
rights, is based on longstanding fears that champertors will encourage
frivolous litigation, harass defendants, increase damages, and resist
settlement. In spite of the fears, however, exceptions to the
prohibition on champerty have been commonplace because of a
recognition that without third party support some meritorious
plaintiffs who lacked the financial wherewithal would not be able to
litigate their claims.
35
Others also repeat this justification:
Unafford[a]bility has been described as one of the major failings of
the contemporary United States legal system. Consequently, out of
necessity, the applicable rules of ethics have long permitted an
attorney to pay litigation expenses on behalf of his client, despite the
fact that such a practice-where an attorney accepts a case in return
for a percentage of any award or settlement-is clearly champertous.
The contingency fee has been accepted because it remains the only
viable way for claimants with limited means to get through the court
doors and sidestep the "American Rule" that, in the absence of a
specific common law or statutory exception providing for fee-
shifting, requires each party in litigation to pay its own attorneys'
fees. Contingency fees have been accepted and approved by the
American Bar Association, which noted that such arrangements do
Model Code, as an ethical aspiration, provided that the lawyer 'should not sue a client for
a fee unless necessary to prevent fraud or gross imposition by the client."' Id. § 6-6.3.2
n. 18 (citation omitted). Thus, as a practical matter, it is possible that attorneys in Model
Code states may not enforce client obligations to repay advances for litigation costs, even
though professional responsibility rules may impose such obligations.
34. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Smollen, 17 P.3d 456 (Okla. 2000)
(upholding disciplinary action to attorney loaning money to client for living expenses
after home destroyed by fire). The Oklahoma Supreme Court notes that only eight states
expressly allow attorneys to advance or guarantee loans to clients for living expenses. Id.
at 460-61 n.16-23 (citing modified versions of MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.8(e)). Fourteen states follow the Model Code or a version of the Model Code that
requires a client to remain liable for any advances of litigation costs and prohibits
advances for living expenses. See id at 460; see also Elizabeth J. Cohen, Affairs of the
Heart: Lawyers May Find That No Good Deed Goes Unregulated, ABA J., Aug. 2001, at
66 (noting that several states have amended MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)
to permit lawyers to advance medical or living expenses in the case of hardship, though
the lawyer "may not ... advertise that he'll do so").
35. Martin, supra note 27, at 58 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 107:3
TAXING PLAINTIFFS
not violate ethical standards as long as they are "appropriate and
reasonable" and clients are fully informed of appropriate alternative
billing arrangements. 
3 6
Contingent fees are frequently used to finance civil litigation,
particularly tort claims.37  In some cases, contingent fee arrangements
have become the standard approach, regardless of whether the client can
afford another fee structure. 38  Even if an alternative fee structure is
available, evaluating the comparative returns of a contingent fee versus a
certain fee can be quite difficult for a layperson.39 Perceived economic
36. Sarah Northway, Non-Traditional Class Action Financing and Traditional Rules
of Ethics: Time for a Compromise, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 241, 245 (2000) (footnotes
omitted); see also ROTUNDA, supra note 22, § 6-3.6 ("A commonly articulated
justification of contingent fees is that they allow poorer litigants to hire competent
lawyers and pay them out of the judgment won."); Kristin A. Poreu, Protecting the Poor:
The Dangers of Altering the Contingency Fee System, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 149, 149 (2001) ("The contingency fee system developed from a once illegal
practice to an essential element of the American Legal system that allows people who
could not otherwise afford an attorney to gain access to the courts."); Neil Rickman,
Contingent Fees and Litigation Settlement, 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 295, 295 (1999)
("Contingent fees are widely used to pay for lawyers' services in the United States,
particularly in personal injury actions. Policy debate tends to justify this on the (equity)
ground of ensuring wide access to justice."); Todd A. Twyman, In Defense of the
Contingent Fee, W. VA. LAW., Dec. 1999, at 12 ("The contingency fee is often referred to
as the poor man's key to the courthouse."); Tony A. Freyer, Peter Karsten, Heart Versus
Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America, 18 LAW & HIST. REv. 236, 237
(2000) (book review) ( "Under traditional English common law procedure, litigation
costs were paid by the losing party. In addition, the rule against champerty prevented
lawyers from agreeing to represent plaintiffs by making payment for services dependent
entirely upon a successfully [sic] verdict. Only in America were these principles
universally rejected to the benefit of poorer plaintiffs. Thus lawyers would cover the
initial litigation costs, receiving nothing if plaintiffs lost, but a substantial percentage of
the verdict if they won.").
37. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Legal-Process Constraints on the Regulation of
Lawyers' Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 371, 371 (1998) ("Unlike their
counterparts in other countries and certain other professions, lawyers in the United States
have long been permitted to charge contingent fees. With lawyers now representing
plaintiffs on a contingent fee basis in most of the roughly one million tort cases that are
filed each year, the practice is more common than ever.") (footnotes omitted); Kenneth L.
Jorgensen, Regulating Contingent Fees in No-Fault Cases, BENCH & B. OF MINN., July
2000, at 18 ("Contingent fees are the norm for lawyers representing plaintiffs in personal
injury cases."); Winand Emons, Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Insufficient Attorney
Effort, 20 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 21, 21 (2000) ("In a typical tort case in the United
States the plaintiffs attorney receives her compensation in the form of a contingent fee.
Under this payment scheme, the attorney gets a share of the judgment if her client wins
and nothing if her client loses. A common practice is to use a sliding scale: the attorney
gets one third if the case is settled without trial, 40% if the plaintiff wins at trial, and 50%
if a judgment for the plaintiff is affirmed on appeal.").
38. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 400 (2000) (noting that plaintiff in
age discrimination class action had no choice but to accept contingent fee contract
adopted by law firm), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
39. See Emons, supra note 37, at 21-23 (recognizing difference in expertise between
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incentives associated with linking the lawyer's reward to results obtained
may also favor a contingent fee approach, although this is difficult to
evaluate given the many different circumstances presented.4 ° Contingent
fee arrangements may also be the only practical means to compensate
attorneys in connection with class action lawsuits involving many clients
with relatively small individual claims.4'
B. Fee-Shifting Statutes
Fee-shifting statutes provide another means to finance litigation
through allowing the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees from the
defendant in certain cases. As the Supreme Court has explained, "the
aim of such statutes was to enable private parties to obtain legal help in
seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened
violation of specific federal laws. ' ' 2  More than one hundred federal
statutes contain fee-shifting provisions,43 and claims rooted in civil
rights, environmental, and even federal tax law may be affected.4 4 In
addition to these federal statutes, state laws also provide for fee-
shifting.45
In the context of civil rights statutes, the Supreme Court has
explained that fee-shifting statutes serve important compensatory
purposes for victims of discrimination, but they also serve broader policy
goals:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 embodies a national commitment to
eradicate discrimination. Congress intended not only "to make the
wrongdoers pay at law," but more broadly to make victims of
attorney and client and need for client to rely upon attorney as "expert").
40. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Contingency Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEG. STUD.
503 (1996).
41. See Northway, supra note 36, at 241 (characterizing contingency fee as "the
standard form of class action financing"). This author also asserts that the high litigation
costs coupled with the long lag times between filing and resolving the case make it
difficult for attorneys to finance large class actions. See id. at 247-48.
42. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565
(1986).
43. See id. at 562.
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2002) (Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988); id. § 12205 (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); id. § 2000a-3(b) (Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964); id. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); id. § 1988(b) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976); id. § 7604(d)
(Clean Air Act); 26 U.S.C. § 7430(a)(2) (Internal Revenue Code). An extensive list of
fee-shifting statutes is found in an appendix to Justice Brennan's dissent in Marek v.
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985).
45. See, e.g., Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying New
Jersey fee-shifting statute in connection with employment discrimination claim);
McGinnis v. Ky. Fried Chicken, 51 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying Washington fee-
shifting statute in connection with employment discrimination claim).
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discrimination whole. Given the scarcity of public resources
available for enforcement, individuals injured by discrimination serve
as "the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority."' Congress recognized
that victims of discrimination often lack the resources to retain paid
counsel, and frequently are unable to attract lawyers on a contingency
basis because many victims seek injunctive relief rather than
pecuniary damages. It therefore enacted § 706(k) [codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(k)] to ensure that victims of
discrimination could obtain lawyers to bring suits necessary to
vindicate their rights and to rovide victorious plaintiffs with fully
compensatory attorney's fees.
Similarly, in the case of the Clean Air Act, the Court noted that the
applicable fee-shifting provision shared a common purpose with civil
rights provisions "to promote citizen enforcement of important federal
policies., 47 In particular, the Court noted that Congress had "urged the
courts to 'recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this section
citizens would be performing a public service and in such instances the
courts should award costs of litigation to such party.',48
Litigation to vindicate federal rights supported by fee-shifting
awards is thus not strictly analogous to tort cases seeking compensatory
relief that are financed by contingent fee agreements. As the Supreme
Court has explained in the civil rights context:
[W]e have not accepted the contention that fee awards in § 1983
damages cases should be modeled upon the contingent-fee
arrangements used in personal injury litigation. "[W]e reject the
notion that a civil rights action for damages constitutes nothing more
than a private tort suit benefiting only the individual plaintiffs whose
rights were violated. Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights
plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights
that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms."
49
Fee awards thus provide both personal and public benefits. A
prevailing party may be awarded attorney's fees whether that party
recovers damages or pursues equitable relief.50 In evaluating the amount
46. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 772 (1989) (citations
omitted).
47. Del. Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 560.
48. Id.
49. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989) (quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (plurality)).
50. See id. at 95-96 ("[Section 1988 of Title 42] makes no distinction between
actions for damages and suits for equitable relief Congress has elected to encourage
meritorious civil rights claims because of the benefits for such litigation for the named
plaintiff and for society at large, irrespective of whether the action seeks monetary
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of the award, a court must consider the extent of success achieved by the
attorney. 51 However, success is not measured solely by the amount of
damages recovered. In City of Riverside v. Rivera,52 a plurality of the
Court stated that the amount of damages is "only one of many factors
that a court should consider in calculating an award of attorney's fees.
We reject the proposition that fee awards under § 1988 should
necessarily be proportionate to the amount of damages a civil rights
plaintiff actually recovers., 53
In Rivera, the plaintiffs were "eight Chicano individuals" who
brought claims for damages and injunctive relief under federal civil
rights statutes and state law theories against the City of Riverside, its
police chief, and several police officers. 54  The plaintiffs ultimately
abandoned their claim for injunctive relief, but they prevailed on thirty-
seven of their claims, including eleven violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and twenty-six claims under state law.55 The jury awarded damages of
$13,300 for their federal claims, and $20,050 for their state-law claims.
56
In addition, the court awarded $245,456.25 as attorney's fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988. 57
The defendants appealed only the fee award, which the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.58 The case reached the Supreme Court on the issue of
whether such an award is "per se 'unreasonable' within the meaning of
the statute if it exceeds the amount of damages recovered by the plaintiff
in the underlying civil rights action., 59 A majority of the Court answered
this question in the negative. 60 Even Justice Powell, who concurred only
in the judgment, separately stated that a rule of proportionality was not
proper:
damages.").
51. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).
52. 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality).
53. Id. at 574. Justice Powell joined in the judgment, but did not join in the plurality
opinion. See id. at 581 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. See id. at 564; id. at 581-82 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
55. See id. at 564-65. It should be noted that the district court judge opined on the
record that he would have granted the claim for injunctive relief if it had been pursued,
even though it would have simply required the police to obey the law, as the behavior of
the officers in question "warranted an injunction." Id. at 565 n.1.
56. Id. at 564-65.
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 564.
60. See id. at 581 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that plurality
opinion rejects a strict rule that attorney's fees under section 1988 be proportionate to
damages recovered). Justice Powell did not agree with the plurality's expansive reading
of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 451 U.S. 952 (1983), but there is no question that he agreed with
the rejection of a rule of proportionality.
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Petitioners argue for a rule of proportionality between the fee
awarded and the damages recovered in a civil rights case. Neither the
decisions of this Court nor the legislative history of § 1988 support
such a "rule." The facts and circumstances of litigation are infinitely
variable. Under [Hensley v. Eckerhart], of course, "the most critical
factor [in the final determination of fee awards] is the degree of
success obtained." Where recovery of private damages is the purpose
of a civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated
to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as
compared to the amount sought. In some civil rights cases, however,
the court may consider the vindication of constitutional rights in
addition to the amount of damages recovered. In this case, for
example, the District Court made an explicit finding that the "public
interest" had been served by the jury's verdict that the warrantless
entry was lawless and unconstitutional. Although the finding of a
Fourth Amendment violation hardly can be considered a new
constitutional ruling, in the special circumstances of this case, the
vindication of the asserted Fourth Amendment right may well have
served a public interest, supporting the amount of the fees awarded.
6 1
Justice Powell also noted: "It probably will be the rare case in which an
award of private damages can be said to benefit the public interest to an
extent that would justify the disproportionality between damages and
fees reflected in this case., 62  However, the paradigm for awarding a
reasonable fee in cases like this one shows that it is entirely possible for a
prevailing party to recover an award for attorney's fees that can exceed
the amount of damages actually recovered.63
It is important to note that an award of attorney's fees under a fee-
shifting statute specifically belongs to the party-that is, the client.64
61. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 585-86 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations
omitted).
62. Id. at 586 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. See e.g., Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 194 (7th Cir. 1994)
(affirming trial court's award in employment discrimination of $10,000 in back wages,
$3294.95 in costs, and $58,480.87 in attorney's fees and ordering employer to provide
neutral reference); Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (affirming a
nominal award of $1 against warden to four prisoners who were subjected to sexual
assaults, but upholding an award of attorney's fees in the sum of $94,680).
64. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2002) (stating that the "[court] in its discretion may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs") (emphasis added); id. § 2000e-5(k) (same); Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001) (stating
that "[n]umerous federal statutes allow courts to award attorney's fees and courts to a
'prevailing party'); Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1990) ("Section 1988
makes the prevailing party eligible for a discretionary award of attorney's fees. Because
it is the party, rather than the lawyer, who is so eligible, we have consistently maintained
that fees may be awarded under § 1988 even to those plaintiffs who did not need them to
maintain their litigation, either because they were fortunate enough to be able to retain
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Clients' fee agreements with their attorneys are separate matters from the
amounts the defendants must pay under section 1988. As the Court
explained in Blanchard v. Bergeron:
65
As we understand [42 U.S.C.] § 1988's provision for allowing a
"reasonable attorney's fee," it contemplates reasonable
compensation, in light of all of the circumstances, for the time and
effort expended by the attorney for the prevailing plaintiff, no more
and no less. Should a fee agreement provide less than a reasonable
fee calculated in this manner, the defendant should nevertheless be
required to pay the higher amount. The defendant is not, however,
required to pay the amount called for in a contingent-fee contract if it
is more than a reasonable fee calculated in the usual way. It is true
that the purpose of § 1988 was to make sure that competent counsel
was available to civil rights plaintiffs, and it is of course arguable that
if a plaintiff is able to secure an attorney on the basis of a contingent
or other fee agreement, the purpose of the statute is served if the
plaintiff is bound by his contract. On that basis, however, the
plaintiff should recover nothing from the defendant, which would be
plainly contrary to the statute. And Congress implemented its
purpose by broadly requiring all defendants to pay a reasonable fee to
all prevailing plaintiffs, if ordered to do so by the court. Thus it is
that a plaintiffs recovery will not be reduced by what he must pay
his counsel. Plaintiffs who can afford to hire their own lawyers, as
well as impecunious litigants, may take advantage of this provision.
And where there are lawyers or organizations that will take a
plaintiffs case without compensation, that fact does not bar the
award of a reasonable fee. All of this is consistent with and reflects
our decisions in cases involving court-awarded attorney's fees.
66
In Venegas v. Mitchell,67 the court clarified that an award of
attorney's fees under section 1988 did not abrogate a private contract for
fees between lawyer and client:
[N]either Blanchard nor any other of our cases has indicated that §
1988, by its own force, protects plaintiffs from having to pay what
they have contracted to pay, even though their contractual liability is
greater than the statutory award that they may collect from losing
opponents. Indeed, depriving plaintiffs of the option of promising to
pay more than the statutory fee if that is necessary to secure counsel
of their choice would not further § 1988's general purpose of
counsel on a fee-paying basis or because they were represented free of charge by
nonprofit legal aid organizations. We have therefore accepted, at least implicitly, that
statutory awards of fees can coexist with private fee arrangements.") (citations omitted).
65. 489 U.S. 87 (1989).
66. Id. at 93-94.
67. 495 U.S. 82 (1990).
[Vol. 107:3
TAXING PLAINTIFFS
enabling such plaintiffs in civil rights cases to secure competent
counsel.
In sum, § 1988 controls what the losing defendant must pay, not
what the prevailing plaintiff must pay his lawyer. What a plaintiff
may be bound to pay and what an attorney is free to collect under a
fee agreement are not necessarily measured by the "reasonable
attorney's fee" that a defendant must pay pursuant to a court order.




Although the so-called "American Rule" ordinarily requires
litigants to bear their own attorney's fees, a different practice has
emerged with respect to other costs of litigation. 69 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d) permits courts to award costs to a prevailing party in
litigation. 70  However, this power under Rule 54 is statutorily
constrained. 7' Expenditures that may be taxed as costs are limited to the
following categories:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic
transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
68. Id. at 89-90.
69. For history of the development of statutory authority for awarding litigation
costs to prevailing parties, see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759-61
(1980) (tracing origins of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1927 to federal legislation enacted in 1813
and 1853), and Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 (1975)
(tracing awards of costs and attomey fees from 1215 England to modem statutes,
including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920-1921).
70. Rule 54(d)(1) provides in part:
Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the
United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs
against the United States, its officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the
extent permitted by law. Such costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day's
notice.
FED R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Other rules may also allow costs and fees to be shifted between
parties based on factors other than prevailing in the litigation. See id. 68 (shifting costs
incurred after settlement proposal based on whether result obtained exceeds such
proposal); id. 37(b) (shifting costs and attorney's fees as sanction for misconduct in
discovery); id. 11 (shifting costs and attorney's fees as a sanction for misconduct in
pleadings).
71. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987).
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(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special
interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.72
Another statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, further circumscribes an award
of costs for witnesses by limiting appearance fees for witnesses to $40
per day.73  Although fees paid to expert witnesses may exceed this
limitation, such fees are not recoverable without explicit statutory
authority. 74  Some fee-shifting statutes, including 42 U.S.C. §' 1988,
75
specifically provide that expert witness fees may be awarded to a
prevailing party.76
Certain other costs, such as attorney travel, telephone, and postage
expenses, may fall outside the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, but may be
allowable nevertheless under a fee-shifting statute, such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. Such costs will be considered as a component of attorney's fees
"when it is the custom of attorneys in the local community to bill their
clients separately for them., 77 However, if such expenses are properly
considered an overhead cost of the attorney, they are not recoverable.78
Separate from the issue of cost recovery is the matter of financing
the payment of these costs and the ultimate responsibility for payment.
Attorneys commonly incur litigation costs on behalf of their clients with
the expectation that the client is ultimately responsible for payment. As
stated in one treatise:
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2002).
73. Seeid § 1821(b).
74. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87 (1991) ("None of
the categories listed in § 1920 can reasonably be read to include fees for services
rendered by an expert employed by a party in a nontestimonial advisory capacity.");
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("Section
113 [of the Civil Rights Act of 1991] legislatively reverses West Virginia University
Hospital, Inc. v. Casey by permitting recovery of expert fees as part of the attorney's fee
award.").
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) ("In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of
this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981 a of
this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney's
fee."). This provision was added in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Casey,
which concluded that a failure to include expert witness fees in the then-applicable
version of section 1988 indicated that no such fees could be awarded. See Casey, 499
U.S. at 87-92.
76. See Casey, 499 U.S. at 88-92 (citing examples of fee-shifting statutes that
specifically identify and address attorney's fees and expert witness fees as separate
items).
77. See Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995) (treating
reproduction expenses, telephone expenses of the attorney, travel time and expenses of
the attorney, and postage as outside the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920, but allowable under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a cost in a civil rights case).
78. See id. at 1225-26 n.27.
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The client, and not the attorney, is ultimately liable for the
reasonable and proper expenses incurred incident to the preparation
and trial of a case, and thus an attorney may bind his client to pay for
such expenses incurred by the attorney. If the attorney has advanced
money for the proper and necessary expenses, he may recover the
amount thereof from his client. The right of an attorney to be
reimbursed for expenses of litigation, it has been held, follows as a
matter of law from his making the advances for the benefit of the
litigation he lias been employed to conduct, even where his
employment was under a contingent fee agreement and the agreement
was silent as to expenses.79
As discussed above,80 the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct contemplate that attorneys may advance costs on behalf of their
clients, and that a client's obligation for repayment may be contingent
upon success in the matter.81 Thus, depending on the particulars of the
attorney-client agreement, an attorney may effectively become a creditor
by paying costs on the client's behalf. Moreover, these costs may be
incurred in a different tax year than the recovery. Such timing
differences could impact an attorney's and/or a client's federal tax
obligations for a particular tax year. The significance of different tax
accounting treatments for costs and legal fees is illustrated below.
III. Why Taxation and Timing Matter: The Significance of Tax
Accounting for Fees and Costs
The appropriate tax treatment of recoveries, including associated
attorney's fees and litigation costs, typically involves three important
issues: (1) the amount of any recovery that is ultimately included in
gross income; (2) the amount of expenses allowed as a deduction from
gross income; and (3) the proper tax year for taking into account income
and expenses. Resolution of these issues impacts the economic benefits
resulting from litigation, and could even affect a client's assessment of
"success" in litigation, as measured from an economic perspective.
79. Rossi, supra note 24, § 1.27, at 1-79 (footnotes omitted).
80. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
81. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1983). Professor Rotunda
explains that this provision modifies a requirement in the Model Code of Professional
Conduct that required clients to reimburse fees advanced by the lawyer. See ROTUNDA,
supra note 22, § 9-6, at 262. The modification in Rule 1.8(e) is thought "better [to]
reflect what lawyers do in practice." Id. However, while an attorney may choose to
permit contingent liability for fees and expenses, he or she would presumably still be free
to structure an arrangement in which the client continued to be liable for expenses. See
generally Rossi, supra note 24, § 3.13 (noting that "courts commonly have upheld
agreements under which an attorney merely advanced expenses, with the client remaining
liable irrespective of the outcome of the litigation").
2003]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Section A illustrates the significance of the tax accounting approach
adopted for attorney's fees on the ultimate tax burdens imposed on a
"successful" litigant. Section B illustrates the significance of tax
accounting approaches with respect to litigation costs other than
attorney's fees.
A. Taxation Matters: Are Recoveries of Attorney's Fees Considered
Gross Income for the Client?
Courts have approached recoveries under a contingent fee
agreement in two different ways: (1) excluding the fee portion of the
recovery from the client's income, or (2) including the entire recovery in
the client's gross income, and then treating the attorney's fee as a
potentially deductible expense.82 At first glance, one may view these
different approaches as paths that ultimately conjoin to reach the same
result. Deductions in computing taxable income and exclusions from
gross income can produce equivalent tax results. 83 However, statutory
limitations on deductions applicable to individuals result in significant
disparities in these cases.
For taxpayers with taxable recoveries that are not connected with a
trade or business (other than that of being an employee), the deduction
allowable for attorney's fees is a "miscellaneous itemized deduction.,
8 4
Such deductions are subject to limitations that reduce their value,
including the so-called "two percent floor, ' '8' an overall limitation on
itemized deductions contained in section 67 of the Code,86 and a
provision eliminating their deductibility for purposes of computing the
alternative minimum tax.8 7  As illustrated below, these limitations
effectively raise the tax rates on recoveries above those applied to
income from business or similar profit-seeking activities. Section one
82. See cases cited supra notes 8-9.
83. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 407 (2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th
Cir. 2001).
84. "Itemized deductions" are defined to include "deductions allowable under this
chapter other than (1) the deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income, and
(2) the deduction for personal exemptions provided by section 151." I.R.C. § 63(d)
(2002). Expenses for the production of income, which are deductible under section 212
for those who are not carrying on a trade or business, are not among the categories of
expenses enumerated in the computation of "adjusted gross income." See id. § 62(a).
Thus, they are considered "itemized deductions." They are considered "miscellaneous
itemized deductions" because they are not included among the enumerated categories of
itemized deductions excluded from that category. See id. § 67(b).
85. See id. § 67(a).
86. See id. § 68(a) (reducing allowable itemized deductions for upper-income
taxpayers).
87. See id. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i).
[Vol. 107:3
TAXING PLAINTIFFS
illustrates their impact on a recovery by a "lower-income" client.88
Section two illustrates the impact of these provisions on a higher-income
client subject to additional deduction limitations.
1. What Is at Stake: The "Lower-Income" Client
Disparities under alternative reporting approaches may be best
illustrated by the following example. Susie Client is a single taxpayer
with no children who recovered $100,000 in settlement of a defamation
claim during the 2002 tax year. 89 Her attorney receives a fee of 40% of
the total recovery, leaving Client with $60,000 from her recovery before
computing any federal income tax liability. Client also earned $30,000
in taxable compensation during the taxable year, and she had itemized
deductions other than attorney's fees totaling $4700.90
Client's gross income, applicable deductions, and taxable income
would be computed as follows if she were able to exclude the attorney's
fees from her taxable income (Alternative A) or if she included the entire
recovery in her taxable income and was allowed a miscellaneous
itemized deduction for attorney's fees (Alternative B):
Alternative Alternative Difference
A (Exclude) B (Deduct) (A-B)
Gross Income:
Recovery $60,000 $100,000 $(40,000)
Compensation $30,000 $30,000 $ -
Adjusted Gross Income $90,000 $130,000 $(40,000)
Less:
Personal Exemption91 $3000 $3000 $ -
Less: Net Itemized Deductions
Total Itemized Deductions $4700 $44,700 $(40,000)
Less: 2% of AGI
(Alternative B)92  $2600 $(2600)
Net Itemized Deductions $4700 $42,100 $(37,400)
88. For this purpose, "lower-income client" refers to a client who is not affected by
the overall limitation on itemized deductions imposed by I.R.C. § 68, which is explored
in Part II1.A.2.
89. See Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3.01 tbl. 3, 2001-2 C.B. 623 (providing table for
determination of applicable rates for unmarried individuals other than surviving spouses
and heads of households).
90. This amount is equal to the standard deduction for a single filer. See id. § 3.07.
For purposes of this example, assume that such deductions are not "miscellaneous
itemized deductions."
91. See I.R.C. § 151; Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3.11, 2001-2 C.B. 623.
92. See I.R.C. § 67.
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Taxable Income $82,300 $84,900 $(2600)
Total Tax93  $19,005 $19,785 $(780)
Tax on Compensation 94  $3045 $3045 $ -
Tax on Recovery 95  $15,960 $16,740 $(780)
Economic Income from
Recovery $60,000 $60,000 $ -
Effective Tax Rate on Recovery 26.60% 27.90% -1.30%
In this example, the $780 difference in tax liability between these
two alternatives is attributed to section 67 of the Code, which limits
miscellaneous itemized deductions to amounts that exceed 2% of
adjusted gross income. Client was able to deduct only $37,400 instead of
the entire $40,000 of attorney's fees incurred to realize the recovery. At
her highest marginal tax rate of 30%, that $2600 in lost deduction
translated to $780 in additional tax.
At this income level, the amount of additional "regular" income
tax96 in Alternative B appears rather modest: The regular tax rate
imposed on her economic income from the recovery ($60,000) is only
about 1.30% higher than Alternative A. However, the example does not
tell the entire story. In addition to the "regular" income tax, Client will
be subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) in Alternative B, but
not in Alternative A.9 7 The AMT is computed below:
Taxable Income $84,900
Add: Miscellaneous Itemized
Deductions (Attorney's Fees) 98  $37,400
93. These amounts are computed by adding $14,625 to the product of 30% of the
excess of taxable income over $67,700. See Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3.01, 2001-2 C.B. 623
(listing applicable income tax rates for 2002 tax year for unmarried individuals other than
surviving spouses and heads of households).
94. This amount is computed as follows:
Adjusted Gross Income $30,000
Less: Personal Exemptions $ 3,000
Less: Itemized Deductions $ 4,700
Equals Taxable Income $22,300
Based on the tax table, tax due would be $600 plus 15% of the excess over $6000, or
$3045. See id.
95. Total tax minus tax on compensation.
96. See I.R.C. § 26(b).
97. See id. § 56(a).
98. See id. § 55(b)(2)(A) (directing adjustment of taxable income as prescribed in
sections 56 and 58); id. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (disallowing miscellaneous itemized
deductions); id. § 56(b)(1)(E) (disallowing standard deduction and personal exemption).
Here, although attorney's fees totaled $40,000, only $37,400 was deducted as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction due to the limitation in I.R.C. § 67(b).
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Add: Personal Exemption $3000
AMT Income99  $125,300
Less: Exemption Amount 00  $35,750
Taxable Excess' 01  $89,550
AMT Rate 10 2  26%
Tentative Minimum Tax'03  $23,283
Less: Regular Income Tax' °4  $19,785
Alternative Minimum Tax 0 5  $3498
When the AMT is included, Client's total tax liability associated
with the recovery is $3498 higher under Alternative B, which lowers her
after-tax benefit from the litigation by a corresponding amount:
Alternative Alternative Difference
A (Exclude) B (Deduct) (A-B)
Regular Income Tax 10 6  $15,960 $16,740 $(780)
Alternative Minimum Tax $ - $3498 $(3498)
Total Taxes $15,960 $20,238 $(4278)
Effective Tax Rate (as Percentage
of Net Pretax Recovery) 26.60% 33.73% -7.13%
Net After-Tax Benefit of
Recovery $44,040 $39,762 $4278
Percentage of Recovery Retained 44.04% 39.76%
Client is thus subject to an effective tax rate on her net pretax recovery of
$60,000 that is more than 7% higher in Alternative B than in Alternative
A. Stated differently, after she pays her attorney's fees and federal
income taxes, Susie Client keeps 44.04% of the recovery in Alternative
A, as compared with only 39.76% in Alternative B.
2. What Is at Stake: The "Higher-Income" Client
Higher-income taxpayers face still another detriment when
attorney's fees are characterized as a miscellaneous itemized deduction:
99. See id. § 55(b)(2).
100. See id. § 55(d)(1)(B).
101. See id. § 55(b)(1)(ii).
102. See id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I).
103. See id. § 55(b)(1).
104. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
105. See I.R.C. § 55(a).




the overall limitation on itemized deductions under section 68 of the
Code. Section 68 was added to the Code in 1990.107 It effectively raised
taxes without raising nominal tax rates by reducing the value of itemized
deductions as follows:
In the case of an individual whose adjusted gross income exceeds
the applicable amount, the amount of the itemized deductions
otherwise allowable for the taxable year shall be reduced by the
lesser of-
(1) 3 percent of the excess of the adjusted gross income over the
applicable amount, or
(2) 80 percent of the amount of the itemized deductions
otherwise allowable for such taxable year. 108
The "applicable amount" referred to here is adjusted annually for
inflation, and the figure for the 2002 tax year is $137,300 for either
married taxpayers filing jointly or single taxpayers. 0 9 The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 phases out this
limitation beginning in 2006, effectively repealing it in 2010.110
However, the changes effected by this Act sunset for tax years beginning
after December 31, 2010, bringing it back absent other legislative
intervention. 11  Thus, this limitation continues to be significant
regardless of its temporary future repeal.
If it is assumed that Susie Client earned a $1 million taxable
recovery and her attorney's fee was $400,000, her "regular" tax liability
under this scenario would be computed as follows:
Alternative Alternative Difference
A (Exclude) B (Deduct) (A-B)
Gross Income:
Recovery $600,000 $1,000,000 $(400,000)
Compensation $30,000 $30,000 $ -
Adjusted Gross Income $630,000 $1,030,000 $(400,000)
Less:
Personal Exemptions" 2  $ - $ - $ -
107. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388.
108. I.R.C. § 68(a).
109. See Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3.08, 2001-2 C.B. 623.
110. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 103(b), 115 Stat. 38, 39-41.
111. Seeid. § 901(a)(1).
112. See I.R.C. § 151 (d)(3). In this example, Susie Client is not entitled to a personal
exemption, as her adjusted gross income exceeds the phase-out limit, which for 2002 is
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Here, Client's tax liability under Alternative B has increased because of a
higher adjustment under section 67 ($20,600 versus $0) and a higher
overall limitation on itemized deductions under section 68 ($26,762
versus $0). Thus, Client pays $18,289 more in regular tax under
Alternative B. 1
6
However, as in the example above, the disparity between the
approaches increases because of the AMT. At this income level, the
application of a higher marginal AMT rate (a top AMT rate of 28%
versus 26% on lower income amounts) 17 and a phase-out in the amount
exempted from AMT 1 8 helps to increase the AMT tax burden in
Alternative B:
113. See l.R.C. § 68.
114. In this situation, a taxpayer in Alternative A could avoid the limitation by
choosing the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing. See id. § 63(b) (noting itemization
is an election by the taxpayer); id. § 63(c)(6) (limiting eligibility requirements for
standard deduction; no such limitation based on income). Otherwise, only $970 in
itemized deductions would be allowed on account of the limitation.
115. See supra note 94.
116. This difference is the product of reduced deductions of $47,381 ($20,600 under
section 67(b) and $26,781 under section 68) multiplied by the top marginal rate of 38.6%.
117. See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i).
118. Section 55(d)(3) phases out the exemption by 25% of the excess of alternative
minimum taxable income of the taxpayer over a stated amount, which is $112,500 for an




Add: Itemized Deductions 19  $357,319
AMT Income $1,030,000
Less: Exemption Amount 120 $ -
Taxable Excess $1,030,000
AMT Tax Computation:
$175,000 at 26% $45,500
$855,000 at 28% $239,400
Tentative Minimum Tax $284,900
Less: Regular Tax $230,414
AMT $54,486
Total Regular Tax and AMT $284,900
After factoring out the tax due on Client's compensation, the total
tax associated with the $1 million recovery under Alternative A is only
$209,080,121 as compared with a tax of $281,855 in Alternative B.
12 2
The net recovery of $600,000 (after payment of attorney's fees) is thus
taxed at an effective rate of 46.98% in Alternative B, 23 but only 34.85%
under Alternative A124-a difference of 12.13%.
In both these examples, Client had something left of her recovery
after fees and taxes. Significantly, the attorney's fee was figured at 40%
of the total recovery, and no expenses were deducted from that recovery.
If the ratio of costs (attorney's fees and other expenses born by the
client) to the economic recovery is high enough, a prevailing party in
litigation could well owe taxes in excess of the amount that is left after
paying attorney and related expenses. For example, using the $1 million
recovery in the above example, economic benefits of success are erased
entirely when the total miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed
approximately 70% of the recovery:
119. See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i). Here, the fact that the taxpayer has $4700 in other
itemized deductions adds complexity to this computation. If it is assumed for simplicity
that all such itemized deductions are disallowed for purposes of the AMT, the effect of
this adjustment will be to add back all itemized deductions taken, so that the taxable
income will be equal to the adjusted gross income.
120. See supra note 118 (stating that no exemption is applicable here).
121. $212,125 (total regular tax) - $3045 (tax on compensation). See supra notes
112-15 and accompanying text.






A (Exclude) B (Deduct) (A-B)
Recovery $1,000,000 $1,000,000 $ -
Attorney's Fees/Costs $706,194 $706,194 $ -
Economic Benefit (Pre-Tax) $293,806 $293,806 $ -
Regular Income Tax $90,889 $109,178 $(18,289)
Alternative Minimum Tax $ - $184,627 $(184,627)
Total Taxes $90,889 $293,806 $(202,917)
Taxes as Percentage of
Economic Benefit 30.94% 100% -69.06%
After-Tax Benefit $202,917 $0 $202,917
Although such a low recovery might seem unusual in a contingent fee
case, substantial litigation costs incurred by the client could produce this
result. (Litigation cost issues are discussed below in section B.) Where
attorney's fees are not proportional to the monetary recovery, cases
producing awards under fee-shifting statutes could also produce this
result. However, it is important to note that only Alternative B creates
this problem by defining Client's taxable income in excess of the
economic income retained under these conditions.
B. Timing Matters: When May Deductions for Costs Be Taken into
Account?
In the above examples, the litigation was concluded in a single tax
year and no costs other than attorney's fees were incurred. These
assumptions are unrealistic in many cases. Litigation can take years to
resolve, and expenditures for depositions, exhibits, copying, filing fees,
and expert witnesses can be incurred throughout the duration of the
litigation. The tax year in which litigation costs are taken into account
by the taxpayer can significantly impact tax liability.
For example, assume Susie Client continues to earn $30,000 a year
during the course of her litigation, which requires two years to complete.
In year one, her law firm incurs $100,000 in litigation costs on Client's
behalf. Pursuant to their fee agreement, the firm expects these costs to
be deducted from the recovery, and it is to be paid a contingent fee. In
year two, the defendant settles the litigation by paying $1 million.
Assuming that no portion of this award is eligible for exclusion
under section 104,125 what are the tax consequences in each year? The
125. I.R.C. § 104 (2002) (providing exclusion from gross income for categories of
recoveries, including worker's compensation awards, compensatory damages for personal
physical injuries or sickness, and certain amounts recovered through accident or health
insurance from gross income).
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answer to this question depends on the resolution of several important
legal issues, including: (1) whether the client or the attorney is
considered to be the proper taxpayer in accounting for the litigation
costs, (2) whether these costs are taken into account in year one or year
two, and (3) how to account for the portion of the recovery that is
devoted to satisfying those costs. As discussed below, in most cases the
client will be the proper taxpayer, but this will depend on the particulars
of the attorney-client arrangement and the applicable jurisdiction. The
proper tax year to take these costs into account and the treatment of a
recovery of such costs is also a matter of some complexity and will be
explored in greater detail below.
126
Assuming Client is the proper taxpayer, the tax year is important
because of the annual accounting concept on which our tax system is
based. 127 In this case, Client could very well experience an inequitable
tax result if she is required to take the costs into account as expenses
during year one, but the associated income generated by those expenses
is not taken into account until year two.
To illustrate, if Client earns only $30,000 per year while her
litigation is pending, she cannot fully utilize a $100,000 miscellaneous
itemized deduction in year one. Her taxable income (after applicable
deductions not connected with the litigation and her personal exemption)
is only $22,300, on which a tax liability of $3045 would be imposed.
128
She could thus utilize a deduction of only $22,300, which would reduce
her taxable income to zero and allow her to achieve a tax benefit of
$3045. 129 The remainder of the $100,000 in deductible costs would
apparently be lost, as non-business deductions of taxpayers other than
corporations cannot create a net operating loss that would be eligible to
be carried into a different tax year. 30
In year two, assuming that Client follows the approach outlined in
Alternative B, Client will include $1 million in her gross income.
However, she will retain only $500,000 before taxes, assuming offsetting
amounts of $400,000 for attorney's fees and $100,000 to repay the firm
for costs advanced on her behalf. In computing her tax liability, only
$400,000 in attorney's fees paid in year two may give rise to a
deduction;13 1 she may be allowed no deduction in year two to the extent
126. See infra Part V.
127. See I.R.C. § 441 (requiring taxable income to be computed on the basis of an
annual accounting period).
128. See supra note 94.
129. See supra note 94.
130. See I.R.C. § 172(d)(4) (providing that deductions not attributable to trade or




that reimbursing the law firm is effectively characterized as repayment of
a "loan" made on her behalf.' 32 Thus, as a result of this litigation, Client
has an economic benefit (after attorney's fees and expenses) of only
$500,000, but Client will be taxed on more than $600,000 of gross
income due to the limitations of sections 67 and 68 of the Code. The tax
result obtained will be similar to the examples illustrated above, where
regular tax and AMT totaled $284,900.133 Adjusting for the $3045 tax
benefit in year one (and ignoring time value of money effects), 134 this
amounts to total taxes of $281,855 on economic income of $560,000
($500,000 recovered from litigation and $60,000 of earned income),
which computes to an effective tax rate of 50.33%-nearly 12% higher
than the top marginal rate of 38.6% in 2002.
Here, Client's tax burden was raised not only by the limitations
imposed on itemized deductions, but also by the timing difference in
taking into account expenses incurred in year one but recovered in year
two. In this example, she realized only $3045 in tax benefits in year one
from a $100,000 expenditure. However, she could have realized tax
benefits totaling more than ten times that amount if this expenditure
could be used in year two to offset the income from her recovery. 135 The
denial of a full deduction in year one due to net operating loss
limitations, coupled with the effects of graduated tax rates in year two's
income, help to explain Client's additional tax burden in this situation.
Under different facts, a deduction in year one could work to the
Client's advantage. For example, if Client were a high-income taxpayer,
she might prefer the economic advantage of immediate tax benefits
instead of deferring them until a later year. However, for a litigant of
modest means, deferral until the year of a recovery would appear to be
more attractive tax-wise than an immediate deduction.
Furthermore, in the event that she loses her case, Client may face
still other unpleasant tax consequences. She may have to repay the
attorney for costs advanced on her behalf without any tax benefit
associated with payment. Alternatively, if the attorney forgives that
indebtedness, she faces the possibility of discharge-of-indebtedness
income, which might subject her to additional tax obligations. 136 Thus,
losers in litigation may also lose from a tax perspective.
132. See infra Part V.A-B.
133. See supra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 94.
135. For example, at the top marginal rate of 38.6%, a $100,000 deduction would be
worth up to $38,600. Of course, the limitations under sections 67 and 68 (illustrated
above) might further reduce the ultimate tax benefit.
136. See I.R.C. § 108 (limiting an exclusion from gross income for discharge of
indebtedness to discharges that occur when the taxpayer is insolvent).
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It is not clear whether taxpayers have been following the approach
illustrated above in reporting taxable income from litigation, or whether
the Service will adopt an aggressive, pro-government position regarding
the timing of litigation costs, as it has in the case of attorney's fees.
However, as discussed below, it appears that current tax law provides a
foundation for such a position. Legal foundations for the tax accounting
treatment of attorney's fees are discussed in Part IV; the foundations for
tax treatment of litigation costs are addressed in Part V.
IV. Legal Foundations for Taxing Recoveries of Attorney's Fees
The disparity in results illustrated in the previous part is the product
of two separate but interrelated features of our current tax system: (1)
the practice of defining a client's gross income to include the entire
recovery, including the portion devoted to attorney's fees, and (2) the
operation of Code provisions limiting deductions for attorney's fees
incurred outside the business context. Although both of these features
have statutory roots, judicial and administrative discretion have played a
significant role in defining the locus of gross income. 1
37
As discussed below, the assignment of income principle, which is
used to determine the identity of the proper taxpayer, is sufficiently
malleable to permit income to be taxed to persons other than those who
"earned" it. However, a number of circuit courts have approached the
context of contingent legal fees as though they are required to apply the
assignment of income principle against the client, leaving responsibility
for any harsh results in the lap of Congress. Section A provides
background perspective on the parameters of the assignment of income
principle, including its application as a tool to prevent tax avoidance.
(Those readers who are already thoroughly familiar with the assignment
of income principle might choose to skip directly to section B). Section
B examines how courts have applied the assignment of income principle
to the specific problem of contingent attorney's fees. Section C explores
how awards under fee-shifting statutes may be affected by different
approaches to the assignment of income principle.
137. See, e.g., Shuster v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Section
61(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 reads: 'Except as otherwise provided in
this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including
compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items.' 26 U.S.C.
§ 61(a)(1) (1982). The fact that compensation for services is includable in gross income




A. Parameters of the Assignment of Income Principle
Various features of our income tax system, including graduated
rates and separate tax structures for individuals and entities such as
corporations and trusts, 138 have created incentives for taxpayers to
attempt to shift the locus of taxable income in order to reduce their tax
burdens. In response, courts have developed and applied what has
become known as "the first principle of income taxation: that income
must be taxed to him who earns it."
'1 39
As a practical matter, income-shifting strategies often involve
taxpayers with familial or economic relationships (such as parent-child
or shareholder-corporation relationships) who seek tax savings while also
retaining income transferred within the family or economic unit.140 For
example, if a high-bracket parent could transfer income to a low-bracket
child, the family's total tax burden would be reduced, leaving more after-
tax income to enjoy. 14 1 Similarly, shareholders might attempt to assign
income to their controlled corporations, thereby taking advantage of a
favorable rate differential between the shareholder and the corporation. 142
Taxpayers without economic or familial connections to the
138. For rate structures applicable in the tax year 2002, see Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-
2 C.B. 623 (showing rates from 10% to 38.6% on personal income under I.R.C. § 1, with
bracket amounts adjusted for inflation) and I.R.C. § 11 (showing corporate tax rates from
15% to 35%).
139. Comm'rv. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949).
140. See id.
[The] existence of the family relationship does not create a status which itself
determines tax questions, but is simply a warning that things may not be what
they seem. It is frequently stated that transactions between members of a
family will be carefully scrutinized. But more particularly, the family
relationship often makes it possible for one to shift tax incidence by surface
changes of ownership without disturbing in the least his dominion and control
over the subject of the gift or the purposes for which the income from the
property is used. He [i.e., the donor] is able, in other words, to retain "the
substance of full enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had in the
property."
Id. at 746 (quoting Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940)); see also Burnet v.
Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933) ("The solidarity of the family is to make it possible for
the taxpayer to surrender title to another and to keep dominion for himself, or, if not
technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.").
141. Here, the potential reduction is the product of the rate differential between the
parent and the child and the amount of the assigned income. For example, if the parent's
hypothetical tax rate is 40% and the child's rate is 15%, shifting $100 of income from the
parent to the child saves a total of $25 ($100 x (40% - 15%)). However, the potential
application of the federal gift tax provides a practical constraint in the magnitude of
income shifting that can be facilitated by this strategy. See I.R.C. § 2503(b). The so-
called "kiddie tax" imposed by section l(g) also limits this strategy for children under
fourteen, who are taxed on investment income at their parents' rate. See id. § 1(g).
142. See infra Part IV.A.2.e.
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transferee are in a different position, as transferring income potentially
causes a real economic loss that is not adequately compensated by tax
savings. Simply put, transferring away one dollar to save a fraction of a
dollar in taxes is not a wealth-maximizing strategy. However, a taxpayer
might attempt to shift income to satisfy an existing payment obligation,
with the hope of avoiding taxation. For example, a taxpayer holding a
right to collect future income might assign that right to satisfy a debt,
which might otherwise have to be paid with after-tax dollars and which
would otherwise not give rise to any tax benefits.1 43  If such an
assignment effectively avoided taxation on that future income, a taxpayer
could discharge obligations with pre-tax dollars and pocket the tax
savings. 144
Alternatively, a taxpayer might attempt more subtle strategies, such
as changing the character or timing of income recognition through
transferring rights to future income in exchange for consideration. 45 In
this context, the assignment principle is invoked as one of the
discretionary tools used to enforce the ideal that taxation should follow
the economic substance of a transaction, and that formalistic attempts to
change the identity of the taxpayer will not be respected. 146 Although a
comprehensive examination of assignment of income cases is beyond the
scope of this article, a brief tour of selected cases provides a useful
foundation for analyzing the locus of taxation for recovery of attorney's
fees by clients.
143. Cf Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (treating employer
paying employee's federal income tax obligation as, in substance, income to employee).
144. Tax savings here would depend on the taxpayer's marginal income tax rate. To
illustrate, assume Debtor owes Creditor $100, which Debtor attempts to satisfy through
assigning the right to receive $100 in income from a third party. If Debtor's top marginal
rate were 40%, Debtor would avoid $40 in tax if that income was not taxable to Debtor.
However, the actual savings are even greater, as Debtor is able to extinguish a debt of
$100 with only $100 in pretax earnings. If all income were taxed, Debtor would need to
earn $166.67 ($100/(l - 0.40 tax rate)) to have $100 in after-tax dollars to pay the debt.
145. See, e.g., Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); see also infra notes
168-73 and accompanying text (discussing P.G. Lake, Inc.).
146. See, e.g., Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 677 (1933) (noting that "there has been
a progressive endeavor by the Congress and the courts to bring about a correspondence
between the legal concept of ownership and the economic realities of enjoyment or
fruition"). In this sense, the assignment of income principle is akin to other tax doctrines,
such as substance over form, that are sometimes used to overcome perceived defects in
formalistic analysis based on inconsistency with concepts of purpose. See Deborah A.
Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 492, 493
(1995) ("[T]ax law has a rich history of nonliteral interpretation in order to avoid results
that one person or another has considered to be inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute as a whole. This tradition is illustrated by the common law doctrines variously




1. Early Cases: Gratuitous Assignments
The Supreme Court's initial foray into preventing tax avoidance
through an assignment of income occurred in Lucas v. Earl. 47 In that
case, the Service successfully thwarted a husband's attempt to avoid
taxation based on a contractual agreement to assign half of his earnings
to his wife. 148  Although the Court recognized that the wife had an
undisputed contract right to half the husband's income, 49 it refused to
apply the taxing statute based on beneficial ownership of the income,
which had vested in the wife by operation of the contract. Instead, it
chose to focus on the identity of the party who earned the income:
A very forcible argument is presented to the effect that the statute
seeks to tax only income beneficially received, and that taking the
question more technically the salary and fees became the joint
property of Earl and his wife on the very first instant on which they
were received. We well might hesitate upon the latter proposition,
because however the matter might stand between husband and wife
he was the only party to the contracts by which the salary and fees
were earned, and it is somewhat hard to say that the last step in the
performance of those contracts could be taken by anyone but himself
alone. But this case is not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It
turns on the import and reasonable construction of the taxing act.
There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who
earned them and provide that the tax could not be escaped by
anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to
prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the
man who eamed it. That seems to us the import of the statute before
us and we think that no distinction can be taken according to the
motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed
to a different tree from that on which they grew.150
The actual receipt of payment, which often determines the time of
realization for a cash method taxpayer receiving income from services,"'
147. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
148. See id. at 113-14.
149. See id. at 114.
150. Id. at 114-15.
151. See I.R.C. § 451(a) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1999)
("Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, such an amount [of
compensation for services] is includible in gross income when actually or constructively
received."). The concept of constructive receipt defines the circumstances in which a
cash method taxpayer may recognize income before he or she actually possesses it:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to
his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw
upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable
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was not used to determine who realized that income. Although the Court
could have focused on physical receipt of the income (or the right to
receive it) as the guiding principle for identifying the proper taxpayer,
the identity of the earner was thought to be more consistent with
congressional intent.
The Court's approach in this case prevents tax avoidance through
dividing the tax base.' 52  An approach that focused on beneficial
ownership, rather than the identity of the earner, would have allowed
taxpayers to contract with other family members to reduce their total tax
liability, while at the same time keeping income within the family unit.
Instead of requiring Congress to curtail this strategy through rulemaking,
the Court intervened.
Focusing on the identity of the earner appears to provide a rule that
could be reasonably understood and applied in this context of
assignments between family members. However, the Court had
apparently not convinced itself as to the wisdom of this simple rule. In
the same year it decided Lucas, the Court, in Poe v. Seaborn,153 allowed
income splitting based on operation of state law instead of by contract.
The Court permitted a husband and wife living in a community property
state each to report separately half of the husband's salary income. The
Court resolved the apparent conflict with the "earner" orientation of
Lucas as follows:
The very assignment in that case was bottomed on the fact that the
earnings would be the husband's property, else there would have
been nothing.on which it could operate. That case presents quite a
different question from this, because here, by law, the earnings are
never -the property of the husband, but that of the community. 154
The approach in Poe created geographic disuniformity among
taxpayers based on whether they resided in a community property state.
year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not
constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to
substantial limitations or restrictions.
Id. § 1.451-2(a).
152. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 398-99 (1983) ("[The
assignment of income doctrine] prevents taxpayers from avoiding taxation by shifting
income from the person or entity that earns it to someone who pays taxes at a lower
rate."); United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 450-51 (1973) ("The principle of Lucas v.
Earl, that he who earns income may not avoid taxation through anticipatory arrangements
no matter how clever or subtle, has been repeatedly invoked by this Court and stands
today as a cornerstone of our graduated income tax system."); see also Wilson v. United
States, 530 F.2d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 1976); Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner:
Continuing Confusion over the Assignment of Income Doctrine and Personal Service
Income, I FLA. TAX REV. 623 (1993).
153. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
154. Id. at 117.
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Uniformity was restored in 1948 when Congress enacted rules allowing
joint returns for married couples. 5 5  However, considerations of
ownership in that case signaled potential complexity that would arise in
later decisions applying the assignment of income principle. As
discussed below, the identity of the "earner" is not easily determined in
the context of joint activities. Moreover, even if the earner can be
identified, other reasons may counsel against the application of the
assignment of income principle to change the locus of taxation.
The Supreme Court further explored the parameters of judicially
imposed constraints on assignment of income in Helvering v. Horst.1
56
In that case, a father Who owned a bond attempted to transfer taxable
interest income to his son by detaching a negotiable interest coupon
before the maturity date and giving it to his son, who ultimately collected
the interest payment. Although the Court recognized that a cash method
taxpayer ordinarily defers realization of income until the receipt of the
cash payment, regardless of the time when a right to receive payment
accrues, 5 7 this rule of deferral did not apply in these circumstances:
The rule [of deferring realization until cash is received], founded
on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement of the
tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt
of it by the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where
the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the
taxpayer's personal receipt of money or property. This may occur
when he has made such use or disposition of his power to receive or
control the income as to procure in its place other satisfactions which
are of economic worth. The question here is, whether because one
who in fact receives payment for services or interest payments is
taxable only on his receipt of the payments, he can escape all tax by
giving away his right to income in advance of payment. If the
taxpayer procures payment directly to his creditors of items of
interest or earnings due him, or if he sets up a revocable trust with
income payable to the objects of his bounty, he does not escape
taxation because he did not actually receive the money.158
The assignment here involved income from an investment, rather
than income earned from personal services. Nevertheless, the identity of
the earner still appears important to the application of the assignment of
155. See generally MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 197-98 (rev.
8th ed. 1999); Frederick J. Bradshaw, IV, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the
Marriage Penalty: New Proposals in Light of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, 54 TAx LAW. 701, 702-04 (2001).
156. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
157. Id. at 115-16.
158. Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
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income principle. As the owner of the bond on which the interest
accrued, the father could still be considered the one who earned the
income. Even though the father did not consume the income himself, he
maintained the right to control the disposition of the income and obtained
satisfaction indirectly through giving it to his son:
Even though [the father] never receives the money he derives
money's worth from the disposition of the coupons which he has
used as money or money's worth in procuring of a satisfaction which
is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's worth.
The enjoyment of the economic benefit accruing to him by virtue of
his acquisition of the coupons is realized as completely as it would
have been if he had collected the interest in dollars and expended
them for any of the purposes named.
In a real sense he has enjoyed compensation for money loaned or
services rendered and not any the less so because it is his only reward
for them. To say that one who has made a gift thus derived from
interest or earnings paid to his donee has never enjoyed or realized
the fruits of his investment or labor because he has assigned them
instead of collecting them himself and then paying them over to the
donee is to affront common understanding and to deny the facts of
common experience. Common understanding and experience are the
touchstones for the interpretation of the revenue laws. 1
59
The Court also viewed this gift of an interest coupon, coupled with
retention of other rights associated with the bond (including the right to
receive future payments of principal and interest), as distinguishable
from a gift of income-producing property.' 60 If instead of giving only the
coupon, the father had given the bond to his son, the son would have
been taxed on the future income earned by the bond, including any
interest that had accrued prior to the date of the gift, but which was not
yet payable to the bondholder, as there is no constructive receipt of this
interest at the time of the gift. 161 However, that was not the case. The
159. Id. at 117-18; see also Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 580 (1941) (noting
that Horst "rested on the principle that the power to dispose of income is the equivalent
of ownership of it and that the exercise of the power to procure its payment to another,
whether to pay a debt or to make a gift, is within the reach of the statute taxing income
'derived from any source whatever'); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930)
("The income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and that he is free to enjoy
at his own opinion may be taxed to him as his income, whether he sees fit to enjoy it or
not.").
160. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118. The Court had previously addressed the issue of what
constitutes a valid property interest, as opposed to an invalid assignment of income. See,
e.g., Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) (upholding assignment of income in connection
with irrevocable assignment of remainder interest in trust).




father's attempt to shift income to the son, while retaining ownership
over the income-producing property, was covered by the principle
applied in Lucas: "[T]he purpose of the statute to tax the income to him
who earns, or creates and enjoys it [cannot] be escaped by 'anticipatory
arrangements ... however skillfully devised' to prevent the income from
vesting even for a second in the donor."' 162 As in Lucas, "the fruit is not
to be attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew."' 63 A
contrary rule would likewise have permitted tax avoidance through
dividing the tax base.
2. Assignments for Consideration
Invocation of the assignment of income principle is not limited to
the context of gratuitous assignments among family members, as the
facts in the cases discussed above might suggest. When a taxpayer
assigns a future income right in exchange for consideration, tax
avoidance concerns still inform the application of the assignment
principle. As discussed below, some forms of tax avoidance are
tolerated in current tax law, and deciding which category applies can be
challenging. However, a taxpayer stands a much better chance at success
when assignment is the product of an arm's length transaction, even
though it results in tax savings.
a. Consumption with Pre-Tax Dollars
The assignment of income principle may be used to thwart taxpayer
attempts to use pre-tax dollars to finance consumption or other
expenditures, which otherwise would require after-tax dollars. 164  To
illustrate, assume A purchases $100 in consumer goods on credit from B.
If A were able to direct A's employer to pay B $100 in satisfaction of B's
obligation, and by doing so that A could avoid taxation on those earnings,
A would be richer at the Treasury's expense.' 65 However, such a position
is at odds with the reality that A has an accession to wealth that is
attributable to the services that A performed for the employer, which
162. Horst, 311 U.S. at 120.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935) ("We have held that income
was received by a taxpayer, when, pursuant to a contract, a debt or other obligation was
discharged by another for his benefit. The transaction was regarded as being the same in
substance as if the money had been paid to the taxpayer and he had transmitted it to his
creditor.") (citing Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S: 716 (1929)); United States
v. Boston & Me. R.R., 279 U.S. 732 (1929); see also Corliss, 281 U.S. at 378 ("If a man
directed his bank to pay over income as received to a servant or friend, until further
orders, no one would doubt that he could be taxed upon the amounts so paid.").
165. For a computation of the hypothetical tax impact, see supra note 145.
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should be taxable to A regardless of the form in which it is received.
66
In this sense, the assignment principle becomes a shorthand method for
referring to the results otherwise achieved by applying other provisions
of the Code governing taxable exchanges.1
67
b. Accelerating and Changing the Characterization of Income
The assignment of income principle may also be invoked to prevent
more subtle forms of tax avoidance, such as improperly converting
ordinary income to capital gain in order to take advantage of a
preferential tax rate. Whether a contractual right to receive income can
be viewed as a capital asset was considered in Commissioner v. P.G.
Lake, Inc.168 A corporate taxpayer paid off a debt owed to its corporate
president through assigning an "oil payment right" to him, and it reported
that disposition as a capital-gain-producing transaction.' 69  The "oil
payment right" entitled the holder to payment of $600,000 out of a
portion of oil revenues due to the corporation,170 plus an additional 3%
per year on the unpaid balance.'
71
The IRS challenged the taxpayer's treatment, claiming that the
disposition of these rights generated ordinary income, not capital gain.'
72
The Supreme Court sided with the IRS, stating in part:
The substance of what was assigned was the right to receive future
income. The substance of what was received was the present value
of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future.
In short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future
income, not for an increase in the value of the income-producing
property. 173
The transferee would get no more than $600,000 in proceeds plus 3%
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1995) ("Gross income means all income from
whatever source derived, unless excluded by law. Gross income includes income
realized in any form, whether in money, property, or services. Income may be realized,
therefore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, stock, or other property, as
well as in cash."). Thus, whether A receives a property right, in the form of a promise of
payment from the employer that A is able to negotiate to another or an actual payment in
cash, A should be deemed to have income in this case because A has exchanged it. See
I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2002) (defining gain realized for the disposition of property); id.
§ 1001(c) (imposing default rule of recognition for realized gains).
167. See I.R.C. § 1001(c).
168. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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interest, contingent on future production and sale of oil.1 74 As in Horst,
the transferor had presently enjoyed the fruits of an investment by
accelerating future income without permanently divesting any significant
property right; this was an ordinary income transaction.175 Significantly,
by invoking the assignment principle in this context, the Court did not
undo the transaction and require the corporation to be taxed as though oil
revenues were received in future years. Instead, it simply ensured that
the corporation was not eligible for capital gain treatment on the income
earned from the exchange.
Apart from an attempt to achieve capital gain treatment as
illustrated in P. G. Lake, Inc., it may be difficult to see how a cash sale of
rights to future income could otherwise erode the tax base, provided that
the sale price reflects the fair market value. After all, the income is taxed
in an earlier year, thus accelerating the tax due and making its collection
more certain. 176 Moreover, the tax base should not shrink in real terms,
assuming that time value of money and risk considerations are
adequately taken into account in determining the purchase price. In an
arm's length transaction, the purchase price for future income would
presumably reflect the time value of money as adjusted for the parties'
perception of risk; applying the same discount factor used by the parties
to the tax due would make the government no worse off than waiting to
tax in the income when collected, even if the tax currently due is less
than the amount that would be collected in a future year.
177
However, Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner17 8 illustrates that an
assignment for consideration can adversely impact tax collections.
Stranahan involved a father's attempt to accelerate the taxable year in
which income was received through a sale of dividend rights to his son.
174. Compare United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963)
(distinguishing the applicability of P.G. Lake, Inc. in a case involving the sale of patent
rights), with Tech. Adv. Mem. 199945008 (Nov. 12, 1999) (distinguishing Dresser
Industries in stating that a sale of the right to receive fixed annual payments from a state
lottery constitutes ordinary income, not capital gain).
175. See P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. at 267.
176. See Jensen, supra note 152, at 634.
177. For example, assuming a tax rate of 10%, $100,000 of income would yield
$10,000 of tax. Using a discount rate of 10% (which reflects an appropriate adjustment
for the time value of money and risk), a "sale" of $100,000 worth of income that is
expected to be received one year in the future would presumably bring $90,909
($100,000/1.10). If the seller is taxed at 10%, the seller would owe $9090, which is the
present value of the $10,000 of tax that would ultimately be due. Of course, this assumes
a constant tax rate, which may not be true due to general changes in the rate structure (tax
cuts or tax increases) or particular circumstances of taxpayers. See also Jensen, supra
note 152, at 634 ("If the shortfall merely represents a discount from the time value of
money, the assignor clearly should be taxed only on the amount he receives, since that
amount is the financial equivalent of the amount ultimately collected.").
178. 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973).
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The father's motivation to accelerate income was rooted in the fact that
he had a large interest deduction in the 1964 taxable year that would
essentially be worthless unless he substantially increased his taxable
income. 79 The father therefore sold the right to receive future dividends
to his son for approximately $115,000, which reflected a discount from
their expected future value of $122,280.180 Relying on P.G. Lake, Inc.,
the father took the position that this sale caused him to realize ordinary
taxable income in 1964; future dividend payments would not be taxable
to the father, but would instead be taxable to the son to the extent that
they exceeded his cost.
18'
The Commissioner attempted to treat this transaction as a loan from
the son to the father, rather than a sale of property, thereby preventing
the father from realizing the income and obtaining the tax benefit of his
interest deduction. 82 Following this characterization, the Commissioner
then attempted to invoke the assignment of income principle to tax the
father on the dividends his son received in future tax years.'
83
The Sixth Circuit upheld the taxpayer's characterization of the
transaction and treated the sale of dividend rights as generating ordinary
income in the year of sale. 184 Here, neither the family relationship nor
the tax avoidance motive was deemed sufficient to change the taxpayer's
characterization of the transaction. As the court explained:
It is conceded by taxpayer that the sole aim of the assignment was
the acceleration of income so as to fully utilize the interest deduction.
Gregory v. Helvering established the landmark principle that the
substance of a transaction, and not the form, determines the taxable
consequences of that transaction. In the present transaction, however,
it appears that both the form and the substance of the agreement
assigned the right to receive future income. What was received by
the [transferor] was the present value of that income the son could
expect in the future. On the basis of the stock's past performance, the
future income could have been (and was) estimated with reasonable
accuracy. Essentially, [transferor's] son paid consideration to receive
future income. Of course, the fact of a family transaction does not
vitiate the transaction but merely subjects it to special scrutiny.
185
179. Id. at 868.
180. See id.
181. See id. It should be noted that the father did not allocate any basis to his sale of
the dividend rights, presumably because he wanted to increase the amount of taxable
income. The Service apparently did not raise any problem with this aspect of the father's
reporting position.
182. See id at 868-69.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 869.
185. Id. (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)) (citations and footnotes
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Unlike the transfers in Lucas and Horst, the underlying transaction
accelerated the year of inclusion in taxable income, rather than
attempting to avoid it altogether. P.G. Lake, Inc. supported the father's
right to do this; moreover, only the amount of the sale, rather than the
total amount of the future dividend income, would be taxed to the father.
Although the tax base may have shrunk as a result of this particular
transaction (on account of the father's ability to use tax attributes that
would otherwise have expired), the tax base would not generally shrink
as a result of similar transactions conducted at arm's length. As
explained above, assuming that an appropriate discount rate was used,
taxable income and the tax due would otherwise be reduced only
according to the time value of money adjusted for perceived risk to the
transferee.
86
Unlike the taxpayer in P.G. Lake, Inc., which also accelerated
taxable income, the transferor was quite content with characterizing the
income as ordinary rather than capital gain, since the existence of a tax
benefit from other transactions in the form of an interest deduction would
effectively offset the ordinary income. However, that tax attribute had
presumably been earned, and the transferor was simply trying to utilize it
while it was still valuable.
These factors may explain why, despite the obvious tax motivation
behind this transaction, the court was willing to recognize and accept the
substance of the transaction as a sale. Full consideration was paid and
economic risks associated with the future receipt of dividends had been
shifted to the son, which was consistent with a genuine change in
ownership. 87  Significantly, the potential for tax avoidance made
possible by the sale did not provide an independent basis for invoking the
assignment principle:
We recognize the oft-stated principle that a taxpayer cannot escape
taxation by legally assigning or giving away a portion of the income
derived from income producing property retained by the taxpayer.
omitted).
186. See supra note 177.
187. These risks may have been small, due to the fact that the father and son were
both shareholders and employees of the company paying the dividends. Nevertheless, the
court found that sufficient risk existed here. See Stranahan, 472 F.2d at 871.
[I]t seems clear that risks, however remote, did in fact exist. The fact that the
risks did not materialize is irrelevant. Assessment of the risks is a matter of
negotiation between the parties and is usually reflected in the terms of the
agreement. Since we are not in a position to evaluate those terms, and since we
are not aware of any terms which dilute the son's dependence on the dividends




Here, however, the acceleration of income was not designed to avoid
or escape recognition of the dividends but rather to reduce taxation
by fully utilizing a substantial interest deduction which was available.
As stated previously, tax avoidance motives alone will not serve to
obviate the tax benefits of a transaction. Further, the fact that this
was a transaction for good and sufficient consideration, and not
merely gratuitous, distinguishes the instant case from the line of
authority beginning with Helvering v. Horst.
188
c. Assigning a Contested Claim
The extent to which benefits and burdens of ownership are shifted
in an arm's length transaction was also considered significant by the
Fifth Circuit in Jones v. Commissioner,189 which involved assignment of
an interest in a contested claim. Unlike Stranahan and P. G. Lake, Inc., a
significant discount was involved due to substantial risks of collection.
Nevertheless, the court resisted the Commissioner's attempt to apply the
assignment principle.
In Jones, the taxpayer was a subcontractor on a project with the
United States Army Corps of Engineers.' 90 Unanticipated changes in
project specifications and working conditions caused him to lose more
than $350,000 on this contract over the tax years 1943 and 1944.19' He
borrowed additional funds from his construction bond surety in order to
complete the project, and he ultimately had to sell his equipment in
partial satisfaction of this debt, leaving a substantial amount of the debt
unpaid. 192
In an attempt to recoup some of these additional costs, the general
contractor submitted a claim to the government for additional
compensation on the project, part of which included Jones's work. The
government contested this claim and litigation ensued, leaving Jones
with an interest in this claim, but no money.
1 93
In 1952, Jones entered into a contract with "Drilling," a corporation
that he had formed along with several key employees, 194 wherein "he
188. Id. at 869-70 (citing Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)) (citations
and footnotes omitted). For further discussion of Stranahan and a comparison with other
cases in which attempts to accelerate income were not successful because they were akin
to loans, see Bruce Kayle, The Taxpayer's Attempt To Intentionally Accelerate Taxable
Income, 46 TAX LAW. 89, 101-03, 117 (1992).
189. 306 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1962).
190. See id. at 293.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 293-94.
193. See id. at 294.
194. See id. at 295. The court also noted: "Although Jones was a majority
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assigned, sold, setover, transferred, and conveyed all of his right, title or
interest in and to the claim [against the United States]. 195 In exchange,
Drilling agreed to pay to Jones $10,000 plus all of the taxpayer's income
tax liability for the 1948 through 1950 tax years, including expenses
incurred in contesting that liability.' 96 At the time the assignment was
made, the government had denied the claim and repeated appeals and
negotiations had been unsuccessful. 1
97
The litigation was not resolved until 1953, when the United States
Court of Claims ruled in favor of the contractor. A check for
$259,936.06, representing a recovery of $339,677.68 less expenses and
fees totaling $79,741.61, was mailed to Jones in April 1954.198 Pursuant
to his assignment contract with Drilling, Jones promptly endorsed this
check to Drilling, and he did not report any amounts from the recovery in
either his 1953 or 1954 tax return.1 99 The Service challenged this
treatment, alleging that Jones's assignment to Drilling was ineffective,
and that Jones should be taxed on the recovery.
200
The Fifth Circuit recited a litany of assignment of income cases,
noting that its review was "not intended to be complete or exhaustive in
any sense.,20 1 However, in the circumstances of this case, it concluded
that Drilling, not Jones, was taxable on the proceeds of the claim.2 °2 The
uncertain and speculative nature of the claim that had been assigned in an
arm's length transaction between Drilling and Jones was apparently
significant to the court's conclusion. The court stated in part: "We
believe it appropriate to point out that the claim prosecuted ... against
the United States by means of which the funds were realized, was at the
time of assignment on February 3, 1953, uncertain, doubtful, and
contingent. 20 3 The court further explained:
stockholder, there were four members of the Board of Directors, Jones being one, and no
family relationship between the members of the Board is indicated." Id. at 294.
195. Id. at 295.
196. Id. at 294. It is unclear whether Drilling paid Jones $10,000, but Jones
apparently had the right to such payment based on the board's authorization. See id at
295, 306. No payments on Jones's tax liability and defense had apparently been made
pursuant to the agreement at the time of this litigation. See id.
197. See id. at 295.
198. Id. at 295-96.
199. See id. at 296.
200. See id. The Service initially took the position that the recovery was income to
Jones in 1953 because he was an accrual method taxpayer, and the tax court had agreed.
However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this position. See id.
201. Id. at 301.
202. See id.
203. Id. The court further noted that the attorneys were employed on a contingency




Unlike assignments in some of the authorities herein reviewed, the
assignment in this case was full, complete, final, and definite. When
this assignment was made over five months before the Court of
Claims announced its decisions, over nine months before the decision
became final, and over fourteen months before payment was
received, the "tree" appeared to be blighted and almost devoid of life.
It had "borne no fruit" and to a layman such as Jones, while hopeful
and confident because he believed in the justice of his claim,
certainly he could not be said to have sufficient insight reasonable to
speculate what the United States Court of Claims would ultimately
decide. His confidence and hope could not have been supported, we
dare say, by a written opinion of competent counsel experienced in
the disappointments and uncertainties of modem day litigation.
20 4
Jones was held to be taxable on the $10,000 he was entitled to
receive from the corporation, plus any additional consideration he would
receive when Drilling paid his tax liabilities and related legal
expenses. 20 5 Drilling was taxable on the net recovery of $259,936, and it
would be allowed to deduct any payments made in satisfaction of its
206obligations to Jones under the assignment agreement.
The income from the recovery was "earned" by Jones only in the
sense that he had already performed services for which he submitted a
claim for additional compensation. However, payment for those services
was contested by the government, making collection ultimately doubtful.
Under the cash method of accounting, Jones was not taxable until he
received cash or a cash equivalent, which in this case occurred when he
made the exchange with Drilling, and the amount was limited to the cash
equivalent he received, not the later amount of the recovery. This
payment was income to Jones regardless of whether Drilling ultimately
recovered anything on the claim. Fortunately, Drilling was able to
collect income in excess of what it had paid to Jones, and it would be
appropriately taxed on that income.20 7
204. Id. at 301-02.
205. See id. at 305-06. The court followed Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S.
260 (1958), and found that no capital asset was disposed of here and therefore Jones was
not entitled to any capital gain treatment. Jones, 306 F.2d at 305-06. Jones was not
entitled to any capital gain treatment, as the court followed P.G. Lake, Inc., in finding
that no capital asset was disposed of here. id.
206. See Jones, 306 F.2d at 306-07.
207. Uncertainty has been rejected as the sole foundation for resisting application of
the assignment principle. See Kochansky v. Comm'r, 92 F.3d 957, 958 (9th Cir. 1996)
(applying assignment of income principle in case of assignment of portion of attorney's
contingent fee by attorney to former spouse as part of divorce settlement). The court in
Kochansky reasoned that, although collection of the fee was uncertain, it was still the
product of the attorney's services, and, as such, it was taxable to the attorney. See id.
Moreover, unlike Jones, the court noted that this was not an arm's length transaction
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The tax avoidance concerns that prompted the government's
challenge to Jones's position presumably involved the possibility that
Drilling, as a corporation, would be subject to lower marginal tax rates
than Jones would as an individual. °8 Pursuant to an agreement among
the shareholders, any proceeds collected on Jones's claim would be
retained in the corporation as working capital, rather than paid out as
dividends. 20 9  Thus, the assignment, if effective, would allow more
investment by the corporation than if Jones had received the proceeds of
the claim and contributed the after-tax amount. 10
Of course, this plan of tax avoidance requires considerable
foresight; Jones and his fellow shareholders presumably could not have
known whether the amount realized would ultimately exceed the amount
that he was to be paid for the claim.211  Jones, as the majority
shareholder, might have been willing to assume some risk that he would
be underpaid for his claim, to the extent that he would benefit from a
substantial share of the recovery if the claim was successful. His fellow
shareholders' willingness to overpay would arguably be constrained by
their own economic interests, and, in this case, they had the controlling
votes on Drilling's board.212
between the attorney and his former spouse. See id.
208. For 1953 and 1954, the maximum corporate tax rate was only 52%, whereas the
maximum individual tax rate was either 91% or 92%. See JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 7 (2d ed. 2000) (illustrating maximum corporate and
individual rates from 1913 to 1993).
209. See Jones, 306 F.2d at 294.
210. For example, assume Jones's hypothetical marginal tax rate was 50%, while the
corporate tax rate was only 35%. If Jones earned $100 of taxable income, he would pay
taxes of $50, leaving only $50 after taxes to invest in the corporation. However, if Jones
could shift this income to the corporation, it would pay only $35 in taxes, leaving $65 in
after-tax income to invest in the corporation.
211. As noted above, if the risk factor applied by Drilling was accurate, the
government would presumably not be harmed by any assignment, as it exchanges the
certainty of taxation to Jones on the consideration he receives for the uncertainty of future
taxation of any recovery. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text; see also
Jensen, supra note 152.
If the dictum that "income must be taxed to him who earns it" is taken as a
metaphysical truth rather than a pragmatic device to prevent tax avoidance,
then the assignor should be taxed on all amounts collected on account of his
personal services even where that amount, after discount for the time value of
money, exceeds what he received from transferring his right to such income.
Otherwise, not all of the income will "be taxed to him who earns it."
If, however, the doctrine is recognized as a prophylactic against tax
avoidance, the assignor should be taxed only on the amount he receives for the
assignment. This is the proper approach and the one adopted by the courts.
Id. at 634 (footnotes omitted).
212. This assumes that they were not "dominated" by Jones. In the corporate law
context, a showing of domination may affect whether approval by other disinterested
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As in Stranahan, potential tax avoidance was not enough to invoke
the assignment principle to recharacterize the flow of income after the
fact when, as here, there was an arm's length transfer for consideration.
Although the government may have had a different perspective as to
whether the risk-adjustment factor applied to valuing the claim was
correct, it had laid an insufficient foundation to challenge the arm's
length character of the transaction. In this case, the court effectively
resisted the Commissioner's attempt based on hindsight to reallocate
proceeds of a recovery that turned out to favor the taxpayer at the
213Department of Treasury's expense.
d. Assigning Accounts Receivable: Corporate Formation
Transactions
Tax avoidance in a transfer of future income rights might also occur
in a corporate formation transaction, where the value of future income
rights is much less speculative than in Jones. For example, assume a
sole proprietor incorporates an ongoing service business, and accounts
receivable from services previously performed comprise a significant
amount of business assets. If the sole proprietor is taxable at the highest
marginal rates,2 14 transferring these accounts to a C corporation in
exchange for stock might allow more after-tax dollars to be available for
investment in the business.215
However, that result is only possible because the exchange of
accounts receivable for stock is a tax-free exchange under section 351 of
the Code.21 6 Otherwise, the exchange of property (accounts receivable
directors will provide a defense from challenges to the transaction by other shareholders.
See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (applying
Delaware law). Query whether a similar inquiry might affect the tax treatment of such
transactions.
213. See also Jensen, supra note 152, at 634 ("Where the price of the assignment has
been negotiated in good faith on an arm's-length basis, there is no reason to suppose a
priori that the amount paid for the assignment will be less or greater than the amount
ultimately collected under the assignment. Naturally, in some cases the amount received
for the assignment will be less than the amount collected by the assignee, but among all
the assignments negotiated in good faith at arm's-length there should be an equal number
of cases where the reverse is true.") (emphasis added).
214. See supra note 138 (comparing rates applicable to individuals and corporations).
215. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "C corporation" as
"[a] corporation whose income is taxed through it rather than through its shareholders").
For example, if taxpayer collected $1000 of income, federal income tax liability at the top
marginal rate of 38.1% would consume $381, leaving only $619 to invest. In contrast, if
that $1000 of income is taxed at the lowest corporate rate of 15%, then $850 would be
available for investment. This kind of tax avoidance is akin to the division of the tax base
attacked in the gratuitous assignment cases discussed above. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
216. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (2002). Although phrased as a nonrecognition provision,
section 351(a) ultimately accomplishes deferral of gains because of the corresponding
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for corporate stock) would provide the foundation for realization of
taxable income, notwithstanding the fact that no cash was received.21 7
In Hempt Brothers, Inc. v. United States,21 8 the Third Circuit
considered a transaction in which a cash method partnership had
contributed accounts receivable to a corporation in a tax-free transaction
under section 351(a) of the Code.219  These accounts receivable
represented amounts due from the performance of construction work and
rental of equipment that had been completed by the partnership prior to
the incorporation transaction. 22  The corporation, which had also used
the cash method, reported over $662,000 of income over a three-year
period on collections of those accounts receivable.221 However, it later
sought a refund of taxes on that income based on the theories that (1)
accounts receivable were not "property" within the meaning of section
351(a) and (2) the assignment of income doctrine required the
partnership, rather than the corporation, to be taxed as the earner of such
income.222
The Third Circuit rejected both of the taxpayer's arguments. As for
the characterization of the receivables as "property," the court stated:
Receivables possess the usual capabilities and attributes associated
with jurisprudential concepts of property law. They may be
identified, valued, and transferred. Moreover, their role in an
ongoing business must be viewed in the context of Section 351
application. The presence of accounts receivable is a normal, rather
than an exceptional accoutrement of the type of business included by
Congress in the transfer to a corporate form. They are "commonly
thought of in the commercial world as a positive business asset."
223
It also refused to apply the assignment of income principle in this
context. Although the court recognized that the transfer of an account
receivable for stock would otherwise fall squarely within P. G. Lake, Inc.,
it chose to give priority to the principle of nonrecognition expressed by
provisions governing basis in the hands of the transferor, see id. § 358(a), and in the
hands of the corporation, see id. § 362. In these circumstances, assuming the cash
method taxpayer has a zero basis in the accounts receivable, the corporation also takes a
zero basis in them and the taxpayer has a zero basis in the stock. Thus, the corporation
will ultimately be taxed on the disposition of the account receivable through collection,
and the individual may ultimately be taxed when the stock is sold.
217. Compare id. § 1001(a) (defining gain realized from the disposition of property)
with id. § 1001(c) (imposing default rule of recognition on realized gain).
218. 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974).
219. Id. at 1173.
220. Id. at 1174.
221. Id. at 1174-75.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1175 (citation omitted).
2003]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
section 351 (a).224 The court explained its balancing act as follows:
We are persuaded that, on balance, the teachings of [P.G. Lake
Inc.] must give way in this case to the broad Congressional interest in
facilitating the incorporation of ongoing businesses. As desirable as
it is to afford symmetry in revenue law, we do not intend to
promulgate a hard and fast rule. We believe that the problems posed
by the clash of conflicting internal revenue doctrines are more
properly determined by the circumstances of each case. Here we are
influenced by the fact that the subject of the assignment was accounts
receivable for partnership's goods and services sold in the regular
course of business, that the change of business form from partnership
to corporation had a basic business purpose and was not designed for
the purpose of deliberate tax avoidance, and by the conviction that
the totality of circumstances here presented fit the mold of the
Congressional intent to give nonrecognition to a transfer of a total
business from a non-corporate to a corporate form.
225
Consistent with the court's willingness to consider the facts and
circumstances in each case, subsequent rulings make it clear that the
Service will not guarantee nonrecognition treatment in all corporate
formation transactions. For example, when the transfer involves less
226than all the assets of the business, or when the right to collect income
is the sole asset of the corporation, the nonrecognition principle in
section 35 1(a) may effectively be trumped by the assignment of income
principle.2 7  Thus, these exceptions to the grant of tax exemption in
section 35 1(a) still allow some latitude for the assignment principle to be
applied to prevent tax avoidance by dividing the tax base.
e. Dividing the Tax Base: Service Providers and Related
Corporations
Cases involving assignments to related corporations that are not part
of a corporate formation transaction merit brief discussion in order to
understand how their context differs from a case such as Jones. When
there is an identity between the owners of the corporation and those who
transfer contract rights, it is possible that the normal constraints on risk-
assessment will prove unreliable. For example, if Jones had sold his
224. See id at 1177.
225. Id. at 1178 (footnote omitted).
226. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8139073 (June 30, 1981).
227. See Rev. Rul. 80-198, 1980-2 C.B. 113 (discussing Brown v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 565 (1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940), in applying the assignment of
income principle to an assignment of a receivable for legal services to a corporation in
exchange for stock, which was then given to the assignor's wife).
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claim to a corporation that he owned and controlled, the government
might have had a stronger basis to question whether fair value had been
paid, or whether there was indeed a tax avoidance plan utilizing rate
differentials or other differences in tax attributes between Jones and his
corporation.
In this context, the principle that income should be taxed to the one
who earns it cannot easily coexist with the artificial personhood of the
corporation, including its inability to do anything without employees or
agents.2 2 8  Application of the assignment principle in these cases
typically focuses on the validity of the corporation and whether it
controls the earning of the income.229 The tax court recently summarized
its considerations as follows:
In cases involving viable corporations, we consider all the facts
and circumstances to determine the actual earner of income. In
determining the proper taxpayer, we consider which person or entity
controls the earning of the income, such as:
1) Whether the individual rather than the corporation or entity
that received the income, in fact, controlled the earning of the
income;
2) whether the individual performed the services as an agent or
employee of the corporation;
3) whether the corporate form and the status of the corporation
as an actual operating enterprise have been recognized by
petitioners;
4) whether the corporate form and the status of the corporation
as an actual operating enterprise have been recognized by the other
parties to the transactions giving rise to the income;
5) whether the form of the transaction served an economic
purpose; and
6) whether the corporations were formed for the purpose of
taking advantage of losses incurred by a separate trade or
228. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 882, 890 (1982).
[T]he realities of the business world prevent an overly simplistic application of
the Lucas v. Earl rule whereby the true earner may be identified by merely
pointing to the one actually turning the spade or dribbling the ball. Recognition
must be given to corporations as taxable entities which, to a great extent, rely
upon the personal services of their employees to produce corporate income.
When a corporate employee performs labors which give rise to income, it
solves little merely to identify the actual laborer. Thus, a tension has evolved
between the basic tenets of Lucas v. Earl and recognition of the nature of the
corporate business form.
Id.; see also Haag v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 604, 611 (1987) ("In the corporate context.. . the
actual earner test may be inadequate because a corporation can earn income only through
the personal services of its employees and agents."), aff'd, 855 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1988).
229. See, e.g., Haag, 88 T.C. at 604 (applying control test to determine whether





These factors, which include an analysis into whether services were
performed by an individual as an agent or employee of the corporation,
take into account the form of agreements between the corporation, the
employee, and third parties, as well as the purpose of the agreements.
Moreover, the Service also has access to statutory provisions to assist in
preventing assignment in this context.23 1  For example, the
Commissioner has attempted to utilize section 482 of the Code to address
these issues of income shifting between corporations and their
232shareholders, as well as between related corporate entities. For
personal service corporations, Congress also empowered the Service
with a special anti-abuse provision, which could be invoked to reallocate
the source of income between the corporation and its owner-employees
to prevent tax avoidance. 233  Thus, although these cases involve the
efficacy of agreements to change the locus of taxable income, the context
of related entities and the interest in preventing tax avoidance through
dividing the tax base provide only limited utility in defining the
230. Inv. Research Assocs., Ltd. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (1999) (citations
omitted).
231. Some courts have even expressed a preference for section 482 over the
assignment of income principle.
Resort to section 482 is clearly superior to the blunt tool employed by the
Tax Court. References to "substance over form" and the "true earner" of
income merely restate the issue in cases like this: Who is the "true earner"?
What is substance and what is form? Moreover, they do so in a way which
makes it appear that these questions can be answered simply by viewing the
facts with appropriate suspicion. The language of § 482 more clearly
commands analysis of the facts in terms of the competing policies outlined
above. Section 482 has other advantages. It provides greater flexibility than
the all-or-nothing approach used by the Tax Court. It also is accompanied by
relief provisions to avoid the hardship of the result reached by the Tax Court in
this case, which would require Rubin to pay taxes on money he has never
received and could not now obtain without paying income taxes on the receipt.
Rubin v. Comm'r, 429 F.2d 650, 653-54 (2d Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted); see also
Johnson v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 882, 890 n.13 (1982) ("In those cases where sec. 482
applies, resort to general sec. 61 principles usually is not necessary since sec. 482
provides a smoother route to the same 'who is taxed' result.").
232. See, e.g., Haag, 88 T.C. at 614-15 n.229; Pacella v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 604, 618
(1982); see also Comm'r v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394 (1972) (involving
Commissioner's attempt to apply section 482 to putative assignment of insurance
commission income between bank and related insurance companies rejected where bank
could not lawfully receive such commissions and did not, in fact, do so).
233. See I.R.C. § 269A (2002). However, prescribing a separate tax rate schedule for
personal service corporations, which eliminates the attraction of the benefits of graduated
corporate rates, has presumably also limited the utility of these corporations as a tax
avoidance vehicle. See id. § 11(b)(2) (exempting a "qualified personal service




parameters of the assignment principle outside this context.
f Assignments to Unrelated Employers
Preexisting agreements to change the locus of taxable income may
also arise in the context of relationships that do not involve attempts to
shift economic income for personal benefit, as noted in the previous
section. These situations are arguably still within the context of
assignments for consideration because they involve an exchange of
promises between the assignor and assignee that define an employment
or similar relationship, but in which the employee-agent does not have an
economic ownership interest in the employer-principal.
For example, assume attorney A joins a nonprofit legal aid
organization, and, in exchange for the organization's promise to pay a
modest salary, A promises to provide legal services to indigent clients.
Recognizing that, in some cases, A's services to indigent clients may
generate fees (as in a court-appointed representation), A also promises to
assign these fees to the organization.
Unlike cases discussed in the previous section, A does not have an
ownership interest in the assignee, at least in a direct economic sense.
True enough, the fees collected may ultimately help support A's modest
salary. A may also believe strongly in the organization and its work, so
that A has some psychic benefit from supporting the organization through
the work. However, A does not own stock in the organization that could
increase in value as a result of the work.
Should A be taxed on these fees solely because A "earned" them, in
the sense that A's labor generated a payment from a third party? In this
context, the agreement that A has made with the employer is not a
scheme for tax avoidance, but instead is an arm's length exchange, albeit
with some gratuitous flavor. Respecting the assignment arguably makes
sense here. Presumably, A's willingness to turn over those fees to the
employer affected the amount that A would receive in salary. However,
an exchange of a promise to turn over fees for a future salary payment
did not give rise to any immediate tax consequences, as would otherwise
occur when cash or property was exchanged.
Allowing A to exclude the amounts "earned" would not be
equivalent to taxing A and then allowing a deduction, as the likely
deductions in this context (employee business expense or charitable
contribution) would require itemization,234 and would be subject to the
234. See id. § 63(e)(1) (providing that no itemized deduction is allowed unless
election to itemize is made).
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attendant limitations of sections 67 and 68 outlined above."' A
charitable contribution would also be subject to an additional limitation
on the amount that could be deducted in a given year.
236
In Revenue Ruling 65-282,237 the Service adopted a common-sense
approach that respected the effectiveness of the assignment by allowing
exclusion in a similar case. It ruled that court-appointed attorneys who
received payments for representing indigent clients and endorsed these
payments over to their employer (a legal aid society) were not taxable on
those fees. In these circumstances, "the attorneys are considered to be
receiving the fees as agents for the legal aid society., 238 This ruling was
also followed in a similar situation involving law school faculty members
who performed services as court-appointed attorneys, and, pursuant to an
agreement with their law school, endorsed their checks over to the law
school.239
In Revenue Ruling 69-274,24 0 faculty physicians were allowed to
exclude payments made for medical services that they provided to
indigent patients, where these payments were assigned to the university
that employed them. Pursuant to university policy, they were not
allowed to receive fees for professional services rendered in connection
with their teaching duties.241 Accordingly, the physicians formed a group
for the purpose of collecting these fees, which they remitted to the
university after deducting collection costs. 24 2 The ruling specifically
notes that, "[u]nder this arrangement, no individual physician would ever
have control of the funds collected. The funds were used for university
purposes determined solely by the board of trustees of the university. No
faculty physician was a member of the university's board of trustees. 243
The group that they had formed was effectively a collection mechanism,
which was used to facilitate their compliance with the agreement.
However, the Service reached a different result in Revenue Ruling
66-377,244 which involved faculty physicians earning outside income
who were required by an employment agreement to turn over earned
income above a certain stated amount to the university. In that case, the
Service concluded that an agency theory was not an effective basis to
exclude the outside income, as the physicians had earned those fees in
235. See supra Part III.A.
236. See I.R.C. § 170(b).
237. Rev. Rul. 65-282, 1965-2 C.B. 21.
238. Id
239. See Rev. Rul. 74-581, 1974-2 C.B. 25.




244. Rev. Rul. 66-377, 1966-2 C.B. 21.
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their individual capacities.245 It is not clear why the income turned over
to the university under this agreement should be treated differently than
the income in Revenue Ruling 69-274. However, the physicians were
allowed to deduct those fees paid over to the university as a business
expense under section 162.246 To the extent that they were considered
self-employed with respect to those fees (a conclusion that should follow
from any determination that they did not earn the fees in their capacity as
employees), a deduction might prove equivalent to an exclusion in this
context.
Members of religious orders have not fared as well as the attorneys
and physicians in the above rulings, and courts have upheld the Service's
attempt to apply the assignment principle to them. Kircher v. United
States247 is illustrative. The taxpayers were two ordained Catholic priests
who were members of the Franciscan Order, which has as its primary
mission "serving and administering to the poor and to the infirm. 248
They were required to obey vows of poverty and obedience, which in
this case involved executing "a declaration renouncing all interest in
ownership of compensation received for services performed while
members of the Franciscan Order., 249 At the request of the Order, both
priests applied for positions of and were hired as hospital chaplains,
which were civil service positions.25 0 Both received payroll checks from
the hospitals in which they served, which were made out in their name,
and which they in turn endorsed over to the Order.25'
The taxpayers filed returns in which they reported receiving
compensation, but then excluded the amounts received.2 52 The Service
disallowed this exclusion, contending that the priests were taxable on the
income they earned, notwithstanding the agreement with the Order.253
Here, the availability of a charitable deduction for a contribution to the
Order would not be equivalent to the exclusion due to deduction
limitations. 254  The United States Claims Court granted summary
judgment for the Service, and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed on the ground that the taxpayers had earned this income in their
individual capacities and not as agents of the Order.255 Thus, their
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. 872 F.2d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
248. Id. at 1015.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 1015, 1017.
251. See id. at 1016-17.
252. Id. at 1017.
253. Id. at 1017-18.
254. See I.R.C. § 170(d)(1) (2002).
255. SeeKircher, 872 F.2d at 1018.
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agreement to turn over that income to the Order did not prevent them
from being taxed upon it.
256
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the question of
agency status
is one of law based on general principles of agency to be established
by considering all of the underlying facts. There are no hard and fast
rules. The unique facts in each case will inevitably lead the court to
place more emphasis on one or more factors and less on others.
2 57
In lieu of "rigid standards," the court explained that it had "adopted a
flexible approach that would balance the diverse factual circumstances of
each case against the basic principle of income taxation that income is
taxable to the person who earns it."'2 58  Despite this emphasis on
balancing, the fact that the contractual employment relationship existed
between the hospital and the priests, rather than with the Order,
apparently played a significant role in this decision to tax the priests.
259
Other courts have reached similar results in cases involving members of
religious orders.260
It is difficult to reconcile the results in these cases with the earlier
256. See id.
257. Id. (footnotes omitted).
258. Id. at 1018-19.
259. See id. at 1019-20.
260. See also Schuster v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 672, 679 (7th Cir. 1986) (involving nun
serving as a nurse); Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(involving Jesuit priest in similar circumstances). Also at issue in each of these cases was
the question whether the Commissioner had changed the prior official position by failing
to presume that a member of a religious order was acting as an agent of the order.
However, even if true, this would not have provided the taxpayer with sufficient support
to avoid taxation. See id. at 1011 ("Even accepting the notion that the Commissioner's
present position represents a departure from prior administrative practice, which is by no
means certain, it is well established that the Commissioner may change an earlier
interpretation of the law, even if such a change is made retroactive in effect. This rule
applies even though a taxpayer may have relied to his detriment upon the
Commissioner's prior position.") (citing Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-75
(1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1957)). In Schuster, a
dissenting judge made these observations, which cast some light on a possible reason for
the change in position:
The government seems indeed to have changed its policy on demanding taxes
from members of religious orders who have taken a vow of poverty. I do not
disagree with the majority that the government may under most circumstances
change its administrative practice. But here the government has nowhere
denied that its change of position was anything but a pusillanimous reaction to
the antics of the tax protest movement. Abuse of the tax system by tax
resisters, who occasionally have recourse to religious disguises, is no good
reason for unfairly changing the rules at the expense of genuine members of
religious orders who have taken solemn vows of poverty.
Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679-80 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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taxpayer-friendly rulings for the legal aid attorneys and the medical
faculty. 261 The priests admittedly "earned" the income, in the sense that
it was produced by their services; the same was true of the legal aid
attorney and medical faculty physicians. However, they did not control
that income or its consumption in any meaningful sense.
The priests could perhaps change their future contracts to ensure the
Order is compensated for providing services. However, it is questionable
whether such a formalistic change should be required in order to impact
the tax consequences imposed upon them. The priests' agreement to
renounce any claims to future compensation in favor of the Order was
hardly a typical tax avoidance scheme. For this reason, the assignment
of income principle arguably should not have been applied here. 262 The
comments of a dissenting judge in a similar case should be noted:
Justice Holmes held in Lucas v. Earl that an assignment of income
by the income earner was not effective to shift the locus of tax
liability. I am sure that Justice Holmes, keeping track of our work at
his celestial Lexis terminal, is appalled to find his much-cited opinion
invoked by the government and the Tax Court to extract taxes from a
poverty-pledged nun doing corporal works of mercy on behalf of a
religious community.
263
Thus this tour of the assignment principle ends with a taste of
inconsistency. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Jones, assignment cases can
be difficult because of the diverse facts and circumstances that courts
must consider:
Cases of this kind are not easy to decide. In seeking to reconcile the
implications of the infinite variety of facts presented by the decided
cases and all that has been said about the subject of anticipatory
assignment of income, one is likely to be displeased with his own
wits; and may find his mind teetering between conflicting
conclusions. As stated by Mr. Justice Stone in Harrison v. Schaffner:
"[']Drawing the line' is a recurrent difficulty in those fields of the
261. See Jensen, supra note 152, at 652 (referring to the "striking divergence in the
Service's treatment of seemingly similar cases" in this context).
262. The fact that the assignee in this case was a tax-exempt charitable organization
should have no bearing on the efficacy of the assignment. Moreover, to the extent that
Judge Cudahy's suggestion in Schuster that concerns about the use of tax-exempt
organizations for tax avoidance purposes motivated a change, see supra note 260, query
whether other tools, such as taxation of unrelated business taxable income, might prove
equally effective in addressing this problem.
263. Schuster, 800 F.2d at 679 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In a
footnote, Judge Cudahy cites Matthew 24:35-40, which is an apocalyptic reference.
Query whether he meant to cite Matthew 25:35-40, which begins "for I was hungry and
you gave Me food; I was thirsty and you gave Me drink; I was a stranger and you took
me in." Matthew 25:35.
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law where differences in degree produce ultimate differences inkind.["] 264
Inconsistency in this context appears to be a symptom of the
malleable nature of the assignment principle. If the assignment principle
is triggered by inappropriate schemes of tax avoidance, its triggering
mechanism suffers from indeterminacy. As the above cases show,
merely lowering one's tax burden does not automatically trigger
application of the assignment principle. For example, Stranahan and
Jones both involved transactions that ultimately reduced tax revenues in
particular cases; nevertheless, the court resisted the application of the
assignment principle. Similarly, in Hempt Brothers, legislative intent
divined from other provisions of the Code was utilized to resist the
application of the assignment principle, even though its application
would generally increase tax revenues and reinforce the concept of
taxing those who actually earned the income. The context of agency and
employment relationships, where courts must divine whether to respect
formal legal relationships or to impose an alternative characterization,
provides further examples of the discretionary nature of these
determinations. It is not surprising, then, that courts struggling with
contingent fee cases have reached inconsistent results. These cases are
discussed in the next section.
B. Application to Contingent Fees
Courts are divided on the question of whether a contingent fee
agreement is effective in changing the locus of taxable income from
client to attorney. This division stems in part from disagreements about
the true nature of contingent fee agreements and their legal effects.
Policy concerns about horizontal equity also appear to affect the results
obtained. These divergent approaches-which are here labeled the
"Resistance Camp" (those courts resisting the application of the
assignment of income principle) and the "Assignment Camp" (those
courts applying the assignment of income principle)-are explored
below.
1. The "Resistance Camp"
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Cotnam v. Commissioner265 is a
leading case in which a divided court resisted the application of the
assignment principle, concluding that the contingent fee portion of an
264. Jones v. Comm'r, 306 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted).
265. 216F.2d 119(5th Cir. 1959), rev'g28 T.C. 947 (1957).
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otherwise taxable recovery could be excluded from the client's taxable
income. 266  Cotnam had sued a decedent's estate to enforce an oral
contract for a bequest in consideration for services provided to the
decedent during 1940 through 1944.267 After nearly three years of
litigation, which ended with a decision in her favor by the Supreme
Court of Alabama, she was awarded $120,000 plus interest. 268 In 1948,
the administrator of the estate issued a check, payable to Cotnam and her
attorneys, which was deposited in the firm's bank account. 269  The
attorneys paid over $75,254.17 to Cotnam, representing the amount due
to her after payment of fees of $50,365.83, retained under a contingent
fee agreement.
270
The Commissioner took the position that Cotnam was taxable on the
entire judgment (including the attorney's fee portion), rejecting her
position that the award was excludable as a bequest. 71 Pursuant to
section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the tax due on this
amount was computed by allocating it ratably over the years 1940
through 1944, when she had earned the income.272 To the taxpayer's
dismay, the Commissioner refused to allow any deduction for the fees
against her income tax liability computed under section 107.273 The
Commissioner allowed a deduction for the year 1948, when the fees were
paid,274 but in that year she had only $6,912.07 of other income that
could be offset by this deduction.275 As a result, she faced additional tax
liability because, in effect, a significant portion of the deduction was
lost. 276 Thus, despite the fact that the taxpayer lived before the advent of
the AMT and the constraints of sections 67 and 68 on itemized
266. Id. at 121.
267. See Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 948; see also Cotnam, 216 F.2d at 120.




272. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 121. During the years at issue, section 107 applied
when compensation for services covering a period of at least thirty-six calendar months is
payable in a single tax year. It imposes a limit on tax liability by computing the
aggregate tax due as if the income had been received ratably over several tax years, rather
than in a lump sum. See id at 126 n. 1 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (quoting statute).
273. See id. at 121.
274. See id.
275. See id. According to the tax court, in computing income tax liability, respondent
allocated the $120,000 over a period of four and one-half years, 1940 through 1944, and
allowed petitioner a deduction in 1948 "for legal and trust fees in the amount of
$50,462.76, which in effect was a deduction to the extent of petitioner's other income in
the amount of $6,912.07." Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 950.
276. See Cotnam, 28 T.C. at 950. The amount of the proposed deficiency was
$35,985.02, see id. at 947, which was a substantial portion of the $75,000 of the award
left after payment of her attorney's fees.
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deductions, she was adversely affected by a deduction limitation.
The United States Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's position
on all these points, including the inclusion of the legal fees in her taxable
income. The court emphasized that it was "her claim, not that of her
attorneys.2 7  Moreover, the fact that the check was run through her
attorneys' bank account was of no significance, as these funds belonged
to her.278 Citing Lucas, the tax court concluded that the entire amount
279was includable in her taxable income.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the tax court that the
amount received was not excludable from her income as a bequest.
2 80
However, a divided panel saw the taxation of the recovery in a different
light. The majority, consisting of Judges Rives and Brown, reversed the
tax court on that issue, finding that the fee portion of the recovery was
taxable to her attorneys, but not to her. Their views of the factual and
legal effect of the contingent fee agreement are significant, as they help
in focusing future controversies.
First, the majority apparently understood this transaction as
involving the assignment of a property interest.28  As the court noted,
Alabama law gives an attorney rights in the claim that are equal to those
of the client when it comes to enforcing the attorney's right to collect
fees. 82 Pursuant to the Alabama lien statute, a defendant could not
satisfy a judgment until the attorney's claim for fees was satisfied.283
The majority also viewed Cotnam's assignment of a property
interest as distinct from an assignment of income under Lucas. The
speculative value of her claim appears to be a significant aspect of this
distinction. Here, she had a claim based on an oral contract, which the
majority characterized as being "a long way from having the equivalent
of cash. 284 In fact, it was so far from a cash equivalent that the majority
stated: "Her claim had no fair market value, and it was doubtful and
uncertain as to whether it had any value. The only economic benefit she
could then derive from her claim was to use a part of it in helping her to
collect the remainder." 285 Thus, although a property right was involved,
it was quite limited in scope.
277. Id. at 953.
278. Id. at 954.
279. Id.
280. See id.; see also Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 124-25.
281. It should be noted that a claim or chose in action is considered property for other
purposes, including estate taxation. See, e.g., Herbert's Estate v. Comm'r, 139 F.2d 756,
758 (3d Cir. 1943) (treating chose in action as property for estate taxation).
282. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
283. See id. at 125 n.5.




Although the majority recognized that she could use a portion of her
claim to collect a recovery, it distinguished this situation from one where
the assignor should be taxed on consumption or enjoyment of economic
gain, as in Horst:
At the time she entered into the contingent fee contract, she had
realized no income from the claim, and the only use she could make
of it was to transfer a part so that she might have some hope of
ultimately enjoying the remainder.
By such limited use she has not 'fully enjoyed the benefit of his
(her) economic gain represented by his(her) right to receive income'
within the doctrine of Helvering v. Horst .... That doctrine can
have no just and realistic application to a case like this, where the
only economic benefit to the taxpayer was as an aid to the collection
of a part of an otherwise worthless claim.
286
The majority also recognized that, although the judgment may have
been "earned" by Cotnam because she had performed services, that sense
of earning was not cognizable by the assignment of income principle in
this context:
True, in a remote rather than a proximate sense, the entire amount
of the judgment had also been earned by Mrs. Cotnam, but she could
never have collected anything or enjoyed any economic benefit
unless she had employed attorneys, and to do so, she had to part with
forty percent of her claim long before the realization of any income
from it. The only in income, the only real economic benefit, which
Mrs. Cotnam ever received was the $75,254.17 which she collected.
(In our opinion, it is as illegal as it is unjust to tax her on the
remaining $50,365.83 which did not pass through her hands and of
which she never had any control.) In a realistic sense the remaining
$50,365.83 was income of the attorneys, not of Mrs. Cotnam.
2 8 7
Finally, the majority rejected an application of the assignment
principle by analogy to Old Colony Trust, based on the theory that her
assignment of future income satisfied a payment obligation to the
attorneys:
That argument seems to us to be based on the false premise that Mrs.
Cotnam obligated herself to pay the attorneys' fee. She did not.
Their fee was contingent upon success, and was fully paid by the
assignment of a portion of a doubtful claim. Mrs. Cotnam's tree
(Lucas v. Earl) had borne no fruit and would have been barren if she
had not transferred a part interest in that tree to her attorneys, who
286. Id. at 125-26 (citation omitted).
287. Id. at 126.
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then rendered the services necessary to bring forth the fruit.
288
If Cotnam had no payment obligation, her attorneys' collection of their
fee could not appropriately be characterized as.satisfaction of a payment
obligation and a source of taxable income. Thus, in this context, the
majority found that Cotnam neither realized nor recognized income when
she made the bargain with her attorneys, or at any time thereafter, with
respect to the portion of her claim transferred to her attorneys.
The majority's approach has been followed by courts in the Fifth,
Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits. For example, in Estate of Clarks ex rel.
Brisco-Whitter v. United States,28 9 the Sixth Circuit analogized
Michigan's attorney lien statute to Alabama's in choosing to follow the
majority's approach in Cotnam.290 The court stated in part:
The common law lien in this case under Michigan law operates in
more or less the same way as the Alabama lien in Cotnam. Ray
Andrews Brown, [in The Law of Personal Property], describes a
common law attorney's lien as follows:
According to Mr. Justice Earl, of the New York Court of Appeals,
"the lien, as thus established, is not strictly like any other lien
known to the law, because it may exist although the attorney has
not and cannot, in any proper senses, have possession of the
judgment recovered. It is a peculiar lien, to be enforced by
peculiar methods. It was a device invented by the courts for the
protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients, by
disabling clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without
paying for the valuable services by which the recoveries were
obtained. The lien was never enforced like other liens. If the fund
recovered was in possession or under the control of the court, it
would not allow the client to obtain it until he had paid his
attorney, and in administering the fund it would see that the
attorney was protected. If the thing recovered was in a judgment,
and notice of the attorney's claim had been given, the court would
not allow the judgment to be paid to the prejudice of the
attorney."
291
The Sixth Circuit also recognized that the gratuitous context of Lucas
and Horst provided an additional basis for resisting application of the
assignment principle:
In Lucas and Horst, the assignees were the object of gifts and not
288. Id. (citation omitted).
289. 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
290. Id. at 857-58.
291. Id. at 856 (quoting RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §
116, at 559 (2d ed. 1955) (quoting Goodrich v. McDonald, 19 N.E. 649 (N.Y. 1889))).
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subject to income taxation themselves if the income was taxed to
their assignor or donor. The IRS chose to tax the assignors, not both
the donors and donees. By having the income taxed to the donor, the
donee escapes income taxation. Not so here. Here the lawyer is
taxed on the full amount of the payment. Under the government's
theory both the lawyer and the client are taxable.
The present transaction under scrutiny is more like a division of
property than an assignment of income. Here the client as assignor
has transferred some of the trees in his orchard, not merely the fruit
from the trees. The lawyer has become a tenant in common of the
orchard owner and must cultivate and care for and harvest the fruit of
the entire tract. Here the lawyer's income is the result of his own
personal skill and judgment, not the skill or largess of a family
member who wants to split his income to avoid taxation. The income
should be charged to the one who earned it and received it, not as
under the government's theory of the case, to one who neither
received it nor earned it. The situation is no different from the
transfer of a one-third interest in real estate that is thereafter leased to
a tenant.
292
Later decisions in the Fifth and the Eleventh Circuits, which were
formed by dividing the Fifth Circuit as comprised when Cotnam was
decided, have followed the majority in Cotnam on stare decisis
grounds.293 In Srivastava v. Commissioner,294 a three-judge panel of the
Fifth Circuit noted that tax policy implications might now counsel a new
result if it were writing on a clean slate:
Were we ruling on a tabula rasa, we might be inclined to include
contingent fees in gross income. Principles of tax neutrality, if
nothing else, dictate that result, for when a taxpayer recovers from a
favorable judgment or litigation settlement, and compensates his
attorney on a non-contingent basis, the full amount of the recovery
may be treated as gross income (as petitioners acknowledged during
oral argument). There is no apparent reason to treat contingent fees
differently or to believe that Congress intended to subsidize
292. Id. at 857-58. The court's analogy to a transfer of trees or an interest in real
estate may be problematic, as in both cases a taxable disposition of property would
presumably occur. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 410 n.4 (2000) (pointing out
this concern), affd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). However, if the value of the
transferred item is presumed to be de minimis without the attorney's services, as the
majority in Cotnam apparently did, this analogy creates no significant tax problem.
293. See, e.g., Young v. Comm'r, 240 F.3d 359, 377 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Since the
former Fifth Circuit split, the Eleventh Circuit and the new Fifth Circuit have followed
Cotnam on stare decisis grounds."); see also Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346, 1347
(11 th Cir. 2000); Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2000).
294. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
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contingent fee agreements in such a fashion.
295
However, it ultimately followed Cotnam. In doing so, it also clarified
the role that the particulars of state law, including attorney's lien statutes,
should play in evaluating whether to apply the assignment principle:
The Commissioner invites us to distinguish Cotnam on the ground
that we are faced with contingent fees governed by the law of Texas',
not Alabama. The distinction rests on the predicate that Alabama
gives its contingent fee attorneys a greater degree of power to enforce
their rights than does Texas.
These distinctions, however, should not affect the analysis required
by the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, which looks to the
taxpayer's degree of control and dominion over the asset. As we
have said, a taxpayer who enters into a contingent fee contract divests
some measure of control over a claim but retains the rest, and how
much control is sufficient to trigger taxation under the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine is not easily answerable. But we find
no assistance from the fact that Alabama may offer its contingent fee
attorneys, by way of example, greater power to pursue relief directly
against the opposing party. Whatever are the attorney's rights
against the defendant under Texas law as opposed to Alabama law,
the discrepancy does not meaningfully affect the economic reality
facing the taxpayer-plaintiff.
2 9 6
Thus, consistent with Cotnam, the court focused on the substance of the
relationship as evidenced by the practical reality of control over the
attorney's fee portion of an award as the basis for taxation.
The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the continuing vitality of
Cotnam and sent a warning to the Commissioner in Foster v. United
States,297 where it awarded attorney's fees under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 to a
taxpayer who was forced to litigate to defend his right to exclude a
contingent fee on the authority of Cotnam.298 The court stated in part:
The government argues that, because of the circuit split on the issues
raised in Cotnam, the IRS was substantially justified in denying
Foster's refund claim. In its appeal brief, the government lists the
circuits where it is litigating the Cotnam issue, and includes a list of
circuits where it has won and where it has lost. However, the IRS
should not expect the individual taxpayer to fund its crusade to
change the law. While other circuits may include contingency fees
paid to attorneys in a taxpayer's gross income, Cotnam is clearly the
295. Id. at 357.
296. Id. at 363-64 (footnote omitted).
297. 249 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
298. Id. at 1278.
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law of this circuit.
299
As discussed below, the policy objection raised in Srivastava, which
focused on horizontal equity between litigants, has been raised by other
courts as a reason to depart from Cotnam. Query, however, whether this
policy concern truly holds up under careful scrutiny. 300  Contrary to
Srivastava's recognition of the perils of looking solely to state lien
statutes as the basis for applying the assignment principle, other courts
have indeed used this as a basis to depart from Cotnam and Clarks.
Some significant cases from the Assignment Camp are discussed in the
next section.
2. The "Assignment Camp"
Judge Wisdom's dissent in Cotnam took an approach that would
later become familiar in the Assignment Camp: expressing sympathy for
the plight of the taxpayer, but invoking the assignment principle against
the taxpayer because the judge is constrained from doing otherwise.
Judge Wisdom began his dissent as follows:
The fates and the tax collector, a formidable combination, have cut
so deeply into the award for Mrs. Cotnam's services that it is with
some regret [that] I feel constrained to dissent from the holding that
the amount paid as attorneys' fees is excluded from the taxpayer's
gross income.
30 1
In contrast to the majority, Judge Wisdom viewed Cotnam as
having already earned her income by performing services to the
decedent. Indeed, he stated that "at the time of the assignment to the
attorneys all of her services had been rendered and all of the income
earned., 30 2 In his view, she obtained an economic benefit through using
the claim to obtain the services of her attorneys, which he characterized
as an act of consumption or enjoyment much like that found to cause
taxation in Horst:
This case is stronger than Horst.. ., since Mrs. Cotnam assigned the
right to income already earned. She controlled the disposition of the
entire amount and diverted part of the payment from herself to the
attorneys. By virtue of the assignment Mrs. Cotnam enjoyed the
economic benefit of being able to fight her case through the course
and discharged her obligation to her attorneys (in itself equivalent to
299. Id.
300. See infra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
301. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 126 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
302. Id. (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
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receipt of income, under Old Colony Trust.. . .303
Thus, Judge Wisdom reached different conclusions about when the
income had been "earned," who "earned" it, and whether it had been
assigned to another in satisfaction of an obligation. Unlike the majority,
Judge Wisdom appears to give no weight to the impact of the contested
nature of her claim on its value at the time the assignment was made. He
effectively treated Cotnam as though she had a valuable property right,
rather than a right that was worthless without the assistance of her
attorneys. Moreover, he treated Cotnam as using that right to satisfy an
obligation that she had to pay her attorneys for their services. In
contrast, the majority rejected the conclusion that Cotnam had any future
obligation, presumably because her transfer of a property right
extinguished that obligation at the outset of the attorney-client
relationship.
Other circuit courts have reached the same conclusion as Judge
Wisdom, but with some variations in approach. The Ninth Circuit's
decision in Coady v. Commissioner,30 4 exemplifies one approach in
which the court focused on the specific rights under the attorney's lien
statute as a basis to distinguish the result from Cotnam.3 05 Coady had
retained attorneys to represent her in a wrongful discharge claim against
her former employer. Pursuant to their agreement, the attorneys were to
receive "a contingent fee of 33.33% (45% if the judgment were
appealed) or $185 per hour plus costs.
306
Coady was successful at trial and she was awarded damages totaling
$373,307.307 Her former employer wrote a check to her for $259,610.89
in full payment of the judgment, reflecting the stated damages less
withholding for federal income and employment taxes due on her
earnings.3 °8 Coady paid $221,338.32 to her attorneys, representing
$124,435.67 in attorney's fees and $96,902.65 in unpaid litigation
costs.
30 9
At issue on appeal was whether fees and costs paid to her attorneys
could be excluded from gross income.3t0 On this issue, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Cotnam and Clarks on the basis that the Alaska attorney's
303. Id. at 127 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
304. 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001).
305. Id. at 1190.
306. Id. at 1187.
307. Id. The components of this award were as follows: "$89,225 for back pay,
$76,980 for future lost earnings, and $207,102 for lost fringe and pension benefits." Id
308. See id.
309. Id at 1188.
310. See id. Coady ultimately conceded that a portion of the fees paid relating to her
wages should be included in income and treated as an itemized deduction, but she
contested similar treatment for the rest of the fees. See id.
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lien statute applicable in this case did not give proprietary rights to the
attorney in the same manner as the Alabama and Michigan lien statutes:
[U]nder Alaska law, attorneys do not have a superior lien or
ownership interest in the cause of action as they do in Alabama and
Michigan .... According to the [Alaska] statute, an attorney obtains
a lien which attaches to property belonging to the client; it does not
confer any ownership interest upon attorneys or grant attorneys any
right and power over the suits, judgments, or decrees of their
clients.
311
Following similar decisions in the First and Federal Circuits,31 2 the
court essentially viewed the contingent fee agreement in this context as
attempting exactly what the Supreme Court had prohibited in Lucas and
Horst: it was merely a clever device to change the locus of taxable
income. 31 3  Moreover, the court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to
311. See id. at 1190. The tax court's analysis of the statute was even more extensive,
as it stated in part:
This provision stands in marked contrast to the provision of the Alabama Code
relied upon by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the Cotnam case.
Although both provisions give an attorney a lien to secure his or her
compensation, the Alaska provision, unlike the Alabama provision, does not
give attorneys the same right and power over suits, judgments, and decrees as
their clients had or may have. In contrast to a client subject to the Alabama
provision, a client subject to the Alaska provision retains all proprietary rights
in his or her claim, subject to a statutory lien held by the attorney on any
proceeds from the claim. The Alaska provision also subordinates an attorney's
lien "to the rights existing between the parties to the action or proceeding",
whereas the lien of an attorney under the Alabama provision is "superior to all
liens but tax liens." In fact, the Alaska provision is similar to provisions of the
Nebraska and South Dakota Codes, which we held in Petersen v.
Commissioner were distinguishable from the provisions of the Alabama Code
considered by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Cotnam v.
Commissioner.
Coady v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 257 (1998) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 213 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001).
312. See Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 944-46 (1st Cir. 1995) (refusing to exclude
legal fees in connection with recovery of lost wages and retirement benefits); Baylin v.
United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (refusing to exclude legal fees in connection
with proceedings contesting condemnation award). The Ninth Circuit followed Coady's
rationale in a similar case involving California law governing attorney's liens in Benci-
Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112
(2001). The Tenth Circuit has also followed Coady's rationale in Campbell v.
Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2001).
313. See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190-91. In Baylin, the court wasted little time in
applying an economic substance analysis to the taxpayer's argument for exclusion based
on the effect of the agreement:
The partnership argues alternatively that, because the attorney was paid a
portion of the condemnation recovery directly under the contingency fee
agreement, that portion of the recovery was never part of the partnership's
gross income. Very little need be said about this argument, which, if accepted,
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distinguish these cases based on the contested and contingent nature of
the claim, concluding that this fact alone was not sufficient reason to
resist the assignment principle.
314
In Young. v. Commissioner,31 5 the Fourth Circuit similarly rejected
the taxpayer's argument based on the summary application of Lucas and
a policy concern about treating attorney's fees differently based on the
method of payment:
Mrs. Young urges us to follow Cotnam and Clarks. But to do so
would permit a client to avoid taxation by "skillfully devis[ing]" the
method for paying her attorneys' fees, the precise danger the
Supreme Court warned against in [Lucas v.] Earl. If her attorneys
charged an hourly rate, Mrs. Young would certainly have to include
within her gross income any income used to pay her legal fees,
whether the income came from the settlement proceeds or otherwise.
We see no reason to allow her to escape taxation on a portion of the
settlement proceeds simply because she arranged to compensate her
attorneys directly from the proceeds through a contingent fee
arrangement. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit itself, although following
Cotnam on grounds of stare decisis, has recently recognized that a
client with a contingent fee arrangement:
[O]ught not receive preferential tax treatment from the simple
fortuity that he hired counsel on a contingent basis, for his
attorney's method of compensation did not meaningfully affect the
gain he was able to enjoy from a favorable resolution of the
would elevate form over substance and allow the partnership to escape taxation
on a portion of its income through a skillfully devised fee arrangement.
Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454.
314. See 213 F.3d at 1191. To support this position, the court cited Kochansky v.
Commissioner, 92 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1996), a case involving an assignment between
an attorney and his ex-wife. However, the Kochansky court itself had noted that the
attorney's assignment was quite different from a case in which there was an arm's length
transaction. See id. (distinguishing the application of the assignment principle in that
case from the Fifth Circuit's resistance to assignment in Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d
292, 296 (5th Cir. 1962)); see also supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text
(discussing Jones).
We need not decide here whether Jones is a proper interpretation of Lucas v.
Earl; it is enough that it is very different from Kochansky's case. Jones had
transferred his whole business to a corporation that undertook to maintain and
finance the litigation of a claim for past construction services. Kochansky
transferred nothing but his right to income which, if it arose, was not disputed.
He remained in control of his own services, the source or "tree" from which the
fruit came.
Kochansky, 92 F.3d. at 959. The claims court in Baylin also summarily refused to take
the contingent nature of the claim into account, stating in part: "The temporarily
uncertain magnitude of the legal fees under such an arrangement and the vehicle of an
assignment cannot dictate the income tax treatment of those fees." Baylin v. United
States, 30 Fed. Cl. 248, 258 (1993), af'd, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).





Coady is repeated as authority for refusing to look at the contingent
nature of the client's claim.31 7 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit takes the
view that the client does not part with sufficient control over the claim to
effectuate an assignment of a property interest: "The client still controls
the claim (or property) and ultimately decides to forego, pursue, or settle
that claim. The attorney simply provides a service and receives
compensation for that service, whether by an hourly rate or through a
contingent fee., 318  On this issue, the Fourth Circuit agreed with
Srivastava that federal law, as opposed to the details of state attorney lien
statutes, should govern the result.319 However, in its view, the economic
interest of the attorney apparently fails to meet the standard.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Kenseth v.
Commissioner320 merits attention as an important circuit-level case in the
Assignment Camp. In that case, Judge Posner, writing for the court,
concluded that a contingent fee agreement presents a relatively
straightforward case of an anticipatory assignment of income that falls
squarely within the scope of Lucas.321  His view was premised on
characterizing the attorney-client relationship as similar to that of a seller
of goods and a salesperson paid on commission:
[Taxpayer] concedes as he must that had he paid the law firm on an
hourly basis, the fee would have been an expense. It would have
been a deduction from, not a reduction of, his gross income, as held
in the Alexander case. We cannot see what difference it makes that
the expense happened to be contingent rather than fixed. If a firm
pays a salesman on a commission basis, the sales income he
generates is income to the firm and his commissions are a deductible
expense, even though they were contingent on his making sales.
322
Here, Judge Posner seems interested in ensuring parity between.
taxpayers who pay their attorneys on an hourly basis and those who
utilize a contingent fee. In his view, the fact that state law grants a lien
to the attorney, rather than a proprietary interest, supports this
characterization:
Of course there is a sense in which contingent compensation
316. Id. at 377-78 (quoting Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 363 (5th Cir. 2000))
(footnote omitted).
317. See id. at 378.
318. Id.
319. See id.
320. 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001), aff'g 114 T.C. 399 (2000).




constitutes the recipient a kind of joint venturer of the payor. But the
plaintiff concedes, as again he must, that Wisconsin law does not
make the contingent-fee lawyer a joint owner of his client's claim in
the legal sense any more than the commission salesman is a joint
owner of his employer's accounts receivable. The lawyer has a lien,
that is, a security interest. But the ownership of a security interest is
not ownership of the security. A firm whose assets are secured by a
mortgage can deduct the interest from its income, but it is not
allowed to reduce its income by the amount of the interest. Interest
on a secured obligation is just another expense. And, though this is
just the icing on the cake, Wisconsin now (the rule may once have
been different) prohibits lawyers from acquiring "a proprietary
interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the
lawyer is conducting for a client." The rule allows the lawyer to
acquire a lien and to make a contingent-fee contract, but neither a lien
nor a contractual right is "proprietary."
323
To the extent that the client maintains ownership of the claim, Judge
Posner saw little significance to any loss of control over it:
Kenseth says that he relinquished control over his income-producing
asset, namely the age-discrimination claim. The relevance of this
point to his tax liability is obscure, since owners of income-producing
property frequently relinquish control over the property, for example
to a tenant, receiving income that is taxable; and the point itself is
incorrect. Kenseth no more relinquished control of the claim to his
contingent-fee lawyer than he would have to a fixed-fee lawyer. He
could fire either one and would owe either one for work done but not
paid for. The principal effect of the rule for which Kenseth contends
would be to create an artificial, a purely tax-motivated, incentive to
substitute contingent for hourly legal fees.
324
Judge Posner's concern about tax avoidance is rooted in the
deduction limitations that are otherwise imposed on the taxpayer. Judge
Posner viewed these limitations as the proper subject of legislative,
rather than judicial, remedy:
As an original matter, in taxation's Garden of Eden, it would indeed
323. Id. at 883-84 (citations omitted). Judge Posner also analogized to the
relationship between a general contractor and subcontractors in a construction project:
"All receipts are counted as gross income, and outlays to subcontractors and materialmen
are deductible, even though these subcontractors have liens on the work and even though
the general contractor could say that he just 'assigns' a part of the job to the sub." Id. at
884.
324. Id. The reference to the landlord-tenant relationship here is puzzling. Income
from a tenant (which presumably represents the lawyer) would be limited to the agreed-




be difficult to think of a reason why Kenseth should have been
denied the normal privilege of deducting from his gross income 100
percent of an expense reasonably incurred for the production of
taxable income. And nothing in the background of the alternative
minimum tax law indicates why attorneys' fees were, along with
other "miscellaneous expenses," lumped in with tax-preference items
and denied the normal privilege. But the idea behind the tax is of
course to limit otherwise allowable deductions, so that, to put it
crudely, everybody who has income pays some federal income tax.
So rather than ask why attorneys' fees are not deductible for purposes
of the alternative minimum tax, we should ask why those fees should
be distinguished from other miscellaneous deductions that the tax
disallows; no answer comes to mind.
Enough; for in any event it is not a feasible judicial undertaking to
achieve global equity in taxation, especially when the means
suggested for eliminating one inequity (that which Kenseth argues is
created by the alternative minimum income tax) consists of creating
another inequity (differential treatment for purposes of that tax of
fixed and contingent legal fees). And if it were a feasible judicial
undertaking, it still would not be a proper one, equity in taxation
being a political rather than a jural concept. Indeed the cases that
reject the Tax Court's position seem based on little more than
sympathy for taxpayers.
3. Can These Two Approaches Be Reconciled?
If the decisions in the Resistance Camp are based on "sympathy"
for taxpayers, Judge Posner's approach appears quite unsympathetic to
them. However, his approach is hardly based solely on incontrovertible
logic. Like his counterparts in the Resistance Camp, Judge Posner starts
with contestable presuppositions about the attorney-client relationship
reflecting normative choices favoring the government rather than the
taxpayer. Shifting those presuppositions slightly puts the taxpayer in a
position favoring exclusion, albeit in a manner that departs from a strict
focus on assignment and who actually "earns" income.
Judge Posner chose to analogize attorney's fees to selling costs,
which are deductible from gross income for a taxpayer engaged in the
trade or business of selling goods.326 However, if it is assumed instead
325. Id. at 884-85 (citations omitted). It is interesting to note that, although Judge
Posner refuses to invoke any form of equity jurisprudence favoring the taxpayer, he was
willing to allow the Commissioner to invoke substance over form principles in a recent
case when doing so would favor the government. See Grojean v. Comm'r, 248 F.3d 572
(7th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that substance over form principles can be used by the
government but not the taxpayer).
326. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2002).
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that the taxpayer had paid commissions to a broker to sell stock, a
different characterization follows. Treasury regulations provide that
such commissions "are an offset against the selling price. 327
Treating commissions and other selling expenses as an offset
against the selling price in the case of a capital asset ensures that those
expenses reduce capital gain, which may be taxed at a preferential rate to
ordinary income. 328 However, "offset" treatment also achieves a sensible
result in measuring the true economic income associated with a particular
transaction.
It is important to recognize that "offset" treatment is not limited to
situations where capital-gain producing assets are involved.329 Treasury
327. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e) (as amended in 1987); see also Woodward v.
Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572, 574-75 (1970) (explaining that recovery of capital expenditures
occurs through offset to selling price, rather than deduction); Ward v. Comm'r, 20 T.C.
332 (1953) (requiring attorney's fees paid to negotiate sale to be offset against selling
price for purposes of computing capital gain).
328. See, e.g., Kirschenmann v. Comm'r, 488 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The
rationale of these cases is that since selling expenses are capital expenses, they are not
deductible from ordinary income."); Munson v. McGinnes, 283 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1960).
The Third Circuit expressed willingness to require capitalization to prevent a taxpayer
from converting a deduction from capital gain to a deduction against ordinary income:
[W]e are the more disposed to approve the capitalization of the item in suit
because a contrary conclusion would enable a taxpayer to benefit inequitably
from the circumstance that ordinary income and capital gains are taxed at
different rates. Suppose the amount in excess of cost realized from the sale of a
capital item is exactly equal to the expenditures necessary to accomplish the
sale and allocable solely to it. If such expense is capitalized the taxpayer's
return will show no capital gain and, for tax purposes, the entire transaction has
no effect. This seems fair. But if the taxpayer reports his profit apart from this
expense as a capital gain and then deducts the expense from gross income, in
which only a part of the capital gain is included, he actually reduces his income
tax through a transaction which, in a business sense, has resulted in neither gain
nor loss. We think this should not be permitted unless it is plainly required by
the tax laws. We have already pointed out that in our view the tax laws may
reasonably be construed in a way which avoids such a consequence.
Id. at 337.
329. In Alexander v. Commissioner, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995), the First Circuit
rejected an argument that attorney's fees in a case involving breach of contract and age
discrimination claims should be considered as a "cost of disposition" that would offset
the amount realized from a "disposition" of a legal claim through settlement. The court
dismissed this characterization as inapposite where settlement proceeds received were
"clearly in the nature of compensation." Id. at 943. The court also noted:
One might intuitively argue that some sort of 'basis' should be recognized
when one has to litigate to receive one's due compensation. The fact remains,
however, that the Code simply does not provide for the offsetting of basis in
such circumstances except in limited cases involving capital assets. Instead,
the Code permits litigation expenses to be taken into account by way of a
deduction.
Id. at 943 n.9. Linking the nature of the claim to the ultimate treatment of costs is
questionable. Although the nature of the claim may well impact whether gain is ordinary
or capital in nature, the taxpayer was apparently not making such an argument. See id. at
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regulations provide in part: "In a manufacturing, merchandising, or
mining business, 'gross income' means the total sales, less the cost of
goods sold .... In this context, cost of goods sold is an offset to
sales revenue that is used to compute gross income, rather than a
deduction from gross income. 3
Early in the development of the income tax, the components of cost
of goods sold were the product of uncertain, case-by-case
determinations, which were later resolved by statutes and detailed
regulations.332 However, direct materials, direct labor, and some form of
overhead costs have long been recognized as categories of inventoriable
costs, which are taken into account in computing cost of goods sold.333
Statutory rules governing the scope of capitalized costs appear to
have broadened the scope of property that may be subject to
capitalization rules. Section 263A(a) of the Code potentially applies to
both "inventory" and "other property" in the hands of the taxpayer.334
Includable property is defined as "real or tangible personal property
produced by the taxpayer," and, for this purpose, "'tangible personal
property' shall include a film, sound recording, video tape, book, or
similar property."335  The term "produce" is also defined broadly to
include "construct, build, install, manufacture, develop, or improve."
336
Analogizing the pursuit of a legal claim, which is admittedly
943 n.7 ("Petitioners correctly maintain that Taxpayer's contract claims were ordinary,
not capital assets.").
330. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (as amended in 1992).
331. See Molsen v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 485 (1985).
Although purchases are an 'expense' in the colloquial sense, it is well settled
that they are not a 'deduction' within the meaning of section 461 and that they
are not subject to the rules governing deductions under such section. Purchases
are taken into account in computing the cost of goods sold, which is an offset,
or exclusion, employed in the computation of gross profit and gross income
(section 1.61-3 (a), Income Tax Regs.); whereas, throughout the Code, the term
'deduction' is used to refer to amounts subtracted from gross income to arrive
at taxable income.
Id. at 502; see also GERTZMAN, supra note 161, 6.02[1].
332. See GERTZMAN, supra note 161, 6.03 (discussing history of inventoriable
costs).
333. See id. 6.06[2] (noting that such categories "have not been changed by the
1986 Act rules, although the particular costs to be included have been affected")
(footnotes omitted).
334. See I.R.C. § 263A(a)(1) (2002). This reference to "other property" is apparently
intended to cover self-constructed assets. This issue was previously addressed through
caselaw in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (stating that
materials, wages, and depreciation must be capitalized in self-constructed asset under
I.R.C. § 263A(a)(1)).
335. I.R.C. § 263A(b)(1) (emphasis added). Here, the reference to "similar property"
presumably indicates an intention to include intangible assets, such as intellectual
property, that have been reduced to tangible form.
336. Id. § 263A(g)(1) (emphasis added).
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intangible, to the activities covered by section 263A probably stretches
beyond the limits of the statutory language. 337 Such an analogy would
also be vigorously resisted by a taxpayer engaged in a trade or business
who would generally prefer a current deduction over capitalization.
However, accepting this analogy would end wrangling over the
assignment of income principle by reaching a result that more closely
measures economic income. As discussed below in Part V, such an
approach may also appeal to individual plaintiffs facing timing issues
associated with litigation costs incurred over multiple tax years.
Another aspect of Judge Posner's analysis-the proposition that
adopting a position of exclusion will create an incentive for tax
motivated changes from straight fees to contingent fee agreements 338_
seems disconnected with the realities of the marketplace for legal
services. As discussed in Part II.A, contingent fee agreements are the
only practical form for retaining a lawyer in many types of litigation.
339
Individual plaintiffs in civil litigation often lack the resources to pay
attorney's fees in cash, and even if they had the resources to do so they
are ill-equipped to assess personally the risks and rewards of their case.
As a result, a risk-sharing agreement with their attorneys may be the
most effective approach to finance their litigation, as well as the only
practical one.
Suggesting that a terminated worker seeking to vindicate
employment rights will somehow choose to use a contingent fee
agreement, instead of writing checks to cover hourly legal fees and
litigation costs, is like building a fence around the pond so that the fish
won't leave.34° In short, tax avoidance is an unlikely motivation behind
337. Presumably, the court in Alexander would have had trouble with this analogy as
well. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. However, it should be noted that
I.R.C. § 263(a) may also arguably provide a basis for capitalization in this context, to the
extent that one follows the Supreme Court's opinion in Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79 (1992), and its focus upon matching income and expenses as well as the
extent and duration of future benefits.
338. E.g., Kenseth v. Comm'r, 259 F.3d 881, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2001); see also supra
notes 320-26 and accompanying text. Other commentators have also advanced this
argument. See, e.g., Kristina Maynard, Comment, The Fruit Does Not Fall Far from the
Tree: The Unresolved Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorney's Fees, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
991, 1051 (2002) ("Due to the inequity resulting from the different tax treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers ... the Supreme Court should resolve the existing circuit
split and require that taxpayers in all jurisdictions include contingent attorney's fees in
gross income.") (footnotes omitted); Kathryn J. Ball, Comment, Horizontal Equity and
the Tax Consequences of Attorney-Client Fee Agreements, 74 TEMPLE L. REV. 387, 388
(2001) ("Fees paid to an attorney under a contingent fee agreement should be taxable to
clients for reasons of tax neutrality and horizontal equity.").
339. See supra Part I1.A.
340. However, recent reports of problems with Chinese snakehead fish, which can
indeed crawl upon land, may well raise a technical exception to this analogy. See Feds:
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choosing a contingent fee arrangement. 34 1 Achieving horizontal equity
between litigants in contingent fee and certain fee litigation presupposes
that these taxpayer groups are truly in comparable situations, when they
are not. Courts do not need to intervene to equalize tax results for this
reason.
Finally, as Judge Posner pointed out, sometimes intervening to
achieve equity for one group of litigants will create problems for
others. 342 However, following the Assignment Camp's approach also
creates problems in other contexts. As discussed below, treating a
recovery of attorney's fees as gross income when monetary recoveries
include awards under fee-shifting statutes can produce tax results that are
difficult to reconcile with any reasonable view of legislative intent about
the administration of federal tax law, particularly when fee awards are
large in relation to monetary damages awarded.
C. Awards Under Fee-Shifting Statutes
Recoveries of attorney's fees under fee-shifting statutes present
another context for concern about tax consequences for plaintiffs. Fee-
shifting statutes allow courts to award fees and costs to the litigants, not
to their attorneys.343 However, as a practical matter, these awards
provide a source of funds to pay the attorneys for their services and
related expenses, the amount of which is governed by a separate
agreement with the client.
3 44
In Revenue Ruling 80-364, 345 the Service considered how an award
of attorney's fees would be characterized in a case involving back pay.
In situation one, the taxpayer had been awarded back pay, attorney's
fees, and interest as a result of a court order, and all such amounts were
includable in gross income. A similar result is obtained in situation two,
where the award was made as a lump sum without a separate breakdown
of the amount of attorney's fees. Notwithstanding that a portion of the
award was spent on attorney's fees, the total lump sum award was
included in the taxpayer's gross income.
Ban Frankenfish, NEWSDAY, July 24, 2002, at A20.
341. It should be noted that Kenseth involved a class action. The tax court's opinion
notes that the law firm "would have declined to represent [Kenseth] if he had not entered
into the contingent fee agreement." See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 400 (2000),
affd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). Judge Beghe's dissent from the majority's decision
in the tax court notes that Kenseth's agreement with the firm was a contract of adhesion,
which supported his ultimate finding that Kenseth gave up ultimate control over his claim
to the law firm. See id. at 445-46 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
342. See supra notes 320-26 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Part II.B.
344. See supra Part II.B.
345. Rev. Rul. 80-364, 1980-2 C.B. 294.
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When a claim is brought under Title VII, taxing the client on a
recovery of attorney's fees is arguably inconsistent with the
compensatory purposes of the legislation. In Sparrow v.
Commissioner,346 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
relied on the compensatory purpose of the statute to find that a victim of
employment discrimination was taxable on a settlement that included
back pay.347 As the court explained,
The remedies available under Title VII exist to make whole the
employee discriminated against, that is, to place him in the same
position he would have been in but for the discrimination, but not to
compensate beyond that. The Section-by-Section Analysis
introduced by Senator Williams at the time the back pay provisions
were enacted as part of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972 stated:
The provisions of this subsection [the back pay subsection now
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)] are intended to give the courts
wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the
most complete relief possible. In dealing with the present section
706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of relief under that
section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful
discrimination whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests
not only upon the elimination of the particular unlawful
employment practice complained of [through cease and desist
orders], but also requires that persons aggrieved by the
consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be,
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have
been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
The taxing of a back pay award is consistent with the purpose of
Title VII because it places the employee who has been discriminated
against in the same position as if he had not been discriminated
against, no more and no less. Had Sparrow remained employed by
the Navy, he would have received a salary from the Navy and been
required to pay federal income tax on it. Congress, in enacting Title
VII, chose to limit the scope of the remedies available in redressing
Sparrow's claim of discrimination. To hold that back pay is
excludable from income would give Sparrow something more than
he is entitled to under Title VII. In effect, it would give him a tax
benefit thus placing him in a better position than had he not allegedly
346. 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
347. See id. at 440-41. It is interesting to note that neither the District of Columbia
Circuit opinion nor the tax court's memorandum decision below, see Sparrow v.
Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 816 (1989), aff'd, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991), mentions
anything about the attorney's fee awarded to Sparrow. The controversy concerned only
the taxability of the back pay award that he received in a Title VII claim. See Sparrow,
949 F.2d at 440-41.
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been discriminated against. In view of the injury Sparrow asserted,
such a result might seem fair. But it would be contrary to
congressional intent as evidenced by the explicit provisions of Title
VII.
34 8
However, that case did not involve an award of attorney's fees.
To the extent that an award of back pay and attorney's fees is
intended to make the client whole, taxing a fee award to the victim
without providing a full corresponding deduction for those fees arguably
detracts from this compensatory purpose. The client has not been made
whole, in the sense that the client had to incur additional costs to collect
the taxable income that was due to the client. By including all of the
recovery in gross income, as suggested Revenue Ruling 80-364, but
allowing only a portion of the deduction for attorney's fees actually paid
out (due to the applicable limitations on itemized deductions), the
client's economic well-being has not been restored.
Moreover, attorney's fee awards may also reflect the
accomplishment of other public benefits other than the plaintiffs
personal recovery of monetary damages. Consider the situation in
Rivera,3 49 discussed above in Part II.B, in which a jury awarded damages
to eight victims of civil rights violations by police and other city
officials. The jury awarded monetary damages totaling $33,350 for their
claims under federal and state law, 350 and $245,456.25 as attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.351 The extensive fee award was justified, in
part, because of the public benefits that flowed from the litigation in
preventing unconstitutional behavior by city police and other officials.352
If these eight plaintiffs had agreed to pay their attorneys the amount
of the fee award, their taxable income would exceed their economic
income by a considerable amount.353  Similarly, if attorney's fees are
348. Sparrow, 949 F.2d at 440-41 (citations omitted).
349. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (plurality).
350. Id. at 564-65.
351. Id. at 565-66.
352. Id. at 574 ("Regardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil
rights plaintiff often secures important social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or
relatively small damages awards. In this case, for example, the District Court found that
many of petitioners' unlawful acts were 'motivated by a general hostility to the Chicano
community,' and that this litigation therefore served the public interest .... "); id. at 585
(Powell, J., concurring) ("In this case, for example, the District Court made an explicit
finding that the 'public interest' had been served by the jury's verdict that the warrantless
entry was lawless and unconstitutional.... [I]n the special circumstances of this case, the
vindication of the asserted Fourth Amendment right may well have served a public
interest, supporting the amount of the fees awarded.").
353. Assuming that the eight plaintiffs divided damages and fees equally, each
plaintiff would have received a total of $34,850.78, less attorney's fees of $30,682.03,
leaving $4,168.75. However, taxable income would be greater than $4,168.75 due to the
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awarded in a case where the primary remedy involves injunctive relief,
the plaintiff could end up with taxable income despite receiving no cash
recovery. Due to the AMT, a taxpayer can face a substantial tax liability
that exceeds any economic benefit obtained.
35 4
Despite these concerns, the rationale advanced by the Assignment
Camp appears to favor taxing the plaintiffs on the award as part of the
recovery and subjecting payment of fees to deduction limitations. In a
recent Ninth Circuit case involving an award of attorney's fees under the
ADEA, the taxpayer challenged the taxation of attorney's fees that the
defendant was ordered to pay to the taxpayer's attorneys.355  The
majority found this to be a classic case of extinguishing a payment
liability of the client, which resulted in taxation to the client:
If A owes B a debt, and C pays the debt on A's behalf, it is
elementary that C's payment is income to A as well as to B. Here,
James Sinyard had contracted to pay Winthrop & Weinstine one-third
of what he might receive in settlement. His obligation to the law firm
was satisfied by IDS [i.e., the defendant]. The payment was therefore
income to him. "The discharge by a third person of an obligation to
him is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed."
356
Judge McKeown's dissenting opinion attacked both the legal and
equitable basis for this approach. On the legal front, she viewed the
defendant's payment as extinguishing its own obligation, not the
obligation of the client.357 Moreover, she expressed an equitable basis
for concern in this context:
With that legal analysis resolved, I pause to note the inequitable
result that befalls plaintiffs in certain of these cases. The taxation to
a plaintiff of attorney's fees, combined with the operation of the
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), sometimes leaves a victorious
civil rights plaintiff with a net after-tax loss. For instance:
If the ratio of attorney's fees to the entire recovery is high enough,
a before-tax gain may metamorphose into an after-tax loss. In
Alexander v. Commissioner, for example, the plaintiff settled a
state law employment claim for $250,000 but incurred $245,000 in
attorney's fees, for a pre-tax profit of $5,000. Under the AMT, the
entire $250,000 recovery was taxable but none of the $245,000 in
attorney's fees was deductible. If we assume that the taxpayer files
fact that a portion of the attorney's fee deduction would be eliminated by I.R.C. § 67
(2002).
354. See Sager & Cohen, supra note 17, at 1178; see also supra Part III.A (illustrating
this effect).
355. Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001).
356. Id. at 758 (quoting Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929)).
357. See id. at 762 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
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jointly and has no other income, his AMT liability would be
$53,900. Under these assumptions, the nondeductibility of the
employee's attorney's fees under the AMT would convert a $5,000
before-tax gain into a $48,900 after-tax loss.
This Draconian result under the Tax Code can only undermine our
civil rights laws. After all, the purpose of fee-shifting provisions,
like the one in the ADEA, is not only to permit plaintiffs without
resources to pursue claims but to encourage meritorious civil rights
litigation by defraying its cost. But in an example like the one
posited above, the "victorious" plaintiff would have been better off
without the fee-shifting provision-and, indeed, better off if she had
never filed her ultimately victorious suit. This result is surprising, to
say the least. Although I continue to believe that this anomaly must
ultimately be resolved by Congress, it cries out for speedy resolution,
particularly in view of the majority's position. Of course my view is
that this case need not await statutory reform because the fees were
awarded pursuant to the ADEA, not under state contract law.
358
It should be noted that the possibility of imposing tax liability where
no economic income exists occurs only if the assignment principle is
applied to ensure that the client is taxed on the entire award. To the
extent that one views obtaining an attorney's services as an item of
personal consumption, then perhaps taxation is appropriate. 35 9 Similarly,
to the extent that one views a recovery as extinguishing the client's
payment liability, then consistency would require extending similar
treatment to awards under fee-shifting statutes-regardless of whether
any monetary awards are ultimately collected.
On the other hand, to the extent that one views the contingent fee
agreement as effectively transferring property rights in any recovery to
the attorney, as in Cotnam, the client will not be taxed on an amount in
excess of the client's economic income because of the treatment of
attorney's fees. 360 The same would be true of any other assignment of
358. Id. at 763 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (quoting Sager & Cohen, supra note 17, at
1078 (footnotes omitted)) (citing Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 946 (1st Cir. 1995)
("We recognize that, because the amounts involved trigger the AMT and, thus,
Taxpayer's deficiency, the outcome smacks of injustice because Taxpayer is effectively
robbed of any benefit of the Legal Fee's below the line treatment.")). It should be noted
that Judge McKeown sought to distinguish the result in this case from the taxpayer-
unfriendly result in Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001), which she also authored.
359. However, such consumption occurs throughout the period that litigation occurs,
whereas the value of the consumption is known with precision only after the recovery is
collected.
360. This assumes those rights are also of de minimis value. Otherwise, the client
should arguably have realized income when the transfer is completed. Alternatively,
Judge Beghe's dissent in Kenseth suggests that cropsharing arrangements provide an
alternative analogy for not taxing the client:
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payment rights that accrue under fee shifting statutes. Despite the fact
that the client is the named payee, it does no violence to the concept of
taxable income to treat the substance of the transaction as one in which
the attorney (and not the client) is taxable on the portion of the claim that
the attorney effectively controls.
It is doubtful that Congress intended for litigants defending
important personal and public rights to pay taxes on imputed income
from consumption through the work of their attorneys. As Judge
McKeown recognized, taxing attorney's fees in this context will tend to
undermine the enforcement of civil rights laws. 361 Although no case has
emerged to date in which a taxpayer was required to report an attorney's
fee award as taxable income without also receiving substantial other
economic benefits, there are no assurances that such cases will not arise
in the future. Taxpayers in these situations facing the need to comply
with applicable federal tax laws face uncertainty, which needs to be
resolved.
V. Legal Foundations for Taxing Other Litigation Costs
Litigation costs also present potentially significant tax accounting
issues for both attorneys and their clients. The annual accounting
concept that underlies the tax system presents the possibility that
litigation costs may be incurred in a different tax year than a taxable
recovery is obtained. As a result, taxpayers of modest means may get
little or no tax benefit from an expense deduction, even though that
expenditure gives rise to a recovery that is taxed at the highest marginal
rates.362 Although it may be intuitively appealing to take litigation costs
into account in the same year as a taxable recovery, current authority
appears to the contrary. Moreover, the fact that attorneys often advance
litigation costs on behalf of their clients, with the expectation that they
Cropsharing is strikingly similar to the contingent fee agreement. The attorney
is in the position of the tenant farmer, who bears all his direct and overhead
expenses incurred in earning the contingent fee (and the contingent fees under
all such arrangements to which he is a party with other clients). The client is in
the position of the landowner (lessee-sublessor), who bears none of the
operating expenses, but is responsible for paying the carrying charges on his
land, such as mortgage interest and real estate taxes. These charges are
analogous to court costs, which the client under a contingent fee agreement is
usually responsible for, and which the attorney can only advance to or on
behalf of the client.
Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 455 (2000), aff'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). Here,
despite the landlord's transfer of a property right (use of his land) to the tenant, no
taxable transaction occurs until disposition of the crop that is grown. This appears to be a
sensible, practical result that could also be adapted to the attorney-client relationship.
361. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
362. See supra Part IV.C (presenting illustration of this effect).
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will be reimbursed from the recovery obtained, raises other interesting
questions about whether the attorney or the client is the proper taxpayer
with respect to allowable deductions. These issues are explored below.
A. Timing Issues: When Is a Deduction Properly Taken into Account?
By adopting the annual accounting period as the basis for
computing taxable income, the Code imparts significance to the time
when items of income and expense are taken into account.363 For
expenses, section 461 of the Code provides in part: "The amount of any
deduction or credit allowed by this subtitle shall be taken for the taxable
year which is the proper taxable year under the method of accounting
used in computing taxable income. ' 36 Most individual taxpayers use the
cash method of accounting, for which regulations provide the following
guidance:
Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting,
amounts representing allowable deductions shall, as a general rule, be
taken into account for the taxable year in which paid. Further, a
taxpayer using this method may also be entitled to certain deductions
in the computation of taxable income which do not involve cash
disbursements during the taxable year, such as the deductions for
depreciation, depletion, and losses under sections 167, 611, and 165,
respectively. If an expenditure results in the creation of an asset
having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of
the taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible, or may
be deductible only in part, for the taxable year in which made.
365
Thus, a payment of cash ordinarily determines the time in which a
deduction is taken into account. Transferring a property interest might
also trigger payment, as regulations provide: "Items of gross income and
expenditures which are elements in the computation of table income need
not be in the form of cash. It is sufficient that such items can be valued
in terms of money. 3 66  However, all such payments are subject to
otherwise applicable rules on capitalization, as well as other provisions
that may limit deductibility.
367
363. See I.R.C. § 441 (2002). As the Supreme Court has noted, the annual accounting
approach is a "practical necessity if [the tax system] is to produce revenue ascertainable
and payable at regular intervals." Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 377
(1983) (citations omitted).
364. I.R.C. § 461(a).
365. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a) (as amended in 1999).
366. Id. § 1.446-1(a)(3) (as amended in 2002).
367. See I.R.C. § 261. Section 261 provides: "In computing taxable income no
deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of the items specified in this part." Id.
"This part" covers sections 261 through 280G, which include capitalization provisions in
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For individuals pursuing litigation that is not connected to a trade or
business, litigation costs are potentially deductible under section 212 of
the Code.368 Section 212(1) permits a deduction for expenses paid "for
the production or collection of income." 369 Regulations clarify that such
expenditures "must be reasonable in amount and must bear a reasonable
and proximate relation to the production or collection of taxable
income." 370  This provision correlates to section 265, which disallows
any deductions allocable to tax-exempt income.
371
Deductibility under section 212(1) is not conditioned on the actual
production of income that will be realized during the same taxable
372year. However, regulations also clarify that a taxpayer does not have
discretion to move expenses that are properly taken into account in one
taxable year into an earlier or later year:
Each year's return should be complete in itself, and taxpayers shall
ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return. The expenses,
liabilities, or loss of one year generally cannot be used to reduce the
income of a subsequent year. A taxpayer may not take into account
in a return for a subsequent taxable year liabilities that, under the
taxpayer's method of accounting, should have been taken into
account in a prior taxable year. If a taxpayer ascertains that a liability
should have been taken into account in a prior taxable year, the
taxpayer should, if within the period of limitation, file a claim for
credit or refund of any overpayment of tax arising therefrom.
373
As a result of these timing rules, a client who pays deductible
litigation costs in one taxable year, but does not obtain a recovery until a
future tax year, faces the prospect of a deduction without sufficient
sections 263 and 263A, as well as the limitation on deductions for expenses attributable
to tax exempt income in section 265. See id.
368. See, e.g., Johnson v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 340, 348 (1979); Rafter v. Comm'r, 60
T.C. 1, 8 (1973), affd, 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974).
369. See I.R.C. § 212(1). Employees are considered to be engaged in a trade or
business, and the source of their deductions is section 162. However, such expenses are
taken into account as an itemized deduction. See id § 62(a)(1) (allowing trade and
business deductions to be taken in computing adjusted gross income as long as "such
trade or business does not consist of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an
employee"); id. § 63(d) (allowing as itemized deductions all deductions other than those
allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income in section 62 or the personal exemption
deduction in section 151).
370. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(d) (as amended in 1975) (emphasis added).
371. See I.R.C. § 265(a)(1).
372. See Treas. Reg. 1.212-1(b) (as amended in 1975) ("The term 'income' for the
purpose of section 212 includes not merely income of the taxable year but also income
which the taxpayer has realized in a prior taxable year or may realize in subsequent
taxable years .... ").
373. Id. § 1.461-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1999).
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income to utilize it.3 74 As illustrated in Part III.B, taxpayers in multi-year
litigation face the possibility of effectively losing tax benefits from
expenses incurred to produce a recovery due to limitations on itemized
deductions or insufficient taxable income.
375
To the extent that an attorney advances litigation costs on a client's
behalf, the question might be raised as to whether the client has indeed
made a payment under the cash method. As a leading treatise explains,
the fact that funds are borrowed from a third-party creditor does not
affect whether payment has otherwise occurred under the cash method:
Payment may be made with borrowed funds. Thus, the source of
the funds (or property) used to make payment generally is not
relevant. As long as the funds used to make the payment were
obtained from a third-party lender (i.e., one who is unrelated to the
creditor to whom the liability is owed), the payment will be deemed
made and the deduction will be allowed.
The third-party lender may make payment directly to the creditor
on behalf of the taxpayer. It is not necessary for the lender to
distribute the funds to the taxpayer so that the taxpayer can make the
payment. If the third-party lender issues funds directly to the
taxpayer's creditor in payment of the taxpayer's obligation, the
lender, in effect, has acted as a paying agent for the taxpayer.
376
As discussed below,377 courts considering an attorney's advances
for litigation costs have denied a deduction to the attorney on the basis
that those advances are loans.3 78 If a client is treated in a similar fashion,
the client would take litigation expenses into account in the taxable year
that the attorney made a payment on the client's behalf.379 A current-
374. Such timing problems are not entirely new, as it was previously seen how Mrs.
Cotnam faced a problem because her attorney's fees were allocated to a different tax year
than the taxable income from her recovery. See supra notes 265-88 and accompanying
text.
375. See supra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
376. GERTZMAN, supra note 161, 3.04[3][a] (footnotes omitted). This situation
should be distinguished from one in which a cash basis taxpayer attempts to make a
payment by giving the taxpayer's own note, which Stephen F. Gertzman observes "has
long been treated as no more than an acknowledgement by the taxpayer that his debt must
be 'paid' at some later time. The issuance of the note does not occasion a deduction." Id.
3.04[3][b].
377. See infra Part V.B.
378. See, e.g., Burnett v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); Boccardo v. United
States, 12 CI. Ct. 184 (1987), affd, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995); Canelo v. Comm'r, 53
T.C. 217 (1969), affid, 447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971)..
379. See Lawler v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1699 (1995) ("A cash method
individual must deduct expenses charged to an American Express card in the year that the
expenses are charged, rather thana later year in which American Express is repaid.");
Granan v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 753, 755 (1971) ("[W]hen a deductible payment is made
with borrowed money, the deduction is not postponed until the years in which the
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year deduction may be advantageous for higher-income clients pursuing
business litigation, where limitations imposed on itemized deductions are
not applicable. However, taxpayers in other litigation contexts face both
the limitations on itemized deduction and the possibility that they will
lack adequate current income to utilize the deduction during the year it is
allowable, making the prospect of a current deduction unattractive.38 °
Following this loan-based scenario also produces potentially
unsettling tax consequences during the year of a recovery. If the
attorney's withholding of settlement proceeds to cover litigation costs is
merely the repayment of a loan from the client, then the client is not
entitled to a deduction in the year of the recovery, to the extent that the
loan represents advances for costs incurred during a prior taxable year.
For a taxpayer with modest income in years prior to the recovery, this
may mean virtually no tax benefits from litigation expenses, while the
recovery of those expenses is taxed at the highest marginal rates.
381
When the client's obligation to repay an advance for costs is
conditioned upon recovery, it might be argued that there has been no true
loan-and thus no payment for tax purposes-until the recovery triggers
reimbursement of expenses to the attorney. In order for a "payment" to
occur under the cash method, courts have explained that a taxpayer must
part "irretrievably" with funds.382 However, in this context, the attorney
has parted with funds on the client's behalf; the question is the extent to
which a potential contingency in repayment affects the availability of a
current-year deduction to the client.
The effect of contingency in repayment of a note arising from a
payment to a third party payee has frequently been litigated in tax shelter
cases. 383  In these cases, taxpayers attempted to generate current-year
deductions by giving a promoter a nonrecourse note, which was to be
borrowed money is repaid."); McAdams v. Comm'r, 15 T.C. 231, 235 (1950) ("Expenses
paid with borrowed funds are deductible by a taxpayer on the cash basis in the year in
which they are actually paid, and the deduction thereof can not be deferred until a later
year when repayment of the borrowed funds is made by the taxpayer."), affd, 198 F.2d
54 (5th Cir. 1952); see also Allen v. Comm'r, 925 F.2d 348, 352 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Granan, 55 T.C. at 755); Rife v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[A]
payment by a third party will be considered payment by the taxpayer when a debit is
made to the taxpayer's account with the third party and the charges to the account do not
exceed the credits included in income.") (citation omitted).
380. See supra Part 1V.C (presenting illustration of this problem).
381. See supra Part IV.C.
382. See, e.g., Keller v. Comm'r, 725 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1984)
(distinguishing payment from deposit); Saviano v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 955, 961 (1983),
aft'd, 756 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1985).
383. See, e.g., CRC Corp. v. Comm'r, 693 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1982); Brountas v.
Comm'r, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982); Gibson Prods. Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d
1041 (5th Cir. 1981); Saviano, 80 T.C. 955; Grafv. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 944 (1983).
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repaid solely out of future profits, in exchange for the promoter's
payment of expenses on the taxpayer's behalf.384 Rather than rejecting
the validity of all loans when repayment is contingent on future income-
producing activity, courts in this context have focused on whether the
economic substance of an arrangement was consistent with a true loan, as
opposed to a tax avoidance scheme. Nonrecourse debt can indeed be
recognized as a legitimate, even though repayment is contingent in the
sense that the creditor looks to a particular property to secure payment,
but not the general assets or credit of the obligor.385
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, the prospects for repayment may
be considered in the process of ascertaining whether a true loan exists:
In a true lending transaction, the borrower normally possesses assets
nearly equal or greater in value than the amount of indebtedness,
whether or not those assets are hypothecated to secure the debt. In
addition, the lender usually expects the borrower to maintain those
assets at such a level until the obligation is satisfied. Moreover, in a
true lending transaction, there exists the reasonable likelihood that the
lender will be repaid in light of all reasonably foreseeable risks. In
other words, there must be "a reasonable basis for the prediction that
the ability of the borrower to repay will not be wholly or substantially
contingent upon the success or failure of the business venture."
' 386
Similarly, in Lebowitz v. Commissioner,387 the Second Circuit
reversed the tax court's determination that a nonrecourse obligation used
to pay an advance royalty payment in connection with coal mining rights
was contingent and therefore not genuine debt, stating in part:
We are not unaware of those cases holding that a debt is contingent if
it is to be paid solely from the proceeds or income derived from the
collateral security. In those cases, however, the nonrecourse notes
were secured by the proceeds to be derived from oil drilling that was
exploratory or "wildcat" in nature, with little or no solid evidence
that there was in fact any oil at all on the properties in question.
Under those circumstances, the security would be worthless unless
384. See, e.g., Saviano, 80 T.C. at 957-59 (involving airline pilot who incurred
deductible mine development expenses financed by cash and nonrecourse note); Graff, 80
T.C. at 945-46 (involving physician who incurred deductible dredging costs financed by
cash and nonrecourse note).
385. See Graf, 80 T.C. at 948-49 ("We do not imply that a loan will not be recognized
for tax purposes simply because it is payable solely out of profits. By its nature,
however, such a loan necessarily takes on the flavor of an investment. Only when, in an
objective sense, there is a reasonable certainty that full repayment will occur will such a
loan be recognized.") (citing Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1969);
Ortmayer v. Comm'r, 265 F.2d 848, 855 (7th Cir. 1959)).
386. Gibson Prods. Co., 637 F.2d at 1047 (citation omitted).
387. 917 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1990).
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oil was discovered and the business activity of the partnership was
successful. Here, however, the note at issue was secured by a
perpetual leasehold interest in proven reserves of coal, indeed coal of
high quality .... In holding that the note involved in this case
"would, and could, be paid only if the mine was productive and
generated a sufficient cash flow," therefore, the Tax Court missed the
point that the security would allow full recovery even if there were
no actual production, provided that, at the time the note was
executed, the value of the reserves approached the $4.15 million face
amount of the note.
The fact that the timing of payments to be made on the note was set
according to the production of coal does not detract from our
conclusion that payment on the note was not contingent. The
proposition that a debt is contingent if it is secured solely by the
proceeds to be derived from the collateral does not imply that an
otherwise genuine obligation will be invalid, solely because
payments are to be made at the points at which the collateral
produces income. Here, as long as there was sufficient coal in the
ground to secure payment of the note at the time the note was
executed, the only contingency would have been that the price of coal
might have gone down, as in fact it did, or gone up, as it did not.
Such a "contingency" does not render the obligation illusory,
regardless of how payments on the note happen to have been
timed.
388
Section 465 of the Code resolves many controversies over
obligations that might be viewed as "contingent" by imposing an "at
risk" limitation on losses associated with certain activities. 3 9 Amounts
considered at risk include borrowed funds to the extent that a taxpayer is
personally liable for repayment, or to the extent of the value of property
(other than property used in the activity) that is pledged by the
taxpayer. 390 However, section 465 would not apply to most individual
plaintiffs in civil cases, as this kind of income-producing activity is not
within the scope of activities covered by that section.
391
Thus, the analysis concerning whether a true loan exists would
appear to be applicable here. Using the Fifth Circuit's approach, quoted
above,3 92 a client may not possess other assets that would provide
388, Id. at 1319-20 (citations omitted).
389, See I.R.C. § 465 (2002).
390. See id. § 465(b). Nonrecourse financing is specifically excluded from amounts
at risk. See id. § 465(b)(4).
391. See id. § 465(c)(1) (restricting application of section 465 to "holding, producing,
or distributing motion picture films or videotapes," "farming," "leasing any section 1245
property," "exploring for, or exploiting, oil and gas resource, or ... geothermal
deposits. . . as a trade or business or for the production of income").
392. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
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adequate security for a lender, but the client does possess a claim that the
attorney believes has potential to repay the attorney's investment. As
discussed in Part VI below, courts evaluating attorneys' claims to
deductions for litigation cost advances have had no problem in
characterizing them as loans, based in part on the economic reality that
attorneys make those advances with the expectation of repayment, and
that repayment does, in fact, occur through the recovery. Thus,
theoretical contingency as to repayment probably does not allow a
taxpayer to defer litigation costs to a taxable year after the costs are
advanced.393
It is important to note that no reported cases or revenue rulings
indicate that the Service has affirmatively set forth an administrative
position on this timing issue affecting clients. The taxpayer in Coady,
for example, was apparently allowed to take costs into account in the
year they were recovered, even though it was possible that a portion of
those costs were advanced by the attorney in a different year.
394
However, without specific analysis of this issue, it is difficult to ascertain
whether Coady reflects a deliberate choice or simply an oversight by
field agents.395 Clients should probably not take much comfort in this
authority in light of the applicable tax accounting rules outlined above,
and the penchant of some courts and the Service for following them
regardless of the potential impact on taxpayers.396
B. Characterization Issues: Will an Expense Produce Taxable
Income?
Multi-year litigation presents other practical problems in
393. In some jurisdictions, applicable rules of professional responsibility require
clients to remain obligated to repay advances of litigation expenses regardless of whether
a recovery is obtained. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Smollen, 17 P.3d 456, 460
(Okla. 2000); see also note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Smollen). Clients in
these jurisdictions would appear to face additional hurdles to establishing contingency.
394. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing
litigation costs to be deducted on 1994 return in connection with case arising from
wrongful termination in 1990), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001).
395. As noted above, the Service has sometimes not contested taxpayer positions that
have been contrary to its litigating positions in other cases. See cases cited supra note 8.
However, such acquiescence in a particular case does not prevent the Service from
raising similar issues in a future case.
396. Cf Sec. Flour Mills Co. v. Comm'r, 321 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1944) (referring to
"the well understood and consistently applied doctrine that cash receipts or matured
accounts due on the one hand, and cash payments or accrued definite obligations on the
other, should not be taken out of the annual accounting system and, for the benefit of the
Government or the taxpayer, treated on a basis which is neither a cash basis nor an
accrual basis, because so to do would, in a given instance, work a supposedly more
equitable result to the Government or to the taxpayer").
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determining whether expenditures for litigation costs "bear a reasonable
and proximate relation to the production or collection of taxable
income. 3 97 Suppose that a client sues under a personal injury theory,
which would ordinarily produce a recovery excludable from gross
income under section 104, but that the recovery ultimately includes
taxable interest. Are litigation costs incurred in a prior taxable year
deductible at least in part because such expenditures contributed to the
production of taxable income? If so, how should clients characterize
such expenses when filing their current-year tax returns, before the
ultimate outcome is known?
Cases dealing with allocation of expenses between taxable and tax-
exempt awards have focused primarily on attorney's fees, although some
courts lump costs and fees together in the discussion.398 When the
recovery is obtained pursuant to a judgment, the amount of the recovery
allocable to taxable and tax-exempt claims can readily be determined. In
these situations, the Service generally applies a pro rata approach, by
which fees are allocated to the taxable and tax-exempt portions on the
basis of the amount of the taxable and tax-exempt awards.
399
Whether a pro rata approach accurately reflects the costs of
producing the taxable and tax-exempt portions is questionable.4 °° An
397. I.R.C. § 212 (2002).
398. See, e.g., Rozpad v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1264 (1997) ("Respondent
determined that petitioners were entitled to an itemized deduction for attorney's fees and
costs relating to the taxable portion (i.e., the portion relating to prejudgment interest) of
their respective settlements."), aff'd, 154 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); Kovacs v. Comm'r, 100
T.C. 124, 133 n. 16 (1993) (following pro rata allocation between taxable interest and tax-
exempt portion for purposes of determining the deductibility of attorney's fees), affd, 25
F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994); Church v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 1104, 1110-11 (1983) (allocating
attorney's fees and costs as lump sum on pro rata basis). In some cases, the Service
apparently took the position that all legal fees and expenses were deductible from the
award before determining taxable income. See Francisco v. United States, 267 F.3d 303,
318 n.14 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that no one had contested the IRS position, although it
departed from the pro rata allocation practice adopted in other cases); Miller v. Comm'r,
914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990) (focusing solely on taxability of amounts net of attorney's
fees and costs); see also cases cited supra note 8.
399. See, e.g., Church, 80 T.C. at 1110-11 (allocating attorney's fees and costs as
lump sum on pro rata basis); Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 133 (following pro rata approach in
Church). However, not all judgments are entitled to deference for federal tax purposes
on the issue of allocation. Although the tax court must give "proper regard" to state court
judgments allocating settlement proceeds, it is not bound by them, particularly when the
state trial court has merely "rubber stamped" a judgment drafted by the parties and was
not the product of true adversary proceedings. See Robinson v. Comm'r, 70 F.3d 34, 37-
38 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'g in part 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
400. As one dissenting judge has pointed out, there is more than one approach to the
allocation issue. Since statutory interest awards accrue as a matter of right, the attorney's
efforts to obtain a jury award is arguably insufficiently connected with the interest to
permit a deduction for fees. See Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 140-61 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
Alternatively, fees could be deducted dollar for dollar against taxable interest in order to
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allocation of fees based on the actual time spent on each claim may
present a more accurate alternative.40 ' However, rigorous records of
hourly fees are typically not maintained in litigation governed by
contingent fee agreements. 40 2  Moreover, overlapping benefits from
efforts to pursue taxable and tax-exempt claims may make it difficult to
trace attorney time to a particular claim over another.
Settlements present more difficult problems in ascertaining taxable
and tax-exempt portions of awards. Courts approaching characterization
of recoveries pursuant to settlements often examine the nature of the
claims to ascertain "in lieu of what were damages awarded. ' 4°3  The
"intent of the payor" is sometimes viewed as a guiding light in this
area, 40 4 though this may be difficult to ascertain, particularly when a
number of claims are presented and the payor may be indifferent as to
which claims give rise to a payment. Although it has been said that
"courts should neither engage in speculation nor blind themselves to a
settlement's realities,"40 5 such statements provide no concrete advice for
a decision maker; discretion is an inescapable part of the tax treatment in
this context.
While a comprehensive review of settlement allocation
jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this article, one can easily see the
practical tax accounting problem presented by litigation costs if both
taxable and tax-exempt components of an award are present. If each tax
year stands on its own, a taxpayer faces uncertainty about whether
litigation costs paid in the current tax year will ultimately be allocable to
a taxable component of an award. The prospect of a pro rata allocation
approach, as opposed to one based on specific tracing to specific claims,
makes this determination particularly difficult. If the taxpayer cannot
provide sufficient proof to tie expenditures specifically to an income
achieve the relief purposes behind state laws governing statutory interest. See id. at 161
(Beghe, J., dissenting); see also Miller v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 586, 592 (4th Cir. 1990)
(suggesting that the "question of allocation could be approached on remand by the Tax
Court in a myriad of ways").
401. See, e.g., Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(suggesting allocation based on lawyers' efforts attributable to each claim).
402. See Dye v. United States, 121 F.3d 1399, 1411 n.17 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[I]n a
straight contingent fee case, where lawyers are unlikely to have maintained accurate
hourly work-logs, the proportional recovery of each type of income might often be the
only objective criteria available to a court engaged in the difficult task of allocated legal
expenses according to the 'origin and character of the claim."').
403. See Delaney v. Comm'r, 99 F.3d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Alexander v.
IRS, 72 F.3d 938, 942 (1st Cir. 1995)).
404. See, e.g., Francisco v. United States, 267 F.3d 303, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2001)
(involving settlement after trial court judgment); Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d 393 (8th
Cir. 1997) (involving settlement after trial judgment overturned on appeal, but before
new trial).
405. See Bagley, 121 F.3d at 395 (citing Delaney, 99 F.3d at 23-24).
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generating activity,40 6 the taxpayer may need to rely on a pro rata
approach. In either case, the taxpayer may have to file an amended
return to characterize expenses appropriately, if they are otherwise
accounted for in a prior taxable year.
C. Can a Capitalization Approach Resolve Timing and
Characterization Issues?
A capitalization approach 40 7 would resolve timing issues by
effectively holding costs in abeyance until the recovery is obtained. At
that time, the client could deduct appropriate expenses against any
taxable recovery. Characterization issues, such as whether an expense is
appropriately related to the production of taxable income, might still
exist, but this approach provides a means to avoid constraints of the
annual accounting period in determining taxable income in this context.
The First Circuit was unreceptive to a capitalization theory applied
to attorney's fees when the underlying cause of action did not involve a
capital asset. 4°8 However, as discussed above, a capitalization theory
need not involve a capital asset or suggest a change in the
characterization of ordinary income to capital gain. 40 9  An approach
similar to capitalization may already be adopted as a de facto method of
accounting for litigation costs, to the extent that the Service has
acquiesced in such treatment. 410  The foundation for that treatment is
nevertheless unclear. The fact that no reported cases focus carefully on
timing issues with respect to costs may be of some comfort to taxpayers.
However, in light of the basic tax accounting principles outlined above,
such issues could be raised.
D. Litigation Costs from the Attorney's Perspective
The above discussion has focused primarily on a client's tax
accounting treatment of litigation costs, a topic that appears to have been
406. See, e.g., Francisco, 267 F.3d at 319 (noting that taxpayer bears burden of proof
to show that IRS assessments are incorrect in refund action).
407. See supra notes 327-37 and accompanying text.
408. See Alexander, 72 F.3d at 943 n.9 ("One might intuitively argue that some sort
of 'basis' should be recognized when one has to litigate to receive one's due
compensation. The fact remains, however, that the Code simply does not provide for the
offsetting of basis in such circumstances except in limited cases involving capital assets.
Instead, the Code permits litigation expenses to be taken into account by way of a
deduction.").
409. Cf I.R.C. § 263A (2002). For further discussion on this point, see supra notes
329-42 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 393-95 and accompanying text (discussing Coady v. Comm'r,
213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972 (2001)).
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generally ignored by the Service. However, tax accounting issues for
attorneys have been addressed, and they merit some attention here. As
discussed below, the Service has taken the position that attorneys are not
allowed to deduct litigation costs advanced to clients in the year that they
pays those costs. However, litigation on this issue has generated
different results based on the particulars of the governing attorney-client
agreement. These different results can be illustrated through two cases
involving the same attorney, but different fee agreements.
1. Boccardo I: The "Net Fee" Contract
In Boccardo v. United States,4 11 a partner in a law firm sought to
deduct his share of litigation costs incurred by his law firm in connection
with personal injury cases handled on a contingent fee basis.412 Pursuant
to the contingent fee agreement, the law firm agreed to pay preparation
and trial costs, including filing fees, investigation costs, and expert
witness fees.4 13 If a recovery was obtained, the law firm would first
deduct all such costs, and then it would be entitled to a percentage of the
net recovery as its fee.414 If the recovery was insufficient to recover its
costs, the client would owe nothing.415
Although the firm was at risk for the amounts expended, it was
apparently quite successful, as the firm recovered over ninety percent of
the costs associated with cases filed during the tax year at issue.4 16
However, cases involved often took two to three years to resolve, and
expenditures for costs were often not recovered for three to four years.417
Thus, the firm obtained a tax advantage by deducting the costs it paid
during the current taxable year, and taking those costs into income in a
later tax year when they were ultimately recovered.41 8
The Service challenged this tax treatment, disallowing the partners'
411. 12 Cl. Ct. 184 (1987).
412. Id. at 184-85.
413. Id. at 185.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. See id. Presumably, contingent fees for its services in the successful cases more
than offset the other 10% of costs not recovered in unsuccessful cases.
417. Id.
418. Id. The partners receive a benefit associated with the time value of money on the
tax savings obtained in the year of the deduction, which are not repaid until a later year
when the corresponding expenses are recovered and included in income. To illustrate,
assume that a firm obtains $1 of tax savings in year one through deducting litigation costs
that will ultimately be recovered in year three. If invested to yield 10% after taxes, that
$1 would grow to $1.21 by year three, when the expenses are recovered and included in
income, thus generating a $1 tax liability. The taxpayer would then effectively "repay"
the $1 of tax savings in the year of the recovery, and would then be $0.21 better off as a
result of tax deferral.
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deductions and increasing their taxable income during the year at issue.
Boccardo sought relief in the claims court, which ultimately proved
unsuccessful. 419 First, Boccardo claimed that the firm had not advanced
these costs on behalf of a client, but instead it had paid them on its own
behalf. This argument was rejected on the basis of California law
governing professional responsibility, which prohibited direct payment
of a client's litigation expenses but allowed a lawyer to advance such
expenses.42° If the firm had indeed advanced expenses on the client's
behalf, other authorities supported the characterization of the advance as
being in the nature of a loan.421
Boccardo sought to distinguish the firm's advances from loans
based on the contingent nature of any recovery of costs, but this too was
unsuccessful. Other authorities had gone against him on this point, and
the claims court was likewise not amenable to his claim.422 The court
was not persuaded by the fact that the firm may have looked to the
recovery, rather than the client, as the ultimate source of repayment for
litigation costs. Not only was there a high probability of recovery, giving
little practical effect to any such distinction between the recovery and the
client, but the court still viewed the transaction as involving expenses
made on behalf of the client, rather than by the firm:
Just as the case belongs to the client, so too does any recovery. So
merely because plaintiff must look to the recovery for reimbursement
does not mean he is not also looking to the client. The client has
promised to pay out of his recovery before the contingent attorney fee
is calculated, and in a high percentage of cases that is just what
happens. There is an absolute obligation to repay the advance,
subject only to an overall slight chance that there will be insufficient




420. Id. at 185-86. This rationale would later crumble, as the California law of
professional responsibility would later allow such payments. See Boccardo v. Comm'r,
56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995); see also infra Part V.D.2 (discussing Boccardo).
421. Boccardo, 12 Cl. Ct. at 186 (citing Burnett v. Comm'r, 356 F.2d 755, 759 (5th
Cir. 1966); Elec. Tachometer Corp. v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 158, 161 (1961)).
422. See id. ("Plaintiff has not shown why this court should deviate from this line of
cases, although he frankly admits he chose this forum because the law is against him in
his circuit.").
423. Id. at 187; see also Canelo v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 217, 225 (1969) ("Petitioners
stress that their position is no different from the ordinary businessman who makes
expenditures only on the likelihood that he will recover them in the course of business.
We believe the situations are different. Here petitioners have made expenditures on
behalf of a particular client, under a reimbursement agreement signed by the client, to
pursue a claim held by the client-a claim of no use to any person other than the client.
In reality, they are the client's expenditures.").
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Under this analysis, the law firm is allowed a deduction for costs
advanced on the client's, behalf only when there is no recovery, or when
424the recovery is insufficient to cover the expenses. However, the basis
for such a deduction is not expressly stated in this case. Such a
deduction may be allowable under section 166 as a bad debt, rather than
as a business expense under section 162.425
2. Boccardo II: The "Gross Fee" Contract
After this disappointing result in the claims court, the firm
apparently changed its agreement with clients in an effort to achieve a
current deduction for litigation costs, which was the subject of litigation
that began in the tax court and ultimately reached the Ninth Circuit in• • 426
Boccardo v. Commissioner. The new agreement differed from the
agreement litigated in the claims court only in the sense that the firm's
portion of the recovery was measured on the basis of the gross recovery
for the client, rather than the net recovery after reimbursement for
litigation costs. 4 2 7 This agreement, which the court characterized as a
"gross fee contract" as compared with the "net fee contract" litigated in
the claims court,428 did not provide for the firm to recover its expenses
first before any amounts would be available for the client. As in the
previous case, if no recovery was obtained; the firm was to receive
nothing for its services or for costs paid.429
The taxpayer argued that the terms of the agreement were
significant, in that it changed the nature of the expenditure from a
nondeductible advance or loan to the client to a business expense of the
firm in the year of payment. In the taxpayer's words: "[T]he firm is no
more reimbursed its expenses than a self-employed commissioned
salesman is reimbursed the travel costs incurred in making a sale when
the commission check for the sale finally arrives., 430 Although the tax
court had concluded that the substance of this agreement did not differ
from the net fee agreement previously used by the taxpayer,431 the Ninth
424. See Boccardo, 12 Ct. CI. at 188-89.
425. See Hearn v. Comm'r, 309 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1962) (denying deduction for
litigation advances, but noting possibility of deduction for bad debts provided taxpayer
could bear burden of proof of worthlessness). However, it should be noted that, in
Canelo, the tax court suggested that a bad debt reserve under section 166(c), prior to
repeal by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, would not be available because the obligation on
behalf of a client to repay was contingent on success. Canelo, 53 T.C. at 226.
426. 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
427. Id. at 1018.
428. See id.
429. See id.
430. Id. at 1017.




When the firm, on advice of counsel, chose to adopt different
contractual terms, with a different economic result than those
obtaining under the net fee contracts, the firm created an arrangement
that cannot be governed by the automatic application of the cases
decided on the basis of the net fee contracts. Costs are not the only
expenses tied to an individual case that are not reimbursable under
the gross fee arrangement. It is difficult to see how the label of
"advances" with its implication of "loans" can be applied as a matter
of law to payments when there is no obligation on the part of the
client to repay the money expended. The factual record compiled by
the IRS in no way changes our view on this point. The plain fact is
that, under the gross fee contract, the firm, like other businesses, can
only make a profit if it succeeds in deriving gross fee revenues that
exceed its own expenses-that is, if it succeeds in keeping its own
costs, including the type singled out by the IRS, lower than the fees it
obtains over the course of a given year from the clients whose cases
are successful.
432
Although there may be an economic difference between a gross fee
contract and a net fee contract in a particular case, the overall effect for a
firm that can reasonably predict litigation expenses in relation to
potential recoveries would probably be minimal. In these circumstances,
a firm could presumably adjust the contingent fee percentage based on its
historical experiences with costs and fees to achieve a similar level of
profitability over time. As the tax court explained:
[I]f the firm pays $3,000 in costs on a case and recovers $5,000 after
trial, under the gross fee agreement it recovers $2,000 of the costs,
while under the net fee agreement it is reimbursed the entire $3,000.
However, the overall reimbursement of 90 percent of costs found by
the Claims Court for the net fee agreements, and stipulated to here for
the gross fee agreements, was the same under both types. In reality,
under the gross fee agreements the firm had not only an expectation
of, but an actual, reimbursement of costs, which was based on the
historic rate of recovery from the careful screening of all contingency
fee cases with costs advanced. The fact that reimbursement may be
somewhat more uncertain under the gross fee agreements than under
the net fee agreements is not sufficient, in our opinion, to distinguish
the two types of fee arrangements. 
433
wording of the gross fee agreements, we conclude that in substance the firm expected and
received reimbursement of the costs in issue to a substantial extent from the recoveries
which belonged to the clients.").
432. Boccardo, 56 F.3d at 1018.
433. Boccardo, 65 T.C.M. 2739.
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However, such agreements may not be feasible in connection with
litigation where expenses may be difficult to predict, and where the
amount of expenses may be comparatively large in relation to the
ultimate recovery.
The tax court had also rejected any distinction based on the source
of reimbursement, such as whether any recovery of costs comes from the
firm's contingent fee or from the client:
To the extent that petitioners suggest that the advanced client
litigation costs are recoverable from the contingent fee of the firm,
not from amounts recovered on behalf of the client, we disagree. The
clear import of the California case law is that the attorney acts as the
agent for the client in recovering a judgment or settling a case. The
California Rules of Professional Conduct reflect that the amount
recovered in settlement or trial is recovered on behalf of the client. In
relevant part, Rule 5-104 prohibits an attorney from paying, agreeing
to pay, guaranteeing, representing, or 'sanctioning the representation
that he/she will pay such costs incurred by or for a client, except (1)
with the consent of the client, that the costs be repaid from funds
collected or to be collected for the client, or (2) that the costs be
advanced in prosecuting or defending a claim or action or otherwise
protecting or promoting the client's interest. Rule 8-101 requires in
part that funds received for the benefit of clients be deposited into
identifiable trust accounts and that if a fee is disputed, the attorney
can not withdraw the disputed portion until the dispute is resolved.
The recovery belongs to the client, not the firm. Thus, the
reimbursement of costs to the firm comes from the recovery of the
client.434
However, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow either the California
Rules of Professional Responsibility or the client's "ownership" of the
recovery to control the outcome of the case. First, it expressed doubt as
to whether rules of professional responsibility or similar statutory
provisions in California in fact prohibited payment of litigation expenses
by an attorney without structuring the arrangement as an advance and
obtaining reimbursement from the recovery.43 5 . The court noted that
common law prohibitions on champerty and maintenance had been
436softened under more modern approaches to financing litigation.
Query whether the court's willingness to take a practical view of the
attorney-client relationship in this context, in lieu of a formal analysis of
who "owns" the recovery, is inconsistent with its approach in Coady. As
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to recognize any





change in ownership of the claim for purposes of determining the locus
of income from attorney's fees.437 Treating attorney's fees differently
from the expenses of litigating a client's claim is arguably inconsistent.
Second, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's attempt to
apply section 162(c) of the Code, which disallowed deductions for illegal
payments:
We have no desire to make the profession of law any more a business
than it already is, and we acknowledge the Tax Court's sensitivity to
the ethical norms still in force. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the
Boccardo firm's arrangement does not "violate a law of the United
States" as I.R.C. § 162(c) specifies as to one sort of nondeductible
payment. We have no evidence that the arrangement comes within
that statute's other proviso by violating "a state law that is generally
enforced, which subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of
a license." The Rules of Professional Conduct approved by the
California Supreme Court and governing the legal profession might,
in a pinch, be treated as "state law," although the characterization is
arguable when there is a state statute regulating the same matters.
There is no criminal penalty for the Rule's violation. Theoretically,
no doubt, it could be enforced by revoking a lawyer's license, but we
are presented with no evidence of such enforcement, nor do we know
of any general enforcement of Rule 4-210(A). To the contrary, it has
been judicially recognized in California that "the line between 'costs'
and attorney overhead included as part of the lawyer's fee is an
undefined and changing one." The firm's arrangements were not
illegal and so were not prohibited by I.R.C. § 162(c). The line of
ethical inquiry pursued by the Tax Court ends when it becomes
apparent that the criteria set by § 162(c) for disqualifying a deduction
have not been met.
438
The Service has taken the position that it will not follow the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Boccardo outside of the Ninth Circuit.4 39 Moreover,
it has recently announced that law firms will be allowed to change their
methods of accounting for litigation costs advanced to clients without
437. See Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 972
(2001); see also supra notes 304-10 and accompanying text (discussing Coady).
438. Boccardo, 56 F.3d at 1019-20 (citations omitted). As the court also noted, to the
extent that the agreements affected involved the firm's office in the District of Columbia,
the limitations on payment under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility adopted
in California had effectively been removed by Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8,
which was adopted in the District. See id. at 1019.
439. Field Serv. Advisory (June 2, 1997), 1997 WL 33313738 (IRS FSA) ("[The]
Service position is that expense advances are not deductible regardless of whether the
expense reimbursement contracts are gross fee or net fee contracts. We would prefer,
though, litigating this issue where the Comm'r does not have the burden of proof.").
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prior consent.440  Such an offer may be attractive to firms who might
otherwise face the prospect of litigating this position. Moreover, it has
the effect of placing law firms on the same footing regardless of the
details of their agreements with clients, which adds consistency to tax
administration in this area.
VI. Concluding Observations
The tax treatment of attorney's fees and litigation costs is currently
in a state of conflict and uncertainty. Plaintiffs in civil litigation
potentially face a higher effective tax burden on income associated with
litigation than on similar income associated with a trade or business. In
some cases, this can produce an absurd result, and the popular press has
reported this with alacrity. For example, a recent article in Forbes
magazine commented on the plight of Nona Coady:
After fighting the IRS unsuccessfully in court, Coady was left with
a tax bill for $209,000-more than she got from the case [after
paying her attorneys]. Coady, now 53, still owes $95,000 of that and
with interest the bill is growing. She fears the IRS will attach her
wages or home. She had trouble finding work after she was fired and
is now a traveling loan officer. "I won the battle, but I lost the war,"
sighs the twice-victimized Coady.
441
Such results tend to undermine respect for the tax system, as well as for
lawyers. It is difficult to contend that Congress intended such results by
enacting the limitations on itemized deductions for the regular tax and
AMT. Even those who conclude that the statutory language dictates such
a result recognize the potential inequity of this situation.442
440. Rev. Proc. 2002-9, app. § 1A.01, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327 (allowing automatic change
in method of accounting for law firms deducting advances on behalf of clients).
441. Brigid McMenamin, The Lawyers Did Just Fine, FORBES, Apr. 1, 2002, at 80.
The figures reported in Forbes do not match those reported in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion. See supra note 304-11 and accompanying text. The reason for these differences
is not clear. Nevertheless, Coady's case is not the only source of potentially harsh
results. See also Sager & Cohen, supra note 17, at 1078 (suggesting that the taxpayer in
Alexander v. Commissioner, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995), had tax liability of
approximately $54,000 on taxable income of $5000).
442. See, e.g., Sinyard v. Comm'r, 268 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 2001) (referring to the
outcome under the government's position as an "anomalous result, no doubt unintended,"
but which could not be changed by the court); Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946 (recognizing
that the government's position "smacks of injustice"); Maynard, supra note 338, at 1053
("Even if the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split, Congress should amend the
Internal Revenue Code to allow an unrestricted deduction for contingent attorney's fees
incurred in connection with a taxable recovery."); B. Douglas Smith, Jr., Note, Ethel
Cotnam's Ghost: The Conflicting Tax Treatment of Contingent Attorneys' Fees:
Srivastava v. Comm'r, 54 TAX LAW. 437, 448 (2001) (advocating propriety of including
contingent fees in gross income, yet recognizing injustice from such approach).
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Though Congress could clearly resolve this matter, courts also
possess the power to provide a partial solution through their discretion to
apply the assignment of income principle. Courts in the Assignment
Camp have recognized the equitable appeal of the taxpayer's position,
but have chosen instead to refer the taxpayer to Congress for any
relief.44 3  However, deference to Congress's legislative powers rings
hollow when one considers that the law governing the identity of the
proper taxpayer is largely the product of judicial rulemaking. 4  A judge
need not rewrite any legislation to conclude that the attorney is the
proper locus of taxable income from recoveries in these cases.
Tax avoidance concerns, which are at the core of the assignment
principle, hardly seem applicable here. Suggesting that clients might
otherwise choose contingent fee agreements over certain fee agreements
based on tax considerations ignores the realities of the marketplace and
the economic condition of most plaintiffs in civil litigation, which gives
them no real choice in the matter. In this context, ancillary marketplace
effects on lawyer-client relationships caused by judicial intervention
favoring the taxpayer would appear to be minimal.
Adopting a taxpayer-friendly position on this issue would avoid
other undesirable consequences in litigation involving civil rights, where
awards under fee-shifting statutes designed to make litigants whole could
potentially result in tax burdens that extend beyond any monetary
recovery. Imputed income from the satisfaction of victory hardly seems
to provide an appropriate addition to the tax base in this context. It is
hard to reconcile tax results that disfavor victims to the stated legislative
intent behind fee-shifting statutes of making victims whole.
443. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 407-08 (2000) ("We perceive
dangers in the ad hoc modification of established tax law principles or doctrines to
counteract hardship in specific cases, and, accordingly, we "have not acquiesced in such
approaches."), af'd, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); see Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946 (stating
that the effect of the AMT on an individual taxpayer's deduction of legal expenses
"smacks of injustice" because the taxpayer is effectively robbed of any benefit from the
deductibility of legal expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions). "Despite this
potential for unfairness, however, these policy issues are in the province of Congress, and
we are not authorized to rewrite the statute." Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 407; see, e.g.,
Badaracco v. Comm'r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984); Kenseth, 259 F.3d. at 885 (stating that
equity in taxation is political rather than jural concept); Warfield v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.
179, 183 (1985); see also supra notes 315-29 and accompanying text.
444. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 427 (Beghe, J., dissenting) ("[T]he assignment of
income doctrine is judge-made law, not a rule of statutory interpretation of the more
recently enacted itemized deduction and AMT provisions. Contrary to the claims of the
majority and a recent commentator, we need not wait for Congress to change those
provisions. We're dealing with a problem under the common law of taxation; what the
courts have created and applied, courts can interpret, refine, and distinguish to determine
whether in changed circumstances the conditions for application of the doctrine have
been satisfied.") (footnotes omitted).
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Legislation may ultimately be needed to resolve the current circuit
split involving contingent fees. However, the tax treatment of contingent
attorney's fees is not the only unresolved issue in this context. Multi-
year litigation presents difficult timing and characterization issues
affecting litigation costs that appear to have been overlooked. Although
the Service has taken steps to induce attorneys to adopt a consistent
practice of not treating client advances as current-year business expenses,
it has not announced a similar position about the tax treatment of
litigation costs from the client's perspective.
On one hand, this lack of administrative activity may mean that
clients have avoided strict application of the annual accounting period by
lumping costs together and deducting them in the year of a recovery.
However, this position is not without risk, as the Service is not estopped
from taking an adverse position if it chooses to do so.445 Adopting a
consistent administrative position regarding clients' treatment of
litigation costs, without regard to the particulars of fee agreements with
their attorneys, would be a positive step for tax administration.
As for the content of that position, an ideal solution should attempt
to ameliorate the inequity that can occur as a consequence of using
annual accounting periods. A capitalization approach provides a simple
yet effective way to solve accounting period and characterization
problems by allowing the ultimate income effects to be determined when
the litigation is concluded. It may also solve deduction limitation
problems, to the extent that fees and costs can be viewed as an offset in
determining gross income instead of deductible expenses. Although
capitalization would undoubtedly raise concerns from business
taxpayers, who may otherwise prefer to deduct fees and costs in the year
incurred, offering individuals the option to adopt a capitalization
approach to account for litigation costs would provide an acceptable
solution.
Accounting for attorney's fees and costs under a capitalization
approach would more closely reflect the economic benefits obtained by
successful litigants. It would prevent taxpayers with recoveries of all
kinds-including awards under fee-shifting statutes-from being taxed
on income in excess of the economic benefits they retain as a result of a
recovery, avoiding absurd results that detract from public support of the
tax system. It may also have positive effects on the legal profession, to
the extent that litigants do not perceive their treatment by lawyers and the
tax system as another source of victimization.
445. See, e.g., Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1984) (stating that prior
administrative practice does not prevent Commissioner from changing interpretation of
law, even when taxpayer relies to his detriment).
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The above discussion has focused primarily on successful litigants,
where recovery is obtained to offset the allowable expenses. However,
the plight of the unsuccessful litigant should also be considered. To the
extent that the litigant, not the attorney, is considered to have incurred
litigation costs through advances by his attorney, a capitalization
approach also helps to address the awkward problem of potentially
taxing unsuccessful litigants on discharge of indebtedness income if they
do not recover and then do not repay costs advanced by their attorneys.446
In this context, any potential discharge of indebtedness income to the
client could be offset by the loss incurred on the client's hypothetical
investment in the litigation. This would ensure an appropriate result-
leaving losers to ponder their losses in peace, without imposing tax
consequences on the equivalent of imputed income from the unhappy
experience of losing.
446. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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